Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Vinayapiṭaka

Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā

Introduction to the Text

By wisdom and compassion, all beings;
Were liberated by him who should be trained;
The Buddha, the eye, bowing with my head;
And the Dhamma.

And the Saṅgha, endowed with virtues such as morality,
Taking the essence in all regions;
By my intention, desiring brevity;
And seeing the benefit for the bhikkhus, inspired.

By the one named Samantapāsādikā,
Spoken by the teacher Buddhaghosa;
I will write briefly, in concise terms;
Concise terms will be written.

Name, cause, author, extent, and purpose;
Of the entire Āgama, first;
Should be stated, I wish to state.

Samantapāsādikā is the name. It does not fulfill the needs of bhikkhus in other lands is the cause. Buddhaghosa, by the name taken by the teachers, is the author. By that text, with approximately twenty-seven thousand (verses) is the extent. For the long-lasting benefit of the Dhamma is the purpose.

Here he says: "What was said, 'Should be stated, I wish to state,' what kind of speaker is there?" It is said:

A speaker is one who knows the text and meaning, is steadfast, pure, unselfish;
Who does not abandon the fourfold division, and is eager for the welfare of the listeners. (mahāni. aṭṭha. ganthārambhakathā);

Text (pāṭha). Indeed, it is of various kinds, corresponding to the meaning and not corresponding to the meaning. How? Expressed with a hidden meaning, expressed with a literal meaning, a text with remainder, a text without remainder, the explicit, and the requiring interpretation. There, the sandhāyabhāsito is a statement with multiple meanings, for example, "having killed mother and father," etc. (dha. pa. 294). The byañjanabhāsito is a statement with a single meaning, for example, "Mind precedes all mental states," etc. (dha. pa. 1, 2; netti. 90, 92; peṭako. 14). Sāvaseso is a statement "Everything, O monks, is burning," etc. (mahāva. 54; saṃ. ni. 4.28). The opposite is niravaseso, for example, "All Dhammas in every way come to the face of the knowledge of the Buddha, the Blessed One," etc. (mahāni. 156; paṭi. ma. 3.5). The nīto is to be understood as the words are, for example, "Impermanent, suffering, not-self," etc. The neyyo is to be understood by reasoning, for example, "One person, O monks," etc. (a. ni. 1.170).

The meaning (Attho) is also of various kinds, the meaning of the text, the meaning of the nature, the meaning to be inferred, corresponding to the text, not corresponding to the text, a meaning with remainder, a meaning without remainder, the explicit meaning, the meaning requiring interpretation, and so on. There, that which is uttered for the purpose of making it known, that is the pāṭhattho, as in "with meaning, with expression," etc. (pārā. 1; dī. ni. 1.190). The characteristic, function, etc., of material and immaterial phenomena is the sabhāvattho, as in "develops right view," etc. (vibha. 489; saṃ. ni. 5.3). That which, when understood, leads to welfare, that which is worthy of being known is the ñeyyattho, as in "a speaker of meaning, a speaker of Dhamma," and so on (dī. ni. 1.9, 194; 3.238; ma. ni. 1.411). The pāṭhānurūpo is spoken according to the text, "The eye, O monks, is old kamma" (saṃ. ni. 4.146), therefore, even the eye is kamma, said by the Blessed One. The pāṭhānanurūpo is spoken by one who rejects the meaning by the shadow of the expression. The sāvasesattho is spoken by omitting something to be avoided, leaving the remainder, "Because of the eye and because of forms, there arises..." (saṃ. ni. 4.60; mahāni. 107) and, "All tremble at the rod, all fear death," etc. (dha. pa. 129). The opposite is niravasesattho, "Wandered, transmigrated, by me and by you (dī. ni. 2.155; mahā. 287; netti. 114). There, O monks, what is mantra, what is faith...apart from seeing with one's own eyes," etc. (a. ni. 7.66). The nītattho is to be understood by the sound itself, "Forms, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible objects are delightful," etc. (saṃ. ni. 1.151, 165; mahāva. 33). The neyyattho is to be understood conventionally, "These four persons are like clouds," etc. (a. ni. 4.101; pu. pa. 157). And he said:

"That meaning which is known from the word, the wise know that as the explicit meaning;
The agreement with the meaning itself is called the meaning requiring interpretation."

One who knows the text and meaning (pāṭhatthavidū). Asaṃhīro is one who is not intimidated by the arguments of others due to long dwelling with those of other views. Vattā is one who is able to speak, being accomplished in development, learning, and attainment; meaning, one is capable of explaining by way of brevity and detail, with reasons and examples, and so on. Suci is one who purifies oneself and others; meaning, one is free from the impurities of immorality and wrong views. Indeed, an immoral person harms himself and has words that should not be heeded, like a perpetually ill physician with improper behavior. A person with wrong views harms others, and is inevitably a source of reliance, like a lotus pond disturbed by a venomous snake. One who is ruined in both ways is altogether unworthy of association, like a corpse thrown into dung, or like a black snake in dung. But one who is accomplished in both ways is pure and worthy of association and should be attended to by the wise, like a jewel mine free from danger. Amaccharo is one who is without selfishness, meaning, one who does not withhold the teacher's fist (ācariyamuṭṭhi). One who does not abandon the fourfold division consisting of Sutta, Sutta-following, the teacher's teaching, and one's own opinion, meaning, one who explains only the meaning of that. Or else, one who does not abandon the fourfold division of means of valid cognition consisting of perception, inference, word, and presumption.

"One statement is single, another is divided;
The third should be questioned, the fourth should be established."

Thus, one who does not abandon the fourfold division mentioned above; Hitussuko means one who is eager for the welfare of the listeners, meaning, one who wishes for their understanding; therefore, this is the well-minded one who is dear; being one who does not abandon the fourfold division, is respected; being steadfast, is worthy of cultivation; being a speaker, is an expounder; being eager for welfare, is capable of speaking; being one who knows the text and meaning, is a speaker of profound talks; being unselfish, does not assign to a wrong place.

"Dear, respected, worthy of cultivation, an expounder, and capable of speaking;
A speaker of profound talks, and does not assign to a wrong place." (a. ni. 7.37; netti. 113)

Thus, the speaker has been described.

A teacher of the Dhamma, respected, adorned with virtues such as faith and wisdom;
Not deceitful or crafty is the listener, wise, with a mind toward the Deathless.

There, because of respect for the Dhamma, he does not disparage; because of respect for the teacher, he does not disparage the speaker; because he is adorned with virtues such as faith and wisdom, he does not disparage himself; because he is not deceitful or crafty, and because his mind is toward the Deathless, he has an undistracted mind; because he is wise, he attends properly; this is the meaning. This has been said:

"A listener endowed with these five qualities is capable of entering the right path, of attaining completeness in wholesome qualities. What five? He does not disparage the talk, he does not disparage the speaker, he does not disparage himself, he listens to the Dhamma with an undistracted mind, with a concentrated mind, and he attends properly." (a. ni. 5.151).

Because of attaining that characteristic, development occurs from listening; thus, the listener has been described.

Explanation of the Introduction to the Text

Yo is an indefinite designation; therefore, showing the absence of cause, whether by purity of birth, family, lineage, etc., or by worthiness of worship, whoever, due to the reason of being the world's protector specified in the first verse of this Samantapāsādikā, making it more firm and unshakeable with the cause as stated, fulfilling the cause as stated to the extreme, at the end, accomplishing the result of the cause as stated, achieving the purpose of the result of the cause as stated, he alone is worthy of supreme worship, thus he determines.

By this much –

The removal of fear, delusion, and wrong views is altogether;
This homage is preceded by wisdom, thus it is shown.

There, the causes are the exceedingly difficult meritorious deeds counted as the thirty pāramitās. Indeed, they are done with extreme difficulty, hardship, and with a great effort that is beyond the realm of words to express; therefore, they are called exceedingly difficult. Precisely because they are exceedingly difficult, they ripen into the exceedingly rare, uncommon result in the world, known as protectorhood; that is the cause and the result there; the root of the cause is the great compassion capable of producing the cause as stated, which, from the initial aspiration onward, in the manner of "liberated, I will liberate," etc., flows uninterruptedly up to the purpose of the cause and result. Referring to that, it was said –

"With forests, with mountains, with oceans,
The earth has gone to destruction many times;
At the end of an era, by water, fire, and wind,
How could the great austerity of a Bodhisatta (possibly cease)?"

"Homage to him, the greatly compassionate one," he said. The time of the cause is the time with divisions such as four, eight, sixteen asaṅkhyeyyas, etc., referring to that, he said, "even by hundreds of millions of aeons, time is immeasurable." There, the locative case should be understood in the sense of extreme connection, as in "he studies for a month, he wanders for a day," etc. And though that time is measurable and knowable in terms of asaṅkhyeyyas, nevertheless, referring to its unknowability in terms of hundreds of millions of aeons, he said, "even by hundreds of millions of aeons, time is immeasurable." There, kālo is that which calculates, meaning, that which throws down and destroys the life of beings. Kala means to scatter. There, that which is reckoned, calculated with similes such as mustard seeds and mountains, is only reckoned, not counted by the reckoning of human days, months, years, etc., that is kappa. Being the culmination of the path of counting such as one, etc., is a hundred million; hundreds of millions of kappas are kappakoṭis. That which is not measured even by those is immeasurable, that is appameyya. Doing because of the diversity of meanings of the verbal roots, giving gifts, keeping morality, going out from the accumulation of greed, understanding that Dhamma with the distinction of benefit to oneself and benefit to others, or striving, endeavoring with various efforts, forgiving that offense of beings, making true the conventional truth, the agreement truth, and the ultimate truth, undertaking that benefit of beings, loving the entire world with mettā, abandoning partiality with the distinction of friend and foe, and regarding that being with equanimity; this is the meaning. Having gone to exhaustion means having gone to the great suffering of saṃsāra of endless variety, by way of experiencing, having attained; this is the meaning. Indeed, suffering of saṃsāra, both physical and mental, exhausts and casts down happiness; therefore, it is called "exhaustion (kheda)." For the welfare of the world (lokahitāyā) this is an indication of the purpose of the cause and result as stated, some say "an indication of the cause of experiencing the suffering of saṃsāra" –

"To go to the stilling of the suffering of rebirth;
Though dwelling long in rebirth, only because of compassion."

It is said," that is incorrect. Indeed, the Blessed One does not experience the suffering of saṃsāra for the welfare of the world. Indeed, the experience of suffering by someone does not bring benefit to the world. But this shows the cause which is the variety of the thirty pāramitās, and the result known as protectorhood, which is the fruit of the pāramitās. And as he said, "Indeed, Ānanda, by relying on me as a good friend, beings subject to birth are freed from birth," etc. (saṃ. ni. 1.129; 5.2). There, the Blessed One sows the seeds of the wisdom that produces the capacity for being trained in beings with the causes as stated, and trains beings who have the ripened capacity for being trained perfected by the cause and result, and frees them from the suffering of saṃsāra; this is the meaning. He did not thus do any benefit to the world by the suffering of saṃsāra; therefore, "doing exceedingly difficult deeds for the welfare of the world" is the connection. By this connection, the attainment of the cause and result of the pāramitās known as protectorhood of the Bodhisatta should be understood from the time of the arising of the very first Bodhisatta. Indeed, the connection is implied that "he is a protector." But for this meaning –

"That very first thought that arose for your enlightenment;
You protected that very world, as one worthy of worship."

This statement is proof. The status of the first thought as a pāramitā should be proven by the simile of the arising from the sprout of a tree. Here he says – "the statement 'having gone to exhaustion' is meaningless, because of the impossibility of proving the qualities in the manner as stated?" No, because it indicates the state of not turning back in between. Doing difficult deeds, he indeed goes to exhaustion, he does not turn back without enduring exhaustion in between; this is what it indicates. Or else, it shows the Blessed One's capacity for experiencing suffering himself, being desirous of removing the suffering of the world.

"For whomever there is a choice, until I relieve all beings of suffering;
All, at all times, together, I will awaken, like a lotus."

khedaṃ gato: "Having gone to fatigue" can also mean having become familiar with exertion. Seeing a person busy with work and so on, people say, "He is tired from work, he is tired from beings," and so on. According to this interpretation, "nātho" indicates that he has reached the state of being a protector, having attained Buddhahood, which is the pinnacle of achievement, and shows the time spent in that state. Some write, "Saying 'mahākāruṇikassa' indicates that he has become a Buddha," but that does not seem right, because that term was applicable even during his Bodhisatta period. Therefore, it is demonstrated that after doing difficult deeds for so long, and finally completing the perfection of difficult perfections (dukkarapāramitā), he attained the state of being a protector, which is the fruit of those perfections, and became engaged in the welfare of the world. Even saying "Bodhiṃ gato" clearly shows the cause and the result. Homage is paid to the protector who has attained Buddhahood because of the presence of a specific term, not to a Bodhisatta. Even so, the scope of the Vinaya is intended here. And that extends from the time of ordination until the time of death. While fulfilling a very small portion of that time, a mere ethical conduct (sīlamatta) for one's own benefit, with the intention of removing suffering only for oneself, who would not attain the happiness of transcending this world and the next? Surely, the Teacher praises the quality by alluding to the fact that the Blessed One, acting with the intention of removing the suffering of the entire world, spent an immeasurable amount of time, even for hundreds of millions of aeons, enduring extremely difficult and joyless fatigue.

Lokahitāyā: Here, "loka" means that where suffering is experienced, or it is destroyed by the suffering of birth, aging, and death; thus, it encompasses both the sentient world (sattaloka) and the world of becoming (jātiloka). Therefore, for that sentient world, the benefit in this world and the next, or for the worlds that have transcended the next, or for the worlds where the origin of the world is cut off; and in this world of becoming, the benefit consisting of the pleasant dwelling in this very life in the sense of the sense-sphere (okāsaloka) or the world of beings; combining all this, he simply says "lokahita," meaning benefit for the world, for the worlds, or in the world, making it complete, partial, or residual. Nātho: Because he is capable of teaching the Dhamma in accordance with the different inclinations, tendencies, conducts, and resolutions of all beings, he is a "nātho" because he is asked, "Bhikkhus, I will teach you the Dhamma… listen to it" (Ma. Ni. 3.420). Or, approaching monks with compassion for their present and future welfare by establishing rules of training (sikkhāpada) appropriate to their transgressions, he "burns" (tapati), or approaching the defilements lying dormant in all beings in terms of the Suttanta with compassion and wisdom, he "burns", or examining those conditioned phenomena (saṅkhāra) in terms of impermanence and so on in terms of the Abhidhamma, and abandoning his own defilements by wisdom, cutting them off, he is a "nātho" because he "burns". Because he is unrivaled in the world with its gods, because his teaching is unopposed by anyone, and because he acts with supreme sovereignty, he is a "nātho" in the sense of mastery (issariya). From the statement, "He encouraged, aroused, cheered, and gladdened them with a Dhamma talk" (Mahāva. 90), he should be understood as "nātho" in the sense of bestowing blessings (āsīsaṭṭha), or in the sense of aspiration from the time of his aspiration, in the way of "How shall I, being freed, free others?" the Sammāsambuddho is known as Nātho. All the qualities of the Buddha, such as the four kinds of intrepidity (catuvesārajja), the four kinds of analytical knowledge (catupaṭisambhidā), should be associated with the four aspects of "nātha," but they are not associated due to fear of excessive length.

Namo: In the ultimate sense, it is the bowing of the mind due to the abundance of respect for the qualities of the Buddha, and the bowing of speech and body arising from the bowing of the mind. It is related to the remaining text by the phrase "atthu me" [may there be]. Mahākāruṇikassa: Here, mahākaruṇā, great compassion, is great because it has all beings as its object and because it arises from great effort. There, because he is engaged from the time of his aspiration until his entry into the city of Nibbāna without remainder of clinging (anupādisesanibbāna), he is mahākāruṇiko, the Blessed One. Here, "mahākāruṇikassa" indicates the root cause as stated above. A person without compassion, indifferent to the suffering of others, thinking that even the mere aspiration for Buddhahood is too burdensome, how would he fulfill the extremely difficult cause for an immeasurable time and do the welfare of the world, which is the purpose of the cause and effect known as protectorship? Therefore, because the quality of great compassion is the root of all qualities, he says "namo mahākāruṇikassa," praising the quality of great compassion. Thus, it is shown that the result is in accordance with the cause, the cause is in accordance with the result, the root is in accordance with both, and the purpose is in accordance with all three.

Thus, a wonderful person, a protector established in the qualities of a protector;
Homage to the lone one, the protector of the unprotected, the wealth of those desiring protection.

Here, it may be asked, "Among the many qualities existing in the Blessed One, why is only 'mahākāruṇikassa' taken?" The answer is –

For the Teacher who is devoid of faults, there is no accusation;
But for the Teacher who is endowed with faults, there is accusation, therefore it is unfitting.

I have not made an accusation, but have only asked a question. Moreover –

"Even when the fruit is on a firm tree, it does not fall if it is unshaken;
An accusation against the Teachers is fruitless, but a question has great meaning."

"It does not properly make the sky a cloth, nor is it able to hold a pot;
When an insult is made, it is a bond of ignorance of what is desirable."

"Just as a foot covered in snow is awakened by the touch of fragrance;
So too, the touch of meaning is different from the Teacher's words." –

Thus, one should –

Indeed, even a good accusation is refuted by the teachers;
Protect your disciple more than by a word that is agitated.

The river Saravatī is defiled, if one's own self is conquered by what is desired;
The teacher conquers himself, like a charioteer with a good horse." –

Here it is said –

He who has a thousand words, and a hundred tongues in each word;
Even for an aeon, it is not possible to speak of even a fraction of the qualities of the Ten-Powered One.

Just as –

Even a Buddha might speak of the Buddha's glory,
If he were to speak for another aeon without ceasing;
That aeon would pass away in that long interval,
But the glory of the Tathāgata would not pass away. (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 1.304; 3.141; ma. ni. aṭṭha. 2.425; udā. aṭṭha. 53; cariyā. aṭṭha. nidānakathā) –

Therefore, it is not possible to completely describe the qualities of the Blessed One.

Moreover –

Just as you are the strength of ten for beings, so too are knowledge and compassion;
The pair of qualities is the best, your multitude of qualities is named threefold." –

Because it is the best of all qualities and because it is the root, only one is mentioned. Or, "Because it is one of the six extraordinary knowledges (asādhāraṇañāṇesu), by taking that, the rest are also taken due to the characteristic of association." In particular, here, because the Abhidhamma is exclusively the domain of wisdom, at the beginning of the Abhidhamma commentary, the teacher praised the quality of wisdom, saying, "Whose wisdom is like compassion towards beings, of the great sage," because of the wisdom of discerning according to the different inclinations, tendencies, conducts, and resolutions of those beings, and because of the authority of great compassion towards beings. At the beginning of the Suttanta commentary, both the qualities of wisdom and compassion of the Blessed One are praised, saying, "Whose heart is cooled by compassion, whose darkness of delusion is dispelled by the light of wisdom." Here, however, in the Vinaya, regardless of inclinations, etc., the rule of training (sikkhāpada) was established by compassion alone, even while listening to one who should not be listened to by a natural person, asking one who should not be asked, and speaking of what should not be spoken of; therefore, it should be understood that only the quality of compassion is praised.

Wisdom and compassion are the causes of benefit for oneself and others,
All the qualities of the Conqueror are in accordance with that;
Both qualities are those of the ocean of qualities,
Therefore, they are spoken of here by the excellent Teacher.

Thus far, the verses from the commentary, etc.,
The splendor of the meaning of the words spoken in brief;
This too is a method of expansion, thus I
Will condense it from here onwards for you.

asambudha: not understanding the nature of things as they are. Buddhanisevita: rightly frequented by Buddhas, enlightened ones, and Paccekabuddhas through their respective practices of resort and cultivation. Bhavā bhavaṃ gacchati: "From being to being" means going to, approaching, or undertaking another existence from the current existence. Or, bhava is the eternalist view (sassatadiṭṭhi). Because abhava is opposed to that, it is the annihilationist view (ucchedadiṭṭhi). Or bhava is growth. Abhava is decline. Or bhava is a bad destination. Abhava is a good destination. For the "a" has the meaning of increase, just as in "immeasurable things, things of the noble ones" (dha. sa. tikamātikā 13, 11). Bhavo is that which causes to be, birth (jāti). Or bhavo is that which becomes. The arising of aggregates (khandha) of many kinds with changes is indicated. Abhavo is destruction, it is said that he goes to the state of birth and the state of death. Here, the death of arahants should also be taken in terms of momentariness (khaṇikavasena). Bhavābhavaṃ is the non-existence in existences, it means going to the designation of non-existence in existences. Jīvaloko: "the world of living beings", because the going to existence and non-existence of the world of beings, the world of formations, and the world of space is not possible, he specifies the sentient world as the world of living beings. Avijjādikilesajālaviddhaṃsino: Here, all nine supramundane Dhammas are included. For the diminishing is the elimination of the net of defilements beginning with ignorance, that is the object of the path-moment of the four paths, it exists for him, and also for Nibbāna by becoming its support and going to it as a helper. As he said, "That, friend, is called Nibbāna, the destruction of lust..." Because the term "destruction of lust, etc." also applies to Arahatship. Because of the similarity of the fruit, all three fruits have it, therefore, this ninefold is called "destroyer of the net of defilements beginning with ignorance". Or, because of the characteristic of association as cause, the taking of an object of opposition. For even if a Dhamma is not mentioned, it should be understood to be mentioned there, therefore, by taking the object of the cause, all four fruits are taken. Dhammo: Because it prevents falling into the hells, it sustains by producing in a good destination. Furthermore, because it prevents unwholesome states in a good destination, it nourishes, promotes, and increases, it is called Dhammo. However, because it is threefold due to the distinction of the sense-sphere, form-sphere and formless sphere, and because it is excellent due to bringing absolute happiness, it is dhammavaro, the excellent Dhamma.

Asambudhaṃ: is non-awakening, that is, in terms of meaning, ignorance (avijjā), and by that, craving and clinging are taken, all three of those things are the truth of origin (samudayasacca), and here, bhavābhavaṃ the truth of suffering is stated. For existence and non-existence, which are divisions of good and bad destinations, are, in terms of meaning, the five aggregates of clinging. From the statement, "Thus is the arising of this entire mass of suffering" (mahāva. 1), the arising of suffering is called pavatti, the origin of suffering is called pavattihetu, and because of taking hold of what should be taken hold of, the pair of truths of cessation and path counted as ignorance is called visayo. For it was said, "There, what is ignorance? Ignorance of suffering... ignorance of the practice leading to the cessation of suffering" (vibha. 226).

And here, the truth of cessation (nirodhasacca) is frequented by the Buddha by the practice of resort, and the truth of the path (maggasacca) by the practice of cultivation. Thus far, the meaning of the verse is: homage to the excellent Dhamma, which destroys the threefold net of defilements beginning with ignorance as stated, which are the non-awakening, and the object and cessation which are frequented by the Buddha, which come to be used, and the path. The Dhamma of learning (pariyattidhamma) can also be said to be "destroyer of the net of defilements beginning with ignorance" because it is the supporting condition (upanissayapaccayattā) for the destruction of defilements in the way of the Suttantas, because of its nature of destroying defilements. If this is the case, the meaning of the verse "from lust to dispassion" and the meaning of the Sutta "he teaches the Dhamma... he reveals the holy life" (dī. ni. 1.190; pārā. 1) are completely taken. Or, by this verse, only the Dhamma of learning is taken, referring to which he said, "He teaches the Dhamma, which is beautiful in the beginning... he reveals the holy life" (dī. ni. 1.190; pārā. 1), that too, is not understood by oneself but frequented by the Buddhas alone by the practice of resort. As he said, "Venerable sir, our teachings have the Blessed One as their root, the Blessed One as their guide, the Blessed One as their refuge... bhikkhus will learn the Dhamma after hearing it from the Blessed One" (saṃ. ni. 2.146).

"vimuttiñāṇappabhutīhī" means that which was said. Here, although in the Sutta, vimutti specifically refers to the fruits of the path (phaladhamma), still, because of the statement "having arisen from the path, one reviews the path. One reviews the abandoned defilements. One reviews the fruit. One reviews Nibbāna" (Paṭṭhā. 1.1.410), the knowledge of reviewing the path, etc., should be understood as vimuttiñāṇa. Vimutti, vimokkho, and khaya are, in essence, the same. "Knowledge of cessation, knowledge of non-arising" (Dha. Sa. Dukamātikā 142; Dī. Ni. 3.304) - here, khayo means the path; the cessation of lust, the cessation of hatred, are terms for the fruit and Nibbāna, as has already come in the Sutta. The cessation of abandoned defilements is a natural cessation. The word Pabhuti includes qualities such as the three knowledges (tisso vijjā), the six super-knowledges (cha abhiññā), and the four kinds of analytical knowledge (catasso paṭisambhidā). It is endowed with the meaning of association and the meaning of non-decline. Khettaṃ janānaṃ kusalatthikāna means, "an unsurpassed field of merit for the world," according to the Sutta, because it is the place of growth for what is wholesome, and because of the Sutta method, it is a condition of dependence. The Sangha is indeed a field for merit, but not for people desiring merit. So, if it is asked, is that not fitting? No, because of the possibility of the Sutta's meaning. For in the Sutta it is said, "an unsurpassed field of merit for the world" (Saṃ. Ni. 4.341). For whom is the world? The Sangha is a field for those desiring merit, because the Sangha is a condition of dependence for merit, they are called desirous of merit. Indeed, in the world, it is said, "Devadatta's field," "Yaññadatta's field," because of dependence on rice and barley, "a rice field," "a barley field." Ariyasaṅgha means the Sangha, which is noble and pure due to the absence of defilements, or which has attained the state of the noble ones, or the state of nobility, because of being united in the commonality of virtue and view. Some write, "The word 'Ariya' excludes the conventional Sangha," but that is not right, because it is distinguished by the mention of the qualities of the knowledge of liberation. Sirasā indicates a physical prostration. However, by specifically mentioning the highest part of the body out of reverence for the qualities of the supreme Sangha, he says, "I bow with my head." The head's superiority, however, is because it is the support for the highest sense faculties of sight and hearing, and their superiority should be understood as the cause of unsurpassed seeing and unsurpassed hearing. Here he says – one skilled in synthesis:

"Introduction, the word itself, the meaning of the word, the analysis of the word;
Questioning and answering, the explanation is sixfold in the system." –

buddhayānaṃ generates enthusiasm for those who are following the Buddha Vehicle. The method of honoring the Doctrine, whether it is worldly or transcendental, or specifically the transcendental, paccekabuddhayānaṃ generates enthusiasm for those who are following the Paccekabuddha Vehicle to attain the state of a Paccekabuddha. For they desire only the attainment of the Doctrine. The method of honoring the ultimate Sangha, sāvakayānaṃ generates enthusiasm for those who are following the Disciple Vehicle to attain the state of the ultimate Sangha, or because auspicious things and others are meaningful, without hindrances, long-lasting, and highly esteemed. For the satisfaction of the minds of those with such views, the Blessed One performs the auspicious act praised by the Buddha, "and honoring those worthy of honor." And it is said –

"The Buddha is auspicious, the Doctrine and the Sangha are auspicious;
Auspicious things and others are meaningful, quickly succeeding in every way."

"By the method of honoring the Teacher, many such qualities;
Knowing that one obtains them, one should be devoted to honoring the Teacher."

Here, because the Teacher is primary, the method of honoring the Doctrine and the Sangha should be seen as just the method of honoring the Teacher, both from the perspective of the Dispensation and the world. Therefore, this is said –

"The Teacher is the Doctrine spoken by the Well-gone One;
At the time of Nibbāna, he is the Teacher who controls;
In the verses of well-being, 'the Tathāgata';
And the Sangha is said to be the Teacher who controls."

Moreover, even more –

"Because the Teacher is the Doctrine-body, the Doctrine is therefore considered the Teacher;
That Sangha is established in the Doctrine, and attains the designation of Teacher."

For in the world, there are speakers who, without separately touching a man standing holding a sword sheathed in its scabbard, say, "This one is standing holding a sword." Therefore, the teacher alone said –

"Homage to the Jewel of the Buddha, homage to the Jewel of the Doctrine;
Homage to the Jewel of the Sangha, the one who brings together the Three Jewels."

Moreover, in all phenomena, taking up the aggregate continuum that is denoted by the manifestation of unimpeded knowledge and the unsurpassed liberation, if "Buddha" is designated, the Doctrine is worthy of reverence, so what need be said, and the Sangha, because it was said "Give to the Sangha, Gotami, for when you give to the Sangha, both I and the Sangha will be honored," indicates it is a vessel. Or, "The Doctrine well-awakened by the Buddha, like oil poured into a golden vessel through a lineage of teachers, has been brought without decline up to today, and has reached even the ear-door of those like me," so the teacher makes obeisance to the Sangha with exceeding respect, "I bow with my head."

"iccevamaccantanamassaneyya" and so forth, in the fourth verse. Icceva here, the word iti means the conclusion of the method of honoring the Triple Gem. If it is thus, that the Triple Gem deserves only the method of honoring to the extent that it is befitting, and not beyond that, lest it incurs an undesired consequence, he says, "evamaccantanamassaneyya." There, evaṃ indicates the method as described. By the method as described, or by another such, being constantly and continuously and regularly worthy of reverence, it is the cause of great benefit and happiness for the one who reveres. Of such a kind, by means of rarity and by means of great fruit, having attained the state of a jewel, the Triple Gem, by revering, whatever flow of merit I have obtained. What purifies by abandoning defilements, etc., is merit. What cools by pacifying the agitation of defilements flows into the mind, that is, abhisanda. Both the merit and that abhisanda is puññābhisando, that puññābhisandaṃ. In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, they say "greatness of merit," the teacher says that meaning is not fitting because of the word "extensive." Or else, the flow of merits is puññābhisando, that puññābhisandaṃ. The root is sanda, meaning to flow. Therefore, the meaning of "stream of merit," "outpouring of merit" is fitting, but that is extensive, not limited, is shown by the word vipula.

yasmiṃ in which Vinaya Piṭaka, which is recited and meaningful, complete, and ṭhite established in those with shame by means of being practiced, the entire threefold sāsanaṃ Dispensation is patiṭṭhitaṃ established in those same people. Whose Dispensation? Of the Aṭṭhitassa non-clinging Blessed One. The Blessed One is called non-clinging because of the absence of the annihilationist view, which is the cause of clinging. For one with the annihilationist view, indifferent to the next world, engaging only in indulgence in sensual pleasures, stands, not striving to do merits for the benefit of the next world; one with the eternalist view strives to do them. The Blessed One, however, not standing thus, not striving, following the middle way, himself crossed the flood, and caused others to cross. As he said, "Not clinging, indeed, friends, not striving, I crossed the flood" (Saṃ. Ni. 1.1). Or, by way of the four sublime abodes, by means of being well and rightly established in beings, by way of meaning, susaṇṭhitassa well-established. Because he is well-established, desiring only to remove the suffering of beings, desiring to bring about their welfare, delighted by their prosperity, and without partiality, he teaches the Vinaya. Therefore, in this context of commenting on the Vinaya, praising with suitable praise, he says, "susaṇṭhitassā." In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, based on the Sutta "when a pleasant result of action arises" (Dī. Ni. Aṭṭha. 2.35; Ma. Ni. Aṭṭha. 2.386) and the Sutta "well-formed is beautiful" (Khu. Pā. 8.11), the meaning of "susaṇṭhitassa" has been said, but that is not in accordance with the intended context. Amissa what is the Vinaya unmixed, or is it the power of the ancient teachers? Neither. For the Vinaya commentary is indeed unmixed. Therefore, by way of the neuter gender of the verbal noun, it is related to the phrase "they will comment on that which is unmixed." Pubbācariyānubhāva the commentary is called the power of the ancient teachers, "since they made the commentary in the past," because of that statement. For seeing something unprecedented, there are indeed speakers in the world who say, "Whose power is this?" Or, having followed the intention of the Blessed One, he develops and clarifies the meaning in each and every reading, the development and clarification of that meaning is called power, that is, the commentary.

"kāmañcā" and so forth was said. By those skilled in commenting on the Good Doctrine, or by that commentary, saddhammasaṃvaṇṇanakovidehi skilled in commenting on the Good Doctrine.

Sallekhiye the one who thins or makes lean the accumulation of defilements is sallekho, the state of sallekho is sallekhiyaṃ, in that sallekhiya. Nosulabhūpamehī not with easy comparisons. Mahāvihārassā of the lineage of the Mahāvihāra. Those for whom the banner is a comparison because of being exceedingly high in wisdom, dhajūpamehi by those banner-like ones. Those who have followed in accordance with the excellent Buddha, sambuddhavaranvayehi, the intention is those who follow the intention of the Buddha. Here, the word vara (excellent) includes even the Paccekabuddhas, because of the saying "having awakened to the truths himself, he is a Buddha." Therefore, in order to exclude them, it was said.

"saṃvaṇṇanā" and so forth, he says. Na kiñci atthaṃ abhisambhuṇātī means it does not accomplish any purpose, fruit, or benefit, just as in "that does not accrue to that bhikkhu for any purpose" (Pārā. 538) and so forth. Ajjhesanaṃ buddhasirivhayassā by this, since the Doctrine was taught by the Blessed One at the request of Sahampati Brahma, and the Vinaya was established relying on the request of Sāriputta, therefore, this teacher too, honoring that teacherly duty, shows that he made this commentary relying on the request of Buddhasiritthera. Samanussaranto indicates his absence and also his respect.

The ādi word includes also the Cūḷapaccarī, Andhaka, Ariya commentary, Pannavāra, and so forth. There, paccarī in the Sinhala language is said to be a raft (uḷumpaṃ), since it was made sitting on that, it took that name. There is a monastery named Kurundīvalli, since it was made there, it became known as kurundī.

Samma samārabhissa having prepared the performance of what should be done, I stand, therefore, taṃ me nisāmentū in that verse, that commentary to me, or it is the remainder of the reading "being spoken by me." Nisāmentu may they see or hear with the eye of wisdom, or by honoring it, by venerating sakkaccaṃ dhammaṃ the Doctrine with the formation of faith, energy, joy, and gladness. Whose Doctrine? Dhammappadīpassa tathāgatassa What does it show? For the Doctrine is in the position of a lamp because of illuminating what is beneficial and unbeneficial, the one who upholds the Doctrine, the Tathāgata, is in the position of a lamp-holder, therefore, even when that Tathāgata has passed away, showing that they should listen, honoring the Doctrine with respect, without sorrow there. Or else, "Tathāgatas are the Doctrine-body" (Dī. Ni. 3.118), therefore, both the Doctrine and that lamp is dhammappadīpo, the Blessed One.

ñāto understood, by whom tesaṃ of those sons of the Buddha, matiṃ intention accajantā taking up completely. Pure in the past, or ancient elders. Aṭṭhakathā commentaries, the plural of use.

Whatever collection of meanings is stated in the commentaries, all of that, having avoided just the errors of careless scribes. Is all of it a standard? No, but for those who are respectful in the trainings, learned in the Vinaya here, in the Great Commentary, even what is true and untrue is said to be a wrong doing (dukaṭa), that should be known as a careless error. Having avoided the careless errors, it will be a standard, is the connection.

Tato cāti, from that: According to the commentaries, tantikkamaṃ (sequence according to the treatises) means pāḷikkamaṃ (sequence according to the Pali canon). Suttantā means parts of the Sutta. Anta is seen here in the sense of inner part, possibility, etc. Suttantikā means those who are in the Suttantas; suttantikānaṃ means the words that come in the Suttanta texts. Or, anta means that which is measured, i.e., the meaning. By what is it measured? By the sutta. Suttassa anto, suttanto means the meaning of the sutta. What is that? That is the specific meaning, suttantikāni means the words fixed in that Suttanta. Suttantikānaṃ means the meaning of those words. Paridīpayantī means illuminating in accordance with that particular Agama Sutta, Abhidhamma, and Vinaya Sutta. This, in brief, is the elucidation of the meaning here: The meaning of the suttantika words such as "Iti pi so bhagavā" (Thus indeed, the Blessed One...) (Saṃ. Ni. 2.41; 5.479; A. Ni. 6.10; Pārā. 1) is in accordance with the Agama Suttanta. The meaning of the Abhidhamma suttantika words such as "Vivādādhikaraṇaṃ siyā kusalaṃ siyā akusalaṃ siyā abyākataṃ" (A dispute could be skillful, unskillful, or indeterminate) (Cūḷava. 220) is in accordance with the Abhidhamma Suttanta. Hessatīti means will be, the intention is that it will be done. Vaṇṇanāpīti, in this, the word api has the meaning of combination; it should be connected with the word tasmā (therefore). How? Because it is authoritative for the wise, because it is a summary of the extensive path, because the judgment is complete, because it does not deviate from the tantikkama, and because it illuminates the suttantika words in accordance with the Suttanta commentary; therefore, it should be carefully learned. Here, even though it is established by the statement "tantikkamaṃ avokkamitvā" (without deviating from the sequence of the treatises), it seems that "suttantikāna" is stated to show that "the Aṭṭhakathācariyas went away in Verañjakaṇḍa and other places, saying 'the burden is on the Suttantikas,' but we will go after saying it."

The description of the introductory story of the book is finished.

Description of the External Introductory Story

Dhāritaṃ yena cābhataṃ. Yatthappatiṭṭhitañcetaṃ (That by which it was upheld, brought, and established) this statement is said referring to the entire Vinaya Piṭaka. Attapaccakkhavacanaṃ na hotīti means it is not said by directly citing the Buddha, this is the intention. Indeed, there is nothing that is not directly known to the Buddha regarding the past, etc. If it is not a statement directly known, shouldn't it produce a padasodhammāpatti (an offense related to reciting the Dhamma incorrectly)? No, because even a statement spoken by a disciple can produce a padasodhammāpatti. If there is no rule, wouldn't there be an overextension? No, because in the Padasodhamma Sikkhāpada commentary, it is specified as "saṅgītittayaṃ āruḷho" (ascended to the three recitations). Similarly, in the commentary, because it has ascended to the saṅgīti, the statement "khandhānañca paṭipāṭi…pe… saṃsāroti pavuccatī" (the sequence of the aggregates... is called saṃsāra) (Dha. Sa. Aṭṭha. Nidānakathā; Vibha. Aṭṭha. 226 Saṅkhārapadaniddesa) and whatever follows the order that has ascended to the saṅgīti, that produces a padasodhammāpatti, according to Venerable Upatissa.

Description of the First Great Recitation

Paṭhamamahāsaṅgīti nāma cāti, here, the word ca has the meaning of excess, thereby indicating that there is something else as well. It seems that the fact that he went to that Sal grove, bid farewell to his friends and companions, and returned became known as upavattana. Yamakasālānanti, it seems one row of Sal trees was at the head end, and one at the foot end. There too, one young Sal tree was near the head end, and one near the foot end; it is said that the Sal trees stood intertwined with each other by root-trunk-branches-leaves. Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyāti, the instrumental case with the characteristic of being in that state, like in "katakicco pītija hāsa ceto averamukhenābhatakuṇḍalenā" (one who has done his duty, joyful, laughing, with a mind free from enmity, wearing earrings). Parinibbāne means in the parinibbāna, or the cause for the parinibbāna; in that place, do not grieve with your mind, do not lament with your speech, because "paridevanaṃ vilāpa" means lamentation. Mahāsamaṇenāti, the instrumental case in the sense of being without effort. Just like in "sūriyaṃ'sūbhi paṭukarā'bhā'riṇassa tāṇā." And the teachers say that it is the anuggaha (favor) of the Blessed One, tassa anuggahassa (of that favor). However, some say "yaṃ yasmā ahaṃ anuggahito" (from that by which I was favored). Nibbasanānīti means the actions of abandoning what is finished, what has been removed after being used by me. If he asks whether they are well-suited to be worn, sāṇāni (hempen cloths) like armor. Nava anupubbavihārādayo (the nine successive abodes, etc.) are like lordship. The eight attainments and the cessation attainment are called "anupubbavihārā" in the order of attainment.

In the future near, and in the past long ago;
The word purā is used by poets in both times.

tipiṭakasabbapariyattippabhedadharā (bearers of all the divisions of the entire teaching of the Tipitaka). It should not be said, "Vinā na sakkā" (it is not possible without), because it is said "tipiṭakasabbapariyattippabhedadhare" (bearers of all the divisions of the entire teaching of the Tipitaka); even so, there is a distinction: they have heard it face-to-face and not face-to-face, but there is nothing that the Thera accepted not face-to-face. Na vāyanti, here, vāti means optionally; either he knew it or he didn't know it, this is the meaning. Tatra means in selection. Bahu has the meaning of vast, just like in "anantapāraṃ bahu veditabbaṃ" (the endless shore is much to be known). If it doesn't fit to say "bahu cānena…pe… pariyatto" (and much was learned by him) because it was said earlier "tipiṭakasabbapaayattippabhedadhare" (bearers of all the divisions of the entire teaching of the Tipitaka)? No, because the Tipitaka is endless; therefore, the intention is that he learned much regarding us. Otherwise, Ānanda Thera would be considered to have heard little from them, and there would be a contradiction with the statement "there is nothing that was accepted not face-to-face." Aḍḍhamāso atikkantoti (half a month passed), here, one day was lost, that day is the first day of the lunar fortnight, that day is called the day of commotion, therefore it is not included here. Sādhukīḷanaṃnāma (called playing well) because of rejoicing after relating the saṃvegavatthu (things that cause agitation). Svepīti, api-saddo apekkhāmantānuññāya (the word api implies allowance along with anticipation). If the Subha Sutta is not included in the eighty-four thousand aggregates of the Dhamma because it is said "aciraparinibbute bhagavati" (soon after the Blessed One's parinibbāna) (Dī. Ni. 1.444)? No, because it was obtained in the Buddha's time, like the Kathāvatthu. Chaḍḍitā patitā uklāpā means chaḍḍitapatitauklāpā (thrown away, fallen, debris). Āṇā eva appaṭihataṭṭhena cakkanti means āṇācakkaṃ (the wheel of command) because the command itself is a wheel in the sense of being unimpeded. Ekanipātanaṃ means falling in one place. Ākāsena āgantvā nisīdīti eke (some say, coming through the sky, he sat down), Venerable Upatissa says this is referring to the second time he went. Or, first having gone through the sky, having reached the assembly, not disturbing the line of monks, he submerged into the earth and showed himself on the seat. And he went into sight in both ways, therefore both fit; otherwise, one of the two would become untrue.

Atha kho āyasmā mahākassapo āyasmantaṃ upāliṃ pucchi…pe… āyasmā upālitthero vissajjesīti (Then Venerable Mahākassapa asked Venerable Upāli...Venerable Upāli Thera answered), this question and answer previously stated with "paṭhamaṃ āvuso upālī" (first, friend Upāli) etc. (Cūḷava. 439) is a statement shown by the compilers, so it is written in gaṇṭhipade. If so, why here, instead of stating in the order previously shown as "nidānampi pucchi, puggalampi pucchi, vatthumpi pucchī" (he asked about the introduction, the person, and the subject matter), why is the order made as "vatthumpi pucchi, nidānampi pucchi, puggalampi pucchī" (he asked about the subject matter, the introduction, and the person)? Some say, "because the enactment of the training rules has the subject matter as its root, it is stated in reverse order." Here, however, a deliberation will be done when Verañjakaṇḍa is reached. Rājāgāraketi (in Rājagāraka), in a park with that name. It seems that Rājagāraka was a delightful place. There, it gets this name because of something. Then, the vasīgaṇo (group with mastery) shows by summarizing what was previously said with "āyasmā mahākassapo" (Venerable Mahākassapa), etc. If so, why wasn't the order of answering of Ānanda Thera shown as the order of questioning was shown in "nidānampi pucchi, puggalampi pucchī" (he asked about the introduction, the person)? To show that the five Nikāyas are not ascended to by this order. How then are they ascended? Venerable Mahākassapa asked in the order of the five Nikāyas, but Ānanda Thera, even though asked in order, inserted into each sutta the nature of that sutta, the subject matter arising in between, the order of recitation and explanation, the order of the outline and analysis, and all the appropriate words, and then answered; therefore, he said, "eteneva upāyena pañcapi nikāye pucchī" (in this way, he asked about all five Nikāyas). Or, he indicates this meaning even with the reverse order of saying "rājāgārake ambalaṭṭhikāya" (in Rājagāraka at Ambalaṭṭhikā) when it should have been said "ambalaṭṭhikāyaṃ rājāgārake" (at Ambalaṭṭhikā in Rājagāraka). For it was said, "Ambalaṭṭhikāyaṃ viharati rājāgārake" (he dwelt at Ambalaṭṭhikā in Rājagāraka).

Gahakārakanti, the meaning is, searching for the maker of this house of self, the craving-carpenter, with what knowledge is it possible to see him, for the sake of that, having made the initial effort at the foot of Dīpaṅkara, wandering for so long in the cycle of rebirths, not finding that knowledge. Dukkhā jāti punappunanti, this is the statement of reason for searching for the house-maker. Sabbā te phāsukāti, all your remaining phāsukā (ribs/implements) of defilements are broken by me. Gahakūṭaṃnāma (the roof of the house) means ignorance. Somanassamayaṃ (made of joy) means knowledge accompanied by joy. Indeed, knowledge made of joy is not due to a division of the nature of the aggregates. Daḷhīkammasithilakaraṇappayojanāti (the purpose of strengthening and loosening actions) is said predominantly, but we will reveal it there and there. Aññamaññasaṅkaravirahite dhamme ca vinaye cāti, here, in the Dhamma that is free from intermingling, such as "pāṇātipāto akusalanti evamādīsu" (killing is unskillful), the cetanā (intention) that arises from the effort to cut off the life force with the intention to kill is unskillful, not the cutting off of the life force itself. Similarly, the viññatti (gesture) signifying the taking of what is not given, which belongs to another, is an indeterminate state, the theyyacetanā (intention to steal) that arises from that gesture is an unskillful state; in this way, he is capable of guiding in the Dhamma that is free from intermingling (Paṭṭhā. 1.1.27). In the Vinaya that is free from intermingling, when one takes gold and silver belonging to another with the intention of stealing, one incurs one of the offenses: pārājika, thullaccaya, or dukkaṭa, according to the case; when taking what is being given by the head storekeeper, one incurs a pācittiya; when taking for one's own sake, one incurs a nissaggiya pācittiya; when taking merely out of greed, one incurs an anāmāsadukkaṭa; there is no offense for one who is approved to discard rūpiya (silver), in this way he is capable of guiding in the Vinaya that is free from intermingling, this is the meaning. Bhāvetīti means develops; with this, he shows the growth of the mind in terms of result and in terms of speed. "Avisiṭṭha"nti pāṭho, means common.

In this context, based on what is taught, the teaching is the three Piṭakas;
Based on what should be trained, it is also called the training.

And based on the meaning to be spoken,
The teaching, the training, and the talk, thus reveal the difference.

"As it was said, "...regarding the teachings of the Dhamma". Duccaritasaṃkilesaṃ, in terms of meaning, is volition (cetanā), or the arising of a mind that proceeds in that manner. Because it proceeds having penetrated the characteristics of impermanence, etc., the insight knowledges (vipassanā cittāni) are worldly in terms of object; the realization (abhisamayo) is unconfused (asammohato) and supramundane, or the supramundane realization itself is unconfused in terms of object, which is the state called Nibbāna, while for the rest, such as the path, it is unconfused. Here, "penetration" (paṭivedho) is said to be knowledge (ñāṇa). If asked how it is profound (gambhīra), it is like when measuring deep water, it must be done with a long measuring tool. Thus, some say that "now" is said to show that it is not easily obtainable. For the sake of which, for the sake of the fruition of the path. And they do not experience that purpose, they do not attain any purpose intended by themselves, and freedom from sectarian views. Why? Because the purpose is grasped without proper investigation. Penetrated and unshakeable because of the attainment of the fruition. Again, by including the Khīṇāsava, it shows only the Arahant, not the trainee (sekha). Just as a treasurer guards the king's crown and necklace and presents them at the desired moment, so he taught the Dhamma for the sake of the path and fruition for beings with causes. Because they are mentioned distinctly in the Vinaya Piṭaka, the teachers say that one attains those very things by striving. Why are the three knowledges (vijjā) distinguished there? Because of their highest supporting condition (upanissaya) in the accomplishment of virtue (sīlasampatti). "A bhikkhu who possesses seven other qualities is a Vinaya-holder. He knows an offense (āpatti), he knows a non-offense, he knows a light offense, he knows a serious offense, he recalls many past lives... he sees beings with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses human vision... and through the destruction of the āsavas... he dwells having attained..." (pari. 327). This sutta is evidence for this. Having learned the Vinaya and relying on the accomplishment of virtue, he obtains the divine eye and the recollection of past lives together with the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas. Some say that "those same" are mentioned to show that there is no separate preliminary practice (parikammakicca) for these. In the Abhidhamma, however, the three knowledges, the six superknowledges (abhiññā), the four analytical knowledges (paṭisambhidā), and other special qualities such as the Right Efforts (sammappadhānā), are distinguished. Although distinguished, the shift of determination (avadhāraṇavipallāso) "tāsaṃ tatthevā" (they are only there) is made to show that the four analytical knowledges are attained especially because of being of the nature of wisdom (paññājātikattā). "With the Dhamma wrongly grasped by oneself" is the remainder of the reading. This is the instrumental case in the agent, and also in the sense of cause, the meaning is "because of what is wrongly grasped by oneself." Why indeed expresses the meaning of what was said as "anulomiko" (agreeable).

The Way of Explaining the First Great Council.

Explanation of the Second Council

Pannabhārā means those whose burden of aggregates (khandha) has fallen. For it was said, "The five aggregates are truly a burden" (saṃ. ni. 3.22). They were speakers saying, "We will be face to face, we will not be." Among them, the younger ones were supposedly Jammi, meaning low, inferior.

The Way of Explaining the Second Council.

Explanation of the Third Council

Having fallen from the Brahma-world here means that only the four paths, the five immediate offenses (pañcānantariyāni), and fixed wrong views (niyatamicchādiṭṭhī) are fixed, not the exalted states (mahaggatā), therefore, there is also rebirth in lower realms by way of aspiration (paṇidhivasena). Aticchatha means "go beyond" (aticca) desire (icchatha), the meaning is "go and seek alms." Keṭubhaṃ is a treatise (satthaṃ) composed with the method of writing poetry. Some say it means kiriyākappaṃ, a treatise endowed with characteristics such as agent, etc. Asandhimittā is her name. It seems that joints are not evident in her body, her body is like one made with beeswax. Therefore, they also say, "She was born with such a name." In Magadha, four patthas are an āḷhaka with the Magadhan measure (patthena), four āḷhakas are a doṇa, four doṇas are a mānikā, four mānikās are a khārikā, or twenty khārikas are a vāha. Kethumālā they say, is "a mass of light standing up having risen from the head." This matter (vatthu) is spoken in connection with the topic of royal power (rājiddhiadhikārappasaṅgena), not in sequence (anukkamena). But explaining the matter of the usage of the Buddha's dispensation in sequence, he said "It seems the king..." etc. Dantaṃ by subduing defilements. Guttaṃ by body and speech. There is also the reading "Pācīnamukho." Because he was formerly the elder brother, he shows the gesture for taking the bowl with that very familiarity. Abhāsī he thought, "I will speak." Others say, "Even when told 'unknown,' he spoke everything." Amataṃ is a descriptive word with qualities for cessation (nivattiyā) called Nibbāna, appamādo padaṃ is the path to it. Maccū is a descriptive word with faults for continuity, negligence (pamādo) is the path to it, thus the four truths are shown. Because he had gone for refuge to the Sangha, the going forth (pabbajjā) was dependent on the Sangha, or because the Bhāṇḍukamma was dependent on it at that time. Because of the topic of praising the power of Nigrodha Thera, he combined what was said before and what will be said later and said, "Again, the king, having built a great monastery named Asokārāma, sixty thousand... built eighty-four thousand monasteries." Because of the saying, "Or the belongings reviewed are for a common person’s well-being," only trainees are truly heirs in the ultimate sense. Nevertheless, the Thera, for the purpose of the ordination of Prince Mahinda, said in one way, with a worldly custom established, "Whatever, O Great King... an own son." For it was said in the Veda:

"You are born from the limbs, you are born from the heart;
The self is indeed called the son, may he live for a hundred years."

Dīpakatittiro is a false titthira. But even though this one was engaged in false titthira work, he was pure in mind, therefore he asked the ascetic. Sāṇipākāra by the rampart of cloth. Vibhajjavādī because he speaks dividing, as in "Is there, brahmin, a way..." etc. (pārā. 5). Moreover, the Blessed One is a sassatavādī (eternalist) because of the statement, "There is, bhikkhus, the unborn, the unbecome, the unmade" etc. (itivu. 43). And ekaccasassatiko (partial eternalist) because of the statement "conditions (sappaccayā) are Dhammas, non-conditions (appaccayā) are Dhammas" (dha. sa. dukamātikā 7). And antānantiko (finitist-infinitist) –

"The end of the world can never be reached by going;
And without reaching the end of the world, there is no escape from suffering." (saṃ. ni. 1.107; a. ni. 4.45);

The Blessed One also adheres to the Amarāvikkhepikapakkhampi (eel-wriggler) side a little because of the statement of undeclared matters such as "The world is eternal, this is undeclared; the world is not eternal, this is undeclared" etc., and because of the statement of conventional truth. For that should not be said in terms of internal, external, etc. As he said, "The realm of nothingness should not be spoken of as having an internal object" etc. (dha. sa. 1437). Similarly, he also adheres to the adhiccasamuppannikapakkhampi (spontaneist) side because of the statement "having obtained effortlessly (mudhā), enjoying the attainment of peace" (khu. pā. 6.7; su. ni. 230). There, mudhā is indeed a term for adhiccasamuppanna. And the Blessed One is saññīvādādiko (percipientist) in terms of having perception, not having perception, neither having nor not having perception. He is also an ucchedavādī (annihilationist) because of the statement "For I, brahmin, declare the annihilation of lust" (pārā. 6). He is also a Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādī (one who advocates Nibbāna in this very life) because of the statement "Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived" (mahāva. 23; dī. ni. 2.215; saṃ. ni. 3.35), because of the statement "Now there is no more rebirth" (mahāva. 16), and because of the showing of the attainment of cessation in this very life. Thus, the Blessed One is a vibhajjavādī because he speaks dividing (vibhajitvā), according to the inclinations of those to be trained, in that way by that means.

The Way of Explaining the Third Council.

Pupphanāmo is Sumana Thera. Some say Mahāpaduma Thera. Mahiṃsakamaṇḍalaṃ they call Andharaṭṭha. Dhammacakkhu means the three paths. Some say the Stream-entry path. The five countries are called the five China countries. In Rājagaha in the monastery built by the queen. In Silakūṭamhī on the mountain peak. Vaḍḍhamāna is decorative powder. It seems it is greatly accepted in the noble land. The Tamils say "ekarasena nāthakaraṇā". Sārapāmaṅga is the best pāmaṅga. By stirring up with Petavatthu etc., and for the sake of realization, the Truth-Connected (saccasaṃyutta). Meghavanuyyānaṃ is the site of the Mahāvihāra. There is the reading "In sixty-two caves." Dasabhātika are ten, such as Abhaya Kumāra, they are not mentioned here. Having spent the rains and invited means by the invitation of the four-month period (cātumāsiniyā pavāraṇāyāti). Or having invited by the first invitation, having lived there for a month, he spoke on the full moon day of Kattika, otherwise it is not possible to take it because of the statement "Mahāvīra on the full moon day." Mahāvīra speaks of the relics with the mode of expression for the Buddha. Jaṅghappamāṇa they say, is "the height of the plinth of the stupa." Mātulabhāgineyyā are Cūḷodara and Mahodara. Like the Buddha's ray spreading, he sent the king's written message, and thus he spoke the oral message. A doṇa measure is supposedly twelve nāḷi measures of the Magadhan nāḷi. There is the reading "having been cut in a designated place." Having turned back five rays from all directions because five came out from the five fruits, but they are only six-colored. Kattikajuṇhapakkhassa pāṭipadadivase means on the first day of the waxing fortnight. The hosts of nāgas, yakkhas, and deities standing surrounding the Mahābodhi site. Gopakā are royal attendants, those with such duties. Some say it is the names of their families. Those carrying water etc. are kāliṅgas. Some say that a family accomplished in birth in the Kāliṅga countries is the Kāliṅga family.

Paṭhamapāṭipadadivase means on the first day of the second uposatha. Because the ocean was seen by those standing there, that place is Samuddasālavatthu. Sixteen families accomplished in birth eight families of brahmin ministers. Mahāariṭṭha Thera was ordained on Cetiyagiri. In the residence of the minister he says in terms of the present time. Mahinda Thera, having become twelve years old, arrived at Tambapaṇṇidīpa, having lived there for two years, he established the Vinaya, and having become sixty-two years old, he passed away. Vinayo saṃvaratthāyā is the Vinaya Piṭaka, or the learning of it. Yathābhūtañāṇadassanaṃ is the grasping of name and form with conditions. In the absence of reflection on the path etc., there is no passing away in between, or death of a trainee, it only occurs with it. Therefore, he said "Vimuttiñāṇadassana". Anupādāparinibbānatthāyā means for the sake of passing away without clinging to any dhamma, without grasping, without leaving even a little bit un-destroyed. Upanisā is the series of causes beginning with "Vinayo saṃvaratthāyā." Having shown the accomplishment of one's own welfare with just this much, now to show the accomplishment of the welfare of others, he said "etadatthaṃ sotāvadhāna". Its meaning is: the directing of the ear (sotassa odahanaṃ) to learn the Vinaya-recitation and Vinaya-discussion of oneself, is sotāvadhānaṃ. Therefore, the series of causes as stated above is already established for those with learned Vinaya-recitation and discussion, thus it should be known that it is not shown again. Otherwise, since anupādāparinibbāna is included by this statement itself, "etadatthaṃ upanisāti", and since sotāvadhāna is not possible after anupādāparinibbāna, the "etadatthaṃ sotāvadhānaṃ" at the end would be meaningless, and it would not be meaningless because it is to show the root cause of the accomplishment of the welfare of others, so it should be known.

Thus, whatever, whatever might be possible as a word here;
That, that, everything, should be applied by the wise one.

The Explanation of the External Nidāna Story is Finished.

Explanation of the Pārājika

The Verañja Chapter

Explanation of the Verañja Chapter

"tena samayenā" etc. has been started.

Now, I will explain the purpose in the section on origins: Because the Vinaya is an order, it serves the threefold purpose of illuminating the Blessed One’s worthiness to give orders, revealing that the Vinaya, being an order, has no other domain, and manifesting the great power of the disciples who abide by the order. How so? The Blessed One is worthy of giving orders because he has abandoned defilements, attained special qualities, is the foremost and best in the world, and has attained such a state. The attainment of such a state by the Blessed One should be understood by his being unshaken by the eight grounds for abuse, namely, being base, ill-formed, etc. His having abandoned defilements should be understood from the passage explaining the ways in which those eight grounds for abuse could occur in oneself. His attainment of special qualities should be understood by explaining the attainment of the four jhānas and the three knowledges. His being the foremost and best should be understood from the words, "I do not see any brahmin...even his head might fall off," and "the foremost, the best in the world." And this is the purpose of showing the Blessed One’s worthiness to give orders. The statement, "Come, Sāriputta, come, Sāriputta, the Tathāgata will know the right time there," reveals that it has no other domain. The three lion’s roars of the Elder—"If I wished, venerable sir, I could turn the earth over," "If I wished, venerable sir, I could create a hand," and "If it were agreeable to you, venerable sir, the entire Sangha of monks would go to the Northern Kuru for alms"—reveal the great power of the disciples who abide by the order. If it is asked, why did the Blessed One reside only at Verañjā at that time, instead of dwelling in Sāvatthī and other places? It was to generate joy in the Naḷeru Yaksha, to prevent the Sangha of monks from becoming weary due to having little alms, to generate faith in the brahmin of Verañjā, because it was the place for demonstrating the power of Mahāmoggallāna Thera, and because it was the place for the Elder Sāriputta's reflection that led to his request for the Vinaya rule. Among these, the last is the strongest reason. Therefore, it is said in the commentary, "At that time, that is, at the time when the venerable...at that time." Among the first four unsupportable reasons, the Blessed One generates respect in the monks by protecting the minds of non-humans through the cultivation of loving-kindness, etc., with the first. With the second, he shows that the assembly should be gathered by a monk who frequents assemblies in this way, and that one should be content and unostentatious. With the third, he shows that one should favor families without being dependent on material requisites. With the fourth, he shows that even with such great power, one should not be greedy for material requisites, but should live solely on what others give. "From the reading 'Tena' etc....description of the meaning of the Vinaya" indicates that one reading is "tena" etc., and another is the Vinaya, which involves an offense.

"From the reading 'Tena' etc., what other Vinaya is here?
Explaining its meaning, he makes a description of the Vinaya." –

It is said, "At that time...there was a village named Kalanda," simply because it was well-known. Aniyamaniddesavacana: although this is a specification by rule (niyamaniddesa vacana) in the manner described, because it specifies that, still, because it is unknown to the monks at the present time, it is called "aniyamaniddesavacana". However, what was said, "This is the reasoning in all the Vinaya," should be understood as having been said with that being predominant.

‘‘aparabhāge atthato siddhenā’’tiādi. Samayañcā: taking into account the concurrence of conditions for coming and the time appropriate to it. The meaning is that he intended to know after obtaining the concurrence of conditions and the time for coming.

‘‘ekova kho, bhikkhave, khaṇo ca samayo cā’’ti āha. He said, "Indeed, monks, the moment and the time are one." It is fitting that the meaning of moment and time is the same, the moment is the attainment of opportunity, the ninth moment free from the eight un-opportune times. Samayappavādako: here, they declare about time which is considered as views such as annihilationism. Tindukācīraṃ: because it is surrounded by a row of timbaru trees called tindukācīra. Ekasālake: one sal tree. They also call it "Kuṭikā". Atthābhisamayā: the attainment of one's own benefit. Dhīro is called paṇḍito, not another. Sammā mānābhisamayā: by the complete abandonment of conceit, the meaning is by the thorough abandonment of conceit by way of eradication. Dukkhassa pīḷanaṭṭho: in "the nature of suffering is pressing" etc., and in "the penetration of the four truths by the four aspects" etc., the nature of suffering of the five aggregates is the nature of suffering. Saṅkhataṭṭho: the nature of being conditioned is the nature of arising from a cause. Santāpaṭṭho: the nature of pain for painful feeling. Vipariṇāmaṭṭho: the nature of change for pleasant feeling. The meaning should be understood as abhisamayaṭṭho is like the nature of pressing. In Gabbhokkantisamayo etc., it is evident to gods and humans through the quaking of the earth, the appearance of light, etc. The Dukkarakārikasamayo is also evident by "the ascetic Gotama is not dark." The seven weeks and other things are the Diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārasamayo.

Accantameva taṃ samayanti: from the beginning to the completion of the bowl, at that time with complete association. Karuṇāvihārena vihāsī: at that time he dwelt with the mode of compassion. That time was the time for acting with compassion. The Blessed One has two acts: the act of knowledge (ñāṇakiccaṃ) and the act of compassion. Ñāṇakiccaṃ is full enlightenment (abhisambodhi), Karuṇākiccaṃ is after attaining the great compassion attainment, looking at beings to be trained and doing what is appropriate. It was said, "Monks, two things should be done by you who have assembled" (ma. ni. 1.273; udā. 12, 28). The Blessed One also does that. Or else, he shows the initial association with newly arrived monks. Showing the mode of compassion there, he said, "He dwelt with the mode of compassion." Adhikaraṇañhi kālattho: here, the hi particle is in the sense of a reason. There, in the Abhidhamma, the meaning of time should be seen as fivefold: time, group, moment, concurrence of conditions, and cause. How can time as a place where something occurs be an occasion (adhikaraṇaṃ)? Just as "born in the forenoon," so the word "time" in the sense of time should be understood. How is it in the sense of a heap? Just as "born in a heap of barley." Therefore, it is said that at whatever time or in whatever heap the mind arises, at that time or in that heap contact etc. arise. Adhikaraṇañhī: here, the occasion (adhikaraṇaṃ) specified in the Abhidhamma is in the sense of time and in the sense of a group. It should be seen that what was said, "at whatever time," was said referring to the occasion (adhikaraṇaṃ). Now, showing the characteristic of becoming by becoming, he said, ‘‘tattha vuttāna’’ etc. What is becoming (bhāvo) of what is said in the Abhidhamma? It is arising and existence. That becoming of those phenomena of contact, etc., is known as becoming by means of time. Therefore, it is said that the specification in the locative case has been made there.

khaṇo means the ninth moment, free from the eight inopportune moments; it arises when that is present. Samavāyo means the concurrence of causes such as the eye sense base; it arises when that is present. Hetu means an object such as form. Therefore, it is said that the existence of those contacts, etc., occurs when that moment, concurrence of causes, and cause are present. Idha pana hetuattho karaṇattho ca sambhavatī: here, the reason is that in the word "time" mentioned in the Vinaya, both the instrumental case which is in the agent sense and the instrumental case which is in the cause sense are possible. So dubbiññeyyo: it was said "the Tathāgata will know the time there." Tena samayena: because of that time, "he dwells for food, he dwells for knowledge," just as he dwells for the sake of obtaining food or knowledge. Thus, when it is said "tena samayena viharatī," the instrumental case should be seen in the sense of cause. Therefore, it is said that he dwelt in various places, considering the time and the transgression of the training rule. In the third Pārājika etc., it should be seen in instances such as "I desire, monks, to go into seclusion for half a month" (pārā. 162). Therefore, the second, in the continuous connection of time, the second occurs, just as "he studies for a month, he studies for a day." Here, in this case, both the sense of cause and the sense of instrument are possible. Here, of which the instrumental expression has the sense of cause, because of that time, considering the transgression of the object, or considering the time of transgression, and considering the reason for the training rule, the Blessed One dwelt in various places. Of which the instrumental sense is possible, the Blessed One, making known the training rules at that time, dwelt in various places. This is the meaning.

Gaṇṭhipadepana: "the transgression of Sudinna etc. is the cause, but the fixed time is the instrument, because the training rule should be made known without transgressing that time." This is without fault. But what was said, "This instrument, because it is prior, should have been said first, but was said later," is badly said. From the sense of cause, just as the sense of instrument, when connected later, goes in due order, so it is connected. But that the Aṭṭhakathā teacher connected this instrumental sense, said later, first, and connected the sense of cause, said first, later, should be understood as being for ease of connection. So wrote the teacher. From here on, wherever it is said "the teacher wrote" or "the teacher's reasoning," the teacher should be taken as Ānanda Ācariya, residing in Kalasapura. Here it is said: just as in the Suttanta it is said "ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā," so it should be said "tena samayena bhagavā verañjāya," or should the words "Tathāgato sugato" etc. be said, or is there some purpose in taking just these two words, that should be said? It is said: for some who do not know the extremely profound disposition of the Buddha, the Blessed One, doubt might arise regarding the Buddha's excellent wisdom when seeing the Vinaya teaching such as "without the training rule being laid down, he did not see the disadvantage...he made it fully known" (pārā. 36), "Then the Blessed One questioned the venerable Sudinna" (pārā. 39), "Did you enjoy it, monks?" "I did not enjoy it, Blessed One" (pārā. 72), and the making known of the second Pārājika after questioning a long-time monk and by the distinction he made, and the permitting of Devadatta's going forth, and so on. And doubt might arise regarding his being a Khīṇāsava, relying on the Vinaya teaching associated with harsh speech, such as "what is that to you, a spitter of phlegm?" (cūḷava. 336). To dispel both of those doubts, the venerable Upāli Thera made this taking of just these two words everywhere. Thus, he indicates that the teacher is the Buddha, since he is the all-knowing Buddha, and that he is the Blessed One since he has broken all faults. Further, it was said, "Even though the Tathāgatas know, they ask...a blow to the bridge of those who are not concerned with benefit is for the Tathāgatas" (pārā. 16). And in the Suttanta, it was said, "Even with gentleness, Kesi, I train, and even with harshness" (a. ni. 4.111).

Asādhāraṇahetumhīti, here, wholesome roots are never roots for unwholesome states, and likewise, unwholesome roots are never roots for wholesome states, nor are indeterminate roots ever wholesome; this is the principle that is obtained. Because wholesome causes are a condition by way of the root condition for the material phenomena arising from them (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.401 ff.), therefore the principle that wholesome states are only for wholesome states is not obtained. Puci is said, a wasting disease; because it weakens and destroys, it is called pucimando. Sattānaṃ hitasukhanipphādanādhimuttata, here, to show beings, generally spoken of, by dividing them into two, "manussānaṃ upakārabahulata" etc. is said. Bahujanahitāyā, for the benefit of many people. For the Blessed One is the one who advises on benefits in this life and the next through the accomplishment of wisdom. Sukhāyā, for the sake of happiness. For he is the giver of beneficial happiness through the accomplishment of generosity. Through the accomplishment of loving-kindness and compassion, he is like parents out of compassion for the world. Indeed, he is the protector and guardian of the world. Devamanussānaṃ, here, taking only the capable individual, the being amenable to guidance, he shows his arising for the attainment of the path, fruit, and Nibbāna of those beings. For when "atthāyā" is said, it means for the ultimate benefit, for Nibbāna; when "hitāyā" is said, it means for the path that leads to that, for there is no benefit higher than the path. Sukhāyā, for the happiness of fruition attainment, since there is no happiness higher than that. Diṭṭhisīlasaṅghātenā, here, the taking of only views and morality, without including concentration and wisdom, is because of the commonality of all trainees and those beyond training. In the Kosambaka Sutta (M.N. 1.492) it is said, "he lives having reached commonality in morality, he lives having reached commonality in views." If it is said that wisdom is also included by the taking of views? No, because it would lead to the conclusion that those who have entered the stream etc. are also completers of wisdom; therefore, even though those knowledges and views have a single characteristic, there is a difference in their state, like the faculties of endurance, concentration, and right concentration. Aññāsī, here, known according to the sense-door; for meanings are indeed called heard, as in "This was heard, Master Gotama, evil communications are both seen and heard," etc. Like in "Bhikkhu, Upāli, splits the Sangha," etc. (Cūḷava. 354), it is in the sense of avadhāraṇatthe. In Verañja, bhavo is existing. Itthambhūtassa, of such a being. Of what sort of being? Of a Sakyan son, gone forth from the Sakyan clan, the sound of praise has gone forth, having become and remained such, this means that words of usage are in conjunction with the prefix "abhi".

Kāmupādānapaccayā eva mettaṃ bhāveti, brahmaloke nibbattatī, by this it is said that the doctrine of those who say that having done deeds because of clinging to sense pleasures, one is born only in the realm of sense pleasures is rejected, or having heard that "sense pleasures are refined in the Brahma world," and having imagined, afterwards, "I will experience accomplishment there," one does what leads to that because of clinging to sense pleasures; even in the Brahma world, sense pleasures are pleasures in the sense of being desirable, "because of having that as an object, craving is said to be clinging to sense pleasures," thus they say; it should be investigated. And deed is the generating cause of the eye, craving is the root cause of deed, therefore, what is not the root cause is a generator. Craving for forms etc. is the truth of suffering because it is included within the aggregates, and from the saying, "also, not getting what one wants is suffering" (D.N. 2.387; M.N. 1.131; Vibha. 190). Tassa mūlakāraṇabhāvena samuṭṭhāpikā, it should be connected as the arouser of this aggregate of five which is the cause of that. Because of the saying, "with the arising of the āsavas is the arising of ignorance" (M.N. 1.103), it is appropriate to say that that is the cause. Moreover, "like form etc., craving too is the place of arising and abandoning of craving," therefore, like form etc., craving too is made the truth of suffering. This was said, "craving for form, in the world, is dear form, agreeable form, here this craving arises as it arises" (D.N. 2.400; Vibha. 203) and "here this craving is abandoned as it is abandoned" (D.N. 2.401; M.N. 1.134). Visuddhimagge, "but in every way, the five aggregates of clinging are suffering and the noble truth, apart from craving," if it is said that the statement here that craving for form etc. is the truth of suffering is contradictory? No, because it is spoken of there and there to show the nature of mutual non-distinction. If craving were not included within the aggregates of clinging, in the Saccavibhaṅga, "there, which are the five aggregates of clinging that are suffering in brief? Namely, the aggregate of clinging to form...the aggregate of clinging to consciousness" (Vibha. 202), here it should be said, "having set aside craving, the aggregate of clinging to mental formations," but it is not said, therefore, if craving is included within the truth of suffering? No, because it would lead to the fault of confusion of cause and effect. If there is no fault of confusion? Indeed, in the Saccavibhaṅga text, the truth of origin is indicated by five sections.

How? Craving is one instance, craving and the remaining defilements are the second, craving and the remaining defilements and the remaining unwholesome states are the third, craving and the remaining defilements and the remaining unwholesome states and the three wholesome roots with āsavas are the fourth, craving and the remaining defilements and the remaining unwholesome states and the three wholesome roots with āsavas and the remaining wholesome states with āsavas are the fifth instance. Yes, it is indicated, even so it is only in the Abhidhamma Bhājaniya, not in another, and that principle is not obtained in the discourse on the noble truths. For there it says only "four truths," it does not say "four noble truths" like in the Suttanta Bhājaniya questions. Therefore, only the Suttanta Bhājaniya is the standard, and craving is spoken of there. As he said, "there, what is the noble truth of the origin of suffering, this craving which leads to renewed existence…namely, craving for sense pleasures" etc. (Vibha. 203). Because of the saying "whatever is impermanent is suffering" (S.N. 3.15) in this way, even what is said there is the standard. Because of the saying, "having attained the first jhāna, he dwells with earth kasiṇa" (Dha. Sa. 186 ff.), "kasiṇānī" are said to be the jhāna. Some say, "having considered the learning sign and the counterpart sign it is said," that is not beautiful. Because of the saying, "having dismissed the designation of the thirty-two parts, mindfulness should be established as repulsive," the objects of mindfulness, such as form etc., should also be known.

satta saddhammā means. Sabhāvato, from suffering. Na cavatī, with reference to the devas. Ñāteyya, should be known. Daṭṭheyya, should be seen. Or rather, the meaning is "I do not say that the end of the world is to be known by going." Loka, the aggregate world. Gamanena na pattabbo, it cannot be reached by bodily going or by misguided going, but it is said that only by reaching the end of the world through noble going is there release from suffering. Samitāvī, one who has calmed the defilements. Āhāraṭṭhitikā, dependent on conditions. The intention is that all those dependent on conditions are one world in the sense of being subject to destruction and dissolution. For beings are indeed called attached beings because of their dependence on their respective conditions. Pariharanti, they attend to. Disā, dative plural. Bhanti, they shine. Who are they? Those same resplendent, radiant moon and sun. Aṭṭha lokadhammā, are the aggregates. Because of the saying "Sinerussa samantato", they say that the Yugandhara mountains etc. stand surrounding Mount Sineru in a circular shape. Surrounding and very high, this is the world-sphere. They say "Ma-kāro padasandhikaro". In any case, because of knowing the aggregate world in all ways due to differences in characteristics etc., the being world due to differences in inclinations and underlying tendencies, and the world of space due to the measure of the world-system etc., he is the knower of the world.

Aggisikhadhūmasikhāca nāgā, it is said, in Sri Lanka. A word that illuminates the meaning is an atthapadaṃ. A word that illuminates a single meaning, all of that is a sentence, this is the meaning. Aṭṭha disā means the eight liberations, or attainments. Satthavāho is declined as satthā, like pisitāso as pisāco. I was a frog in the water, not a frog on land, the range was only water, the remainder of the passage is that my head was crushed with a stick while I was listening to your Dhamma. Or it is a word of ownership in the sense of disrespect. Having made a smile, thinking, "even with this much, such power will come to be." Vimokkho, here means the path, immediately after that ñāṇaṃ means the knowledge of fruition, at that moment he is called a Buddha. Sabbassa buddhattā, in the agent. Bodhetā, in the object. A word that illuminates the supreme meaning is called seṭṭhaṃ, likewise uttamaṃ. Sacchikāpaññattī, a designation that is self-originated by way of realization of all things, or a designation that is realized because it is known by oneself. Bhagī, the Blessed One of robes, alms food, etc. Bhajī, remote forest groves, secluded resting places. Bhāgī, of the flavor of meaning, Dhamma, and liberation. He bhaggamakāsi, broke the group of defilements such as lust. Bhāvitattano, one who has developed his body. Because he has gone to the end of existence, Nibbāna, by the attainment of the path, he is bhavantago.

vipariyesā. Craving arises in a bhikkhu for the sake of robes, or for the sake of alms food, lodging, existence, or non-existence (A.N. 4.9). Cetokhilā, he is doubtful about the Teacher, the Dhamma, the Sangha, the training, he is angry with his fellow Brahmacārīs (D.N. 3.319; Vibha. 941), there are five that have come. He is not devoid of lust for sense pleasures…having eaten for as long as it takes to fill the belly, he lives the Brahmacariya aspiring to one of the deva realms (D.N. 3.320; Vibha. 941), there are five bonds that have come. The roots of disputes are anger, hostility, denigration, domineering, envy, stinginess, deceit, trickery, obstinacy, rivalry, adherence to one's own views, taking things as a burden, and unwillingness to relinquish (A.N. 6.36; D.N. 3.325). In the Vibhaṅga, however, it has come that "anger, denigration, envy, trickery, evil desire, adherence to one's own views" (Vibha. 944). Conditioned by craving is seeking, conditioned by seeking is gain, conditioned by gain is judgment, thus desire and lust, obsession, possession, stinginess, protection, on account of protection, taking up sticks and weapons…unwholesome states come to be (D.N. 2.104; 3.359; A.N. 9.23; Vibha. 963), of those that have been said. Six cravings for form, sound, smell, taste, tangible objects, and mental objects, those are eighteen only by way of craving for sense pleasures, existence, and non-existence, those same eighteen for the internal basis, eighteen for the external basis, thus thirty-six, those thirty-six in the past, thirty-six in the future, thirty-six in the present, thus there are one hundred and eight wanderings of craving. Because it kills, it is Māra, negligence, "negligence is the path to death" (Dha. Pa. 21). Or, because of destroying right livelihood, the defilements are called "Māra," the aggregates are Māras only as executioners. The mental formations are Māras because of bringing about the arising of birth and suffering, and because of aging etc. for what is born. Death is Māra because of killing the life included within a single existence. Aṇimatā means becoming invisible like an atom. Laghimatā, quick movement with the body or mind. Mahimatā, even touching the moon and sun with the hand etc. Patti means the attainment of the desired place. Or, pākammaṃ, the ability to show oneself, the accomplishment of benefit for the one who obtains. Īsattaṃ means sayaṃvasitā. Vasittaṃ means aparavasitā. Yatthakāmāvasāyitaṃ means that wherever one wants, whatever one wants, for as long as one wants, there, so long, the accomplishment of that purpose. In Pīḷanasaṅkhatasantāpavipariṇāmaṭṭhena dukkhamariyasaccantiādi, this is a statement of meaning prefaced by a challenge – even though there are other meanings for suffering etc., such as form, craving, etc., why are only four said? Because of the manifestation in accordance with the showing of the other truths.

Since the suffering that has the characteristic of pīḷana (oppression) is accumulated and conditioned by the origin with its characteristic of accumulation, its state of being saṅkhataṭṭho (conditioned) becomes manifest. However, since the path is a very cool destroyer of the torment of defilements, its state of being santāpaṭṭho (free from torment) becomes manifest with the seeing of the path, just as Sundarī's unloveliness with the sight of Nanda's beauty. There is certainly no need to say that with the seeing of cessation, which has the characteristic of non-change, its state of change becomes manifest. With the seeing of suffering, the characteristic of the origin that is by nature accumulation, its state of being nidānaṭṭho (cause) becomes manifest, just as the state of food being the cause of disease is manifest with the seeing of a disease arising from unwholesome food. With the seeing of cessation, which is of the nature of detachment, its state of being saṃyogaṭṭho (attachment) becomes manifest. And with the seeing of the path, which is of the nature of deliverance, its state of being palibodhaṭṭho (obstacle) becomes manifest. Similarly, with the seeing of the origin, which is of the nature of non-discrimination, of cessation that is of the nature of escape, its state of being vivekaṭṭho (discrimination) becomes manifest. With the seeing of the path, its state of being asaṅkhataṭṭho (unconditioned) becomes manifest. For in this beginningless saṃsāra, the path has never been seen before, and since even that is conditioned by conditions, the unconditioned nature of the dhamma free from conditions becomes exceedingly clear. But with the seeing of suffering, its state of being amataṭṭho (deathless) becomes manifest. For suffering is poison, and the deathless is Nibbāna. Similarly, with the seeing of the origin of the path, which is of the nature of niyyāna (deliverance), its state of being hetvattho (cause) becomes manifest, with the thought, "This is not the cause for the attainment of Nibbāna, this is the cause." With the seeing of cessation, its state of being dassanaṭṭho (seeing) becomes manifest, like the clarity of the eye when seeing extremely subtle beautiful forms, with the thought, "Indeed, my eye is very clear." With the seeing of suffering, its state of being adhipateyyaṭṭho (sovereignty) becomes manifest, just as the grandeur of a wealthy person is manifest with the seeing of a crowd of poor people afflicted with many diseases. Thus, here, due to the manifestation of the other three based on the characteristic and due to the seeing of one truth, four meanings have been stated for each. Upadhiviveko (seclusion from the substrata of existence) is freedom from defilements.

paccatthikā (opponents). Paccāmittā (enemies) are those who are opposed and unfriendly. Sacchikatvā pavedeti (having realized, he declares): By this much, he reveals the Blessed One's omniscience. Having revealed the accomplishment of knowledge, he now says "so dhammaṃ desesī" (he taught the Dhamma), etc., in order to reveal the accomplishment of compassion. Or what did he declare? Knowledge, all of which is for the benefit of the three worlds. What kind of Dhamma did he teach? "Ādikalyāṇa" (good in the beginning), etc. By this statement, he reveals his worthiness to speak. Sāsanadhammo (the Teaching's Dhamma) is the instruction-pariyatti (teaching). Kiccasuddhiyā (purity of function) is by the purity of function whose object is the abandonment of defilements and Nibbāna. Sāsanabrahmacariyaṃ (the Teaching's Brahmacariya) means the threefold training, or the nine-koṭi-thousands, etc. The path alone is Brahmacariya, maggabrahmacariyaṃ (the path’s brahmacariya). Here, the three piṭakas (baskets of teaching) that reveal it are called sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ (with meaning and with phrasing). Saṅkāsanaṃ (exposition) is brief explanation in the six meaning-places. Pakāsanaṃ (disclosure) is explanation from the beginning. Vivaranaṃ (elucidation) is teaching by expanding both. Vibhajanaṃ (analysis) is again making a division. Uttānīkaraṇaṃ (making clear) is making obvious with similes, etc. Paññāpanaṃ (establishing) should be understood as generating joy in the minds of the listeners and as settling the mind. Akkharā (syllable) is so-called because of the pronunciation in the phrasing-places; some say, "A single-letter word is a syllable." Padaṃ (word) is an inflected ending. Byañjanaṃ (phrase) is so-called because it makes clear, a sentence. Or a collection of words is a sentence. Ākāro (aspect) is the name for the revelation of distinction. Nirutti (etymology) is the definition, "It touches, therefore it is contact," etc.; niddeso (definition) is the designation of what is not designated by etymology. Phasso (contact) is so-called because it touches, and that is threefold: feeling that is pleasant, feeling that is painful, and feeling that is neither-painful-nor-pleasant. Here is how these are connected: one exposes (saṅkāsayati) with syllables, discloses (pakāsayati) with words, elucidates (vivarati) with phrases, analyzes (vibhajati) with aspects, makes clear (uttānīṃ karoti) with etymologies, and establishes (paññāpeti) with definitions. Or, having exposed with syllables, he discloses with words, having elucidated with phrases, he analyzes with aspects, having made clear with etymologies, he establishes with definitions. Or, it should be understood that having opened up with syllables, he guides with words to one who knows when opened up; having elucidated with phrases, he guides with aspects to one who knows in detail; having led with etymologies, he guides with definitions to one who is to be guided. Attho (meaning) is the meaning spoken. Paṭivedho (penetration) is the self-nature that should be penetrated of that very meaning. Both of those are called meaning. Therefore, it was said, "sāttha (with meaning) by way of depth of meaning, paṭivedhagambhīratāhi (depth of penetration)." Dhammo (Dhamma) or desanā (teaching) is phrasing itself. The Teaching’s Brahmacariya (holy life) that is pure due to being faultless and the path included in the threefold training are both included in the word Brahmacariya. Paṭipattiyā (by practice) is because of the cause of practice. Āgamabyattito (through familiarity with the teaching) the aggregates, etc., become clear when repeatedly studied. Suttas (discourses) that are difficult to speak, when studied, only bring confusion.

2-3.Kacci khamanīyaṃ (Is it bearable?) means cold, heat, etc. Kacci yāpanīyaṃ (Is it livable?) means life with life's requisites obtained as one has gotten. Appābādhanti (Are you free from sickness?) means with few misfortunes. Appātaṅkanti (Are you free from disease?) means with few diseases. Kacci lahuṭṭhānaṃ (Are you quick to rise?) means in bodily duties. Kacci balaṃ (Do you have strength?) means in ascetic duties. Kacci phāsuvihāro (Do you live at ease?) means in the manner stated, due to being free from sickness, or due to being free from discontent, etc. From sixty-seven onwards is pacchimavayo (old age), it is said to be facing north. When the world was revealed, what did he look at here, there is no one here like you, he said, "tvaṃ sadevakassa lokassa aggo" (you are the foremost in the world with its devas), etc. Āsabhiṃ (noble) means foremost. Upapattivasena (in terms of rebirth) means devas. Like ambarasādayo (celestial flavors), “rūparasā” (sense-pleasures) are called, having arisen in accordance with the feeling of joy connected with lust, arisen in terms of the consumption of forms or in terms of wish, and heating the heart. He speaks in terms of authority, "Tathāgatassa pahīnā" (abandoned by the Tathāgata). For even for the Tathāgata, they are made like a palm tree with its head cut off for someone. How? By the statement "sense-pleasures," the Dhammas of resultant-Dhamma are taken, even if those exist, they are unable to produce resultant aggregates like a row of palm trees in the future, because the craving-seeds similar to a head have been cut off by the sword of the path. Therefore, they are made like a palm stump. Some say, "Even wholesome joy is included here." Those in the place of courses of action that have been abandoned by the first path, those gross and with roots cut off by the second, those in the place of sense-desire with palm-stump-made by the third, those in the place of form-desire and formless-desire made non-existent by the fourth. But revealing the nature of non-decline, he said "āyatiṃ anuppādadhammā" (subject to non-arising in the future). Or abandoned by abandonment by parts in the moment of insight or in the moment of the preparatory part of jhāna, with roots cut off by abandonment by suppression in the moment of jhāna. For it was said, "Quite secluded from sensual pleasures" (pārā. 11). Made like a palm stump by abandonment by destruction in the moment of the attainment of the third knowledge. But sense-pleasures such as these that have been made non-existent are subject to non-arising in the future, this is one word of meaning. Or abandoned by the first breakthrough, with roots cut off by the second, made like a palm stump by the third. Since these are said to have been made non-existent, they should be understood as being subject to non-arising in the future. Or, abandoned by the knowledge of suffering, with roots cut off by the knowledge of origin, made like a palm stump by the knowledge of cessation, made non-existent by the knowledge of the path, subject to non-arising in the future by the knowledge of reviewing. Or abandoned by the worldly path, with roots cut off by the path of seeing, made like a palm stump by the threefold path of development, etc. The tastes of the Dhamma are not extracted, since they are not in the brāhmaṇa's domain.

11.Dhammadhātunti (element of the Dhamma) here, omniscient knowledge is called the element of the Dhamma. In accordance with the word of compassion, "puṇṇacando viyā" (like the full moon) was said, the word of the sun is in accordance with the word "suppaṭividdhattā" (because of being well-penetrated), the cause for equanimity like the earth is said to be "karuṇāvipphāra" (spreading of compassion). For revealing his own qualities that should be covered, by saying "My energy is indeed aroused," etc., it should be taken that he is revealing the spreading of his compassion. Varabhūrimedhaso (one with excellent great wisdom) means one with excellent extensive knowledge, or bhūri means ground, the meaning is excellent knowledge spread out like the ground. Rukkho bodhi (the tree is enlightenment) because he awakened here by way of a place. Maggo bodhi (the path is enlightenment) because one awakens oneself, or beings awaken by it who are connected with it. Thus, even sabbaññutaññāṇampi (omniscient knowledge) is enlightenment. Nibbānaṃ bodhi (Nibbāna is enlightenment) because one awakens. Tisso vijjā (the three knowledges) should be understood according to possibility for one who has the underlying conditions for the three knowledges. Tikkhabhāvo (sharpness) is by way of one-pointedness. Though sharp, a certain arrow becomes blunt after reaching its target, this is not so. Kharabhāvo (roughness) is for him in terms of the faculty of confidence, vippasannabhāvo (clarity) in terms of the faculty of faith, and the sūrabhāvo (heroism) in terms of the faculty of energy because of thoroughly overcoming the opposing defilements without interruption. The time of conception for investigation of the path is immediately after equanimity towards formations due to conformity.

Both desire and intention are just craving distinguished by a difference in state –

"He approaches a host of elephants,
His heart reddened with passion;
He approaches a lover gone astray,
The world, fallen into sensual pleasure, has enough, it suffices" –

as in the beginning –

Here, the intention is: even though the meaning was spoken Vibhaṅgeyeva kiñcāpi attho vutto (even in the Vibhaṅga), it is not for the benefit of all, therefore I will reveal it only by the method of the commentary. Ito (from here) means from sensual pleasures. Upadhiviveko (seclusion from the substrata of existence) is the third among kāyavivekādīsu (seclusion of body, etc), therefore, having discarded the third and having taken two and having taken vikkhambhanavivekaṃ (seclusion by suppression) among tadaṅgādīsu (its parts, etc.), it was said "tayo evā" (there are only three). If that is so, there would be no difference since the jhāna and suppression are indeed one meaning? It should not be seen like that because of the occurrence of absorption. It is known that the taking of kāyaviveka (seclusion of body) is the taking of the preliminary part, therefore it was said "cittaviveko" (seclusion of mind) is the taking of momentary seclusion, the time of absorption should be taken by suppression since there is no confusion. Or, it is also right that momentary and suppressional seclusions are taken by seclusion of mind, the other is only seclusion by suppression, like a man who is involved in two works because of being a sensuous-desire. As in the world, "the tree is fruitful" is said by way of an existing designation with what is non-existent, in the same way, the intention is that in the Teaching, "jhāna with initial and sustained thought" is said by way of an existing designation with what exists.

Vūpasamāti (cessation) here, whose cessation is it, is it of those with the first jhāna, or is it of those with the second jhāna? Here, if it is of those with the first jhāna, there is no cessation for them. For there is no first jhāna without initial and sustained thought. If it is of those with the second jhāna, there is indeed no cessation there since that is absent there? Therefore, this is said "samatikkamā" (by transcending), even transcending is not only for them. But is it for the entire aggregate of first-jhāna-dhammas? Therefore, this is said "oḷārikassa pana samatikkamā" (but by transcending the coarse), etc. Are all the first-jhāna-dhammas coarse in comparison to the second jhāna, not only the two of initial and sustained thought? The absence of those in the moment of the second jhāna occurs because of seeing the danger in those very Dhammas associated with initial and sustained thought, not because of those very initial and sustained thought Dhammas. Therefore, it was said "dutiyajjhānakkhaṇe apātubhāvā" (due to not appearing in the moment of the second jhāna), by the power of which Dhamma or by the connection this jhāna is called "sampasādana" (clarification) and "ekodibhāva" (unification), for the purpose of seeing that, confidence and concentration were stated vibhaṅge (in the Vibhaṅga). This explanation does not contradict when it is said to be like ghee, etc. in the Paṇītabhojanasikkhāpade (training rule on exquisite foods) (pāci. 257, etc.). Samaṃ passatī (sees equally) means equanimity, which is the nature of not abandoning the pure natural state in the path of six pleasant and unpleasant sense objects in the six doors for the arahant who has destroyed the influxes after abandoning dullness and restlessness, chaḷaṅgupekkhā (six-factored equanimity). Equanimity that is neutral in the taking of non-attention regarding the hindrances, etc., is called this saṅkhārupekkhā (equanimity regarding formations). Equanimity that is neutral in investigation is called this vipassanupekkhā (insight-equanimity). There, six-factored equanimity, brahmavihāra equanimity, bojjhaṅga equanimity, equanimity that is neutral there, jhāna equanimity, and pure equanimity are essentially just one, equanimity that is neutral there, the difference is their distinction in terms of state. It should be understood that the unity of equanimity regarding formations and insight-equanimity is due to wisdom, but their duality is due to function.

Iṭṭhāniṭṭhaviparītanti (opposite of pleasant and unpleasant) here, some say, "It should be taken that one experiences in the manner opposite of pleasant and unpleasant without taking in terms of object." Why? Because it occurs for all by relying on one kasina. The teaching has been done with sati (mindfulness) as the head because it has been helpful from the third jhāna onwards, like the night that is pleasant due to being free from clouds, etc., is not unhelpful like the day even when blackness exists due to clouds, etc. Therefore, it was said "attano upakārakattena vā" (or by being helpful to oneself). Some say, "The overpowering of the sun's radiance and the lack of night are the two causes for impurity. Being pleasant and being helpful to oneself are the two causes for commonality," which means that it is said of the impure species of it, therefore it is a word of cause, according to some.

The commentary on the Jhāna Talk is finished.

Commentary on the Talk on Past Lives

12. Because of the common characteristic of one-pointedness of mind, it is said that the jhānas are "for some, a place for one-pointedness of mind." Because of the common characteristic of accessing existence for wholesome states, they are "for some, a place for accessing existence." Because of the lack of commonality in the remaining instances, without saying "a place for a foundation," it is said that they are "foundations." Thus, it indicates that even things that are a foundation can bring about one-pointedness of mind or accessing existence as appropriate, and for others, they bring about being a foundation as appropriate. Because of lacking commonality, it also indicates that things that are foundations for javana vipassanā are the same as things that are foundations for abhiññā, and things that are foundations for abhiññā are also foundations for vipassanā, as well as indicating the absence of a foundation. For abhiññā, only the fourth jhāna is a foundation, not the others. Among these, the third is a foundation for the fourth, the second for the third, and the first for the second. Or, it is said "four jhānas" in order of attainment.

The cause of the Vinaya discourse, the imagining of residing in Verañja;
Because of the Teacher, therefore the Blessed One spoke of the three knowledges in Verañja.

"Showing a part of the qualities of which he was the giver," otherwise there would be merely the occasion for gaining the three knowledges.

In the Aṭṭhakathā(Visuddhi. 2.381): "Here, the first three jhānas, since one attains psychic power by permeating with rapture and permeating with happiness, and by overcoming the perception of happiness and the perception of lightness, becoming light, pliable, and wieldy in body, therefore, by this method, they should be understood as preparatory because they conduce to the attainment of psychic power. But the fourth jhāna is the natural basis for the attainment of psychic power." Intending this very meaning, he said, "Formerly, these four jhānas were foundations for abhiññā for some." If so, why wasn't it said that even the fourth jhāna was included? If it is because that is the natural basis? It should not be said, because of the possibility of the existence of the mind that has attained the state of being composed beyond the fourth jhāna. Since when "I directed my mind towards the knowledge of the recollection of past lives" was said, therefore, in that fourth jhāna mind that has attained the state of being the natural basis, the preparatory mind, when the foundation for abhiññā has arisen, he says, "I directed my mind towards the knowledge of the recollection of past lives." Able to be directed: here, he directs that preparatory mind for the purpose of attaining psychic powers. He sends it, having removed it from the kasiṇa object, towards psychic powers. In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, since it is said "for the sake of bringing forth knowledge of psychic powers, etc., from the jhāna that is the foundation for abhiññā," the meaning "able to be directed" is conceived.

By distancing the hindrances, by transcending thought, etc.: this is due to the inclusion of the functions of the first jhāna, etc. This connection is not possible in the first alternative, because of the prevention of connecting the word "thus" by the statement "but in 'pure,' etc." Therefore, he says, "pure by way of purity of equanimity and mindfulness," etc. Desire-range: the meaning is without impurity due to the absence of causes for anger that arise dependent on desire that has arisen in the manner of "oh, that I might commit an offense, and that the bhikkhus might not know me" (ma. ni. 1.60). Here, even desire of the kind spoken of is an obstacle to the attainment of the first jhāna, etc., since "intentional false speech, venerable sirs, is an obstructive thing" (mahāva. 134) has been said, what to say of causes for anger within the range of desire, therefore it is said "of evil things within the range of desire that are inimical to the attainment of jhāna," etc. Somewhere, however, the reading "of things within the range of desire that are conducive to the attainment of jhāna" is seen in books, that is a scribal error, and the meaning that is written in the Gaṇṭhipada "oh, that the Teacher would ask only me and teach the dhamma" is poorly written. For causes of anger are not conducive to the attainment of jhāna, which are spoken of in the Anaṅgaṇa Sutta(ma. ni. 1.57 ff.), "nor do they arise from reason, because of their absence in one who has gained jhāna," the teacher says, that should be examined. Here, it should be understood that the eight factors are shown again and again with "so, when the mind was thus concentrated," etc., for the sake of showing the successive superiorities of the three knowledges. The successive superiorities should be understood from indicating the cessation of seeing one's own suffering, the suffering of others, and the cessation of both. For the Blessed One, having seen his own endless suffering of saṃsāra with the knowledge of the recollection of past lives, and having seen the passing away and rebirth of others and the cessation of both with the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas, teaches that. Or, with the first, he indicates the abandonment of affection for oneself from seeing one's own suffering. With the second, he indicates the abandonment of anger towards others from seeing the suffering of others, and with the third, he indicates the abandonment of delusion from seeing the Noble Path. Thus, because of indicating the distinct qualities, it should be understood that only these two mundane abhiññās are taken here.

Although in the Pāḷi it appears that only the recollection of all births is the knowledge of the recollection of past lives by the statement "even one birth, even two births," etc., it should not be seen thus. In order to show that even the recollection of a part of that is the knowledge of the recollection of past lives, the plural is said, and for the sake of including location, etc. With the word "etc." in "recollection of cut-off branches of trees, etc.," the inclusion of world elements, islands, countries, cities, villages, etc., that have not been inhabited should be understood. In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, it is said, "The transcendent morality, etc., of those cut-off branches of trees were not known by the Blessed One in the bodhisatta stage." By implication, it follows that the mundane ones were known, that appears to agree with the statement "those who revile the Noble Ones" in the section on the divine-eye knowledge. For this does not happen to one who does not see the Noble Ones. Why is recollection spoken of here, is this not the section on knowledge? Because it is brought about by mindfulness in the case of the beginner, and because of the special authority of mindfulness of past things. For it was said, "I recollect."

"In the present, he knows the knowledges;
He remembers in the past.

In the future dhamma,
He remembers the resolutions of the knowledges."

"In existence," etc. With the two terms "such a name, such a clan," he indicates the range, the abode reckoned by designation rooted in the internal and external. Living on fallen fruit: one who eats fruit that has fallen by itself. Or, up to eighty-four thousand kappas: before the resolution. Reviewing for one who is turning back is not the knowledge of the recollection of past lives. "But this is a demonstration of the power of those who have gained the knowledge of the recollection of past lives," is said in the Gaṇṭhipada. In "there," the recollection in the manner of a lion's overcoming is spoken of in the first connection, and that is in the direct order. They also write "in the reverse order," that is difficult to understand. In order to show the lion's overcoming, "in countless hundreds of thousands of kappas," etc., is said. By showing the commonality of result with the commonality of practice with the example "as that," he produces respect in the brahmin, he prevents the statement "he elevates only himself." He directs the previously arisen thought in him to "it is good to see such worthy arahats." With the statement "the first breakthrough," he shows the state of having many layers of the egg of ignorance, thereby he indicates the unbreakthrough by the eight powers, etc.

The description of the talk on the recollection of past lives is finished.

Description of the Talk on Divine-Eye Knowledge

13. "For the knowledge of passing away and rebirth" is said by way of the result. For this divine-eye knowledge is mundane, present, and has internal and external objects because it has form as its object. It does not make passing away or rebirth its object. Therefore, it should be understood that this is said only by way of the result, like the statement "I understand beings who are inferior and superior according to their actions" (pārā. 13). Because it depends on the divine abiding, it is divine by way of the cause. By this, some teachers who say "wholesome and unwholesome eyes are divine-eye, belonging to the sense-sphere" are refuted. For the fourth jhāna wisdom is intended here. In "because of great radiance, because of great speed," it is said that these are "according to the teaching of grammar." Here, the order of arising and the state of being corruptions of the eleven corruptions should be understood. Having increased the light, the great being saw various forms with the divine eye, and the doubt arose, "what could this be?", that corruption, from the statement in the Upakkilesa Sutta(ma. ni. 3.236 ff.) "doubt was what caused me to fall away from concentration, when I fell away from concentration, the light disappeared and so did the sight of forms." Then, as he thought "when I see forms, doubt arises, now I will not attend to anything," non-attention arose, then as he did not attend to anything, sloth and torpor arose, then for the sake of abandoning that, having increased the light and seeing forms, fear arose in him when he saw the ogres and demons in the Himalayas, etc., then for the sake of abandoning that, elation arose in him when he thought "the fear that I saw is not by nature when looked at, what fear is there in what is unseen?" In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, it is said "elation by seeing divine forms," the teacher says, "that is poorly said, because the meaning is established by the word craving later on." Then, for the sake of abandoning the fear, weakness of body, distress of body, and sluggishness of body arose in him as he loosened the energy, thinking "energy has been firmly applied by me, therefore this elation has arisen in me," then as he abandoned that, excessive energy arose, seeing fault in that, deficient energy arose, then having abandoned that, as he increased the light with properly applied energy towards the divine realms, having abandoned the fear and the Himalayas that were seen, craving arose, reckoned by desire, as he saw the multitude of gods, then as he made various forms objects of mind, increasing the light at times towards the divine realms, at times towards the human realm, thinking "craving has arisen in me when I make a form of one kind the object of my mind, therefore now I will make a form of various kinds the object of my mind," perception of diversity arose, then as he did thus, thinking "perception of diversity has arisen in me when I make forms of various kinds the object of my mind, therefore now I will make a form of only one kind the object of my mind, abandoning the taking of signs of desirable things for fear of craving, etc.," brooding over the forms arose, thus, even with corruptions abandoned, because it was not determined, it happened that "I know only the light, but I do not see forms."

In "doubt is a corruption of the mind," etc., some say, "I abandoned these things with the sight of danger, the corruptions, not because they arose in me then." "Or human," with this he shows the transgression of nature. "Like with the fleshy eye": with this, he compares limited perception and having only color as its object. Here, the word "being" is in the sense of only color, not as in "all beings subsist on nutriment" (a. ni. 10.27) in the sense of all conditioned things, inferior birth, etc., are the outflow and result of delusion. Those who were endowed with misconduct of body in the past, in a past life, have now been reborn in hell, thus, the connection should be understood with the remaining reading. "For the knowledge of beings faring according to their actions has only a past object, the divine eye has a present object," is said by way of the function of the two. "Elderly": because it was said with the intention of not knowing what is suitable and unsuitable for ascetics or worldly conduct, it should be understood that he blames by denigrating qualities. If a noble person who is "assured, intent on enlightenment" (saṃ. ni. 2.41; 5.998, 1004) would speak harsh words that are able to cause an obstruction to the path, he could do what leads to the lower realms, therefore he would be one who fares to the lower realms, therefore some say that he should be examined. "He makes an obstruction to the path" because it was said by the elder "do not exert yourself." The door to the lower realms has already been closed by the stream-enterer, therefore there is no obstruction to heaven for him. Some say that "natural" means "it was a result of the course of action." Others say that "growth, bhikkhus, is this in the Noble One's discipline, that one sees a transgression as a transgression and makes amends according to the dhamma." (ma. ni. 3.370; dī. ni. 1.251) that it was natural. "If he does not forgive": it was said with reference to the lack of forgiveness in stream-enterers, etc., or for the sake of good restraint for him in the future. Because of the absence of objects, etc., "of happiness or life," the Kālakāñcika demons exist. "May you go to a good destination from here": because of this statement (itivu. 83), the human destination too. "Divine-eye knowledge-wisdom": the meaning is that the divine eye itself is knowledge in the sense of seeing, wisdom in the sense of finding that thing.

The description of the talk on divine-eye knowledge is finished.

Description of the Talk on the Knowledge of the Destruction of the Āsavas

14. So evaṃ samāhite citte: Is this the same fourth jhāna citta as before, or a different one? In the Aṭṭhakathā also, it is said, "Because the first two knowledges were attained after emerging from it, that same [citta] was made new and frequent by repeatedly entering into samāpatti. Therefore, 'so evaṃ samāhite citte' means that in this case, the fourth jhāna citta, which is the basis for vipassanā, should be understood." Here someone might ask: if that same [citta] was made new by repeatedly entering into samāpatti, then why wasn't it said, as before, "the fourth jhāna citta here should be understood as the basis for vipassanā, the basis for abhiññā, the basis for nirodha, the accomplisher of all tasks, the giver of all mundane and supramundane qualities," and only "the fourth jhāna citta, which is the basis for vipassanā, should be understood" was said? Surely, this is the place for such a statement, since it produces all qualities together with the path of arahatta, not just the attainment of the first two knowledges? It is said: It should be understood that "vipassanāpādakaṃ" is said here to indicate that the path of the ariya, which has the specific characteristics of the bojjhaṅgas, the factors of the path, the jhāna factors, and the practice, was definitely inseparably connected with vipassanā that leads to emergence in the preliminary part, which is known as saṅkhārupekkhā. Because it is included therein, not merely by having that as its object. Pariyāyato: In another way also. "Ime āsavā": Why is this passage begun? For the purpose of conforming to the topic of "knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas." Magga-khaṇe hi cittaṃ vimuccati, phala-khaṇe vimuttaṃ hotī: This is said in terms of oneness. For what is being released is exactly what is called released in the subsequent part. And what is released is exactly what is called being released in the preliminary part. For the one who is eating is indeed called having eaten at the end of the meal. "With this, he shows the knowledge of reviewing": And in the foundation of the knowledge of reviewing, "Having arisen from the path, he reviews the path, the fruit, Nibbāna, the abandoned defilements," this order of arising is stated. The order of occurrence is stated here in two ways: in terms of its own nature and in terms of its meaning. There, "'vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ ahosī'ti" is the indication of the order of occurrence of the fourfold knowledge of reviewing in terms of its own nature. "'Khīṇā jātī'tiādi" is in terms of its meaning. Therefore, in the end, he made a teaching with reference to a person, saying "'abbhaññāsi'," because the knowledge of reviewing does not occur in that way. Knowing that there is no more rebirth, he knows "khīṇā jātī." "Dibbacakkhunā paccuppannānāgataṃsañāṇa": And because the knowledge of the future is dependent on the divine eye, it is stated.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Knowledge of the Destruction of the Āsavas is Finished.

Explanation of the Discourse on the Declaration of a Lay Follower

15. Kaṇṇasukhato: hadayaṅgamato is said with reference to the words themselves. Anattukkaṃsanato: etc., is in terms of the individual, kaṇṇasukhato is with reference to the sense of hearing. Āpāthāramaṇīyato: From being delightful to the path of knowledge. He himself is heṭṭhāmukhajātaṃ vā, but the path is without sorrow (asoka). At that time, sorrow is being abandoned. Cariyādianukūlato: appaṭikūlaṃ. Because it is said "madhuramima," the word "dhammamima" seems extra. Therefore, "rāgavirāgamima" should be construed separately like this, and then combined again, and "dhammamimaṃ upehīti" should be construed, indicating that "they recite 'dhammameva saraṇatthamupehī'." Because for those who have gone for refuge, by that very going for refuge, the triple gem destroys fear, terror, bad destinies, defilement, and suffering, therefore the triple gem is called saraṇaṃ. The state of mind that arises in the manner of relying on that, having abandoned defilements through faith in it, respect for it, etc., is saraṇagamanaṃ. One who is endowed with that is saraṇaṃ gacchati. However, saraṇagamanaṃ is twofold in terms of its divisions: supramundane and mundane. There, supramundane saraṇagamanaṃ, at the moment of the path, with the destruction of the defilements associated with saraṇagamanaṃ, having Nibbāna as its object, is fulfilled in all three gems in terms of its function. Mundane saraṇagamanaṃ, for ordinary people, with the suppression of the defilements associated with saraṇagamanaṃ, having the qualities of the Buddha, etc., as its object in terms of its object, is fulfilled. In terms of meaning, it is the attainment of faith in the triple gem and right view rooted in faith. For supramundane [saraṇagamanaṃ], the four fruits of samañña are the result, and the destruction of all suffering is the benefit as a result. For it is said, "Yo ca buddhañca dhammañca…pe… sabbadukkhā pamuccatī" (Dhp. 190-192). For mundane [saraṇagamanaṃ], there is the accomplishment of existence and enjoyment. For it is said, "Ye keci buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gatāse" (DN 2.332; SN 1.37). Mundane saraṇagamanaṃ is defiled by ignorance, doubt, wrong knowledge, etc., in the three objects, and is not of great brilliance, nor of great extent. There is no defilement in supramundane [saraṇagamanaṃ]. Mundane [saraṇagamanaṃ] has two divisions: blameworthy and blameless. There, blameworthy is caused by self-dedication to other teachers, etc., and that is of undesirable result. Blameless is at the time of death, and that is without result because it is without fruition. There is no division in supramundane [saraṇagamanaṃ]. Even in another existence, an ariya disciple does not point to another teacher. Any householder who has gone for refuge is upāsako. Because of worshipping the triple gem, [he is] upāsako. The five abstinences are sīlaṃ. Livelihood by righteous means, avoiding weapons, beings, meat, intoxicants, and trade is ājīvo. The failure of the stated sīlaṃ and ājīvo is called vipatti. The opposite is sampatti.

16. Lacchāma nu kho: Is said with reference to the destitute. Sakkhissāma nukho no: Is with reference to the prosperous. Tattha: In Verañjā. Paggayhatī: The bowl is the means of holding out, so the meaning is "by that holding out, by the bowl." Samādāyevā: Is an example. Na ca vaṭṭatī: Although cooking again is allowable, it is said because it is not well-cooked, and the statement in the commentary, "Even having obtained rice gruel, it is not allowable to cover it up," is also proof of this. "Sāvakānaṃ vā sikkhāpadaṃ paññapessāmī": By this statement, "sīlaṃ later" is said with reference to purification of livelihood. It indicates that there are many rules of training established by the Blessed One in relation to various matters, due to Upāli Thera. If so, why does the statement "etassa bhagavā kālo" in Verañjā not fit? No, because there would be the fault of the absence of rules of training before that. However, the Thera, setting aside the established [rules], speaks with reference to those that are to be established now, which are sufficient for the recital of the Pātimokkha. The Blessed One also, like in the Bhaddāli Sutta (MN 2.134), said with reference to those that are to be established thereafter, even though some have been established, "na tāva sāriputta satthā sāvakānaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ paññapetī." In this very Aṭṭhakathā, there is also the statement "sāmampi pacanaṃ samaṇasāruppaṃ na hoti na ca vaṭṭatī," and likewise statements such as "ratticchedo vā vassacchedo vā." Otherwise, the establishment of this Pāḷi, "dvīhākārehi buddhā bhagavanto bhikkhū paṭipucchantī," here itself is contradicted, so the teacher has considered, and that is beautiful, because there is the possibility of rules of training having been established previously as well. But in this case, the consideration of the contradiction of the establishment of the Pāḷi seems pointless to me. Why? Because of the text recited by Upāli Thera at the time of the Saṅgīti. Ratticchedo: Is said with reference to the week's duties. "Having gone for a week's duties, neither ratticchedo vā vassacchedo vā was done by even one bhikkhu," it is said in the Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā, therefore some say that it is allowable to do a week's duties when there is a reason for vassaccheda. But the Vinayadharas decide, therefore the meaning of the Aṭṭhakathā should be examined; [they are] pleased with this practice of desiring little, etc., in Verañjā. Sālīnaṃ vikati is sālivikati.

17-8. Upapannaphalo: Of great fruit. There is a reading "khuddaṃ madhu." "Theraṃ sīhanādaṃ nadāpetuṃ pucchī": By this, the teacher accomplishes what we said earlier, "the purpose of residing in Verañjā," which is to show the great power of the disciples who previously stood by his command, and showing that there was a combination of doubt in both Rājagaha and Verañjā, he says "atha kho āyasmato sāriputtassā," etc. Ciraṃ is the separation with respect to time, cirā is with respect to duration.

hetu, even so, here, because its fruit is destroyed or arises by that instrumental cause, it is hetu. Likewise, it is used to build, thus ghaṭo. Kilāsuno: Unused due to lack of purpose. Abbokiṇṇāni: With dissimilar [things]. Āgāminiyā: Means future. To show that it is only of these, it is said "sabbabuddhānaṃ hī." Yāvasāsanapariyantā: Means as long as the Buddhas exist. Khattiyas and brāhmaṇas are high, even then, to show the distinction, "uccanīcauḷāruḷārabhogā." There is also the reading "manasi katvā'tipi." Upasampādyaupasampādyaiccetaṃ dvayaṃ is called "upasampajjā" in Māgadhi. Anupādāyā: Without taking by way of making an object. Āsavehī: Is the third vibhatti in the agent. Cittānī: Is the plural in the reflexive. Vimucciṃsū: Is in the objective case. The teacher's intention is that it should be "vimocitānīti." Having made the word "āsavehīti" the instrumental case in the reflexive, the meaning is explained in the Gaṇṭhipada. If, by virtue of the āsavas having been ceased by the path of the ariya, [the cittas] are without āsavas, in the world the cittas should also be without āsavas. Surely the cittas that have ceased do not make objects, so those are with āsavas because of the non-cessation of the āsavas? The path citta of the sotāpanna is with āsavas because of the āsavas excluded from the higher paths, so should the fruits be with āsavas because of the power of destroying the remaining āsavas? No, because the fruits have the nature of destroying the āsavas. Bhiṃsanassa karaṇaṃ is bhiṃsanakataṃ, in bhiṃsanakatasmiṃ, it means in the act of terrifying. Having changed the feminine gender to the neuter gender or the masculine gender, Nimittattheti, here -

‘‘Cammani dīpinaṃ hanti, dantesu hanti kuñjaraṃ;
Vālesu cāmariṃ hanti, siṅgesu sarabho hato’’ti. –

Adhikaraṇaṃ.

20-21. Even though the cause of non-long lasting [Dhamma] having been stated, the cause of long lasting [Dhamma] is accomplished in terms of meaning by way of the stated opposite, even so, to bring the Blessed One to the occasion for requesting the establishment of the Vinaya, due to the Thera's intention for the occasion for requesting the establishment of the Vinaya, he asked the Blessed One again, "ko pana, bhante, hetū." The Blessed One also, wishing to accept the request, explained. "Āsavaṭṭhānīyā saṅghe pātubhavantī": Because the individual is included in the Saṅgha, it is stated. Ādaratthavasenevettha dvikkhattuṃ vutta: Because the Thera was previously in Rājagaha and now in Verañjā, and there is some [reason] in both cases, therefore, seeing him repeatedly requesting with respect, the Blessed One himself said with respect, "āgamehi tvaṃ sāriputtā." By this, he indicates "do not request again and again, your request has already been accepted by me, surely many rules of training have been established by me in so much time, having accepted your previous request, but the time for allowing the recital of the command-Pātimokkha for my disciples has not yet arrived, even though it is repeatedly indicated by you according to inference 'etassa bhagavā kālo,' that is not the time, but the Tathāgata himself will know the time there." Since it is said "from the time of the establishment of the rules of training, only the command-Pātimokkha is recited," therefore, he speaks with reference to only the rules of training that are sufficient for the recital of the Pātimokkha. "Tatthāti sikkhāpadapaññattiyācanāpekkhaṃ bhummavacana": Only one word is said, from the accomplishment of that, the other is accomplished. "Sāvakānaṃ visayabhāvanti iminā mahāpadumattheravādo paṭikkhitto," it is said in the Anugaṇṭhipada, that seems beautiful. Sammukhe is garahā. Parammukhe is upavādo. "Na, bhikkhave, ūnadasavassena…pe… dukkaṭassā" (Mahāva. 75): The Blessed One established this rule of training having been a Buddha for ten years, because of the absence of such an establishment of the rule of training for one who is less than ten years old. Not at that time when there were those over ten years old, because those ten years old had attained seniority, therefore it is established that that rule of training was established in Rājagaha before the rains retreat in Verañjā, with that established, it is indeed established that "yāva na saṅgho rattaññumahattaṃ pattoti vacanaṃ ito pubbe paṭhamayācanāyapi vutta," and in the Aṭṭhakathā also, at the time of attaining seniority, "dve sikkhāpadānīti" the statement of the limitation of the count is said with reference to the statement said in the first request. Otherwise, only two, not others, occur at the time of attaining seniority.

In ‘‘Atha kho āyasmato sāriputtassā’’tiādi, the explanation of the meaning begins thus: it seems that venerable Sāriputta, having attained Arahatship while elaborating upon a single verse of the Dhamma teaching received from venerable Assaji Thera with hundreds of thousands of methods and standing in the knowledge of a disciple who has reached the perfection, thought, "Indeed, this Saddhamma is of great power, which, even without the Teacher of the Dhamma, having only been heard from another's mouth, produced a great special quality in me. Well indeed, may this Saddhamma last long!" Contemplating the matter of “Which Buddhas, Blessed Ones…do not last long?” and the cause, by means of his knowledge as the foremost disciple, having determined that "the establishment of rules of training for the disciples is a cause for long standing," he asked the Blessed One in order to make an opportunity for requesting the establishment of the Vinaya. Then, when the opportunity arose for answering the question and requesting the establishment of the Vinaya, he requested the establishment of the Vinaya, saying, "This is the time, Blessed One, this is the time, Sugata." Then, the Blessed One, showing the acceptance of his request, the unsuitability of the time stated in "This is the time, Blessed One," and that the time is not unrelated, said "Come, then." Then, the Blessed One, considering his request and compassion for beings, and considering the vastness and greatness in the manner of "At that time, monks were without preceptors, without teachers, not being advised," (Mahāva. 64) the Teacher established for the disciples the duties of preceptors, etc., and the rules of training appropriate to them. Then, gradually, he resided at Verañjā for twelve years. And then venerable Sāriputta, when the causes for long standing, as indicated by the Teacher, had arisen, thinking "Now the greatness of the Teacher's Dispensation with its nine parts has arisen, and many Vinaya rules have arisen, but only the Pātimokkha recitation has not yet been permitted to the disciples, and that is done by a Saṅgha that is purified. And the Saṅgha is now purified because of the Sotāpanna in the final part," wishing to obtain permission for the Pātimokkha recitation, requested the Pātimokkha recitation, with the request for the establishment of as many training rules as are permitted by the Pātimokkha recitation, and when the opportunity for the request arose in the order of questions and answers indicating previously arisen thoughts, he said, "This is the time, Blessed One," and so on.

It should be explained by the Bhaddāli Sutta (Ma. Ni. 2.134 ff.). For there, when many rules of training had been established and were being established, it was said, "Bhaddāli, the Teacher does not yet establish a rule of training for the disciples," (Ma. Ni. 2.145) regarding what was not yet established; so here too, it should be understood as said with reference to what was not yet established. Showing that because of the purity of the Saṅgha, he does not yet permit the command Pātimokkha recitation to the disciples, he said, "Nirabbudo" and so on. For in a pure Saṅgha, there is no reason for not reciting the exhortation Pātimokkha, and in that case, there is the intention of permitting the command Pātimokkha recitation. And so, after the passing of eight years from then, it was permitted. As it is said in the Pātimokkhaṭhapanakkhandhaka (Cūḷava. 386), "I will not, monks, from now on, perform the Uposatha…recite the Pātimokkha." But the event that came up in the Upasampadakkhandhaka (Mahāva. 129), "At that time, monks, having ordained a certain monk, departed leaving him alone…he engaged in sexual intercourse with her and returned after a long time," was said in order to connect it appropriately there, even though it arose after the Sudinna event. Similarly, in that same place, the components should also be understood by "Both Pātimokkhas are well learned by him in detail," (Pāci. 147; A. Ni. 8.52; 10.33) etc. For the two Pātimokkhas were not established from the beginning. Moreover, this sequence should be understood from the beginning, as follows: when Rāhula Kumāra was born, the Bodhisatta went forth, did austerities for six years, and in the seventh year attained enlightenment, and in that same year, he went to Kapilavatthu and ordained Rāhula Kumāra. In the Ambalaṭṭhikarāhulovādasuttaṭṭhakathā (Ma. Ni. Aṭṭha. 2.107 ff.), it is said, "For this venerable one, at the age of seven, having taken hold of the Teacher's robe and begged for an inheritance, saying, 'Give me an inheritance, Samaṇa, give me an inheritance,' was handed over by the Blessed One to the Dhamma General Sāriputta Thera and was ordained." Therefore, regarding Rāhula Kumāra, because it was said, "I allow, monks, the Sāmaṇera ordination with the three refuges," (Mahāva. 105) the Saraṇagamana Upasampadā was rejected within the first year itself, and it is understood that the Upasampadā by Ñatticatutthakamma was permitted. Moreover, in the Rāhulavatthu, the rule of training was established, "A son who has not been permitted by his parents should not be ordained, monks; whoever ordains him, there is an offense of wrong-doing," (Mahāva. 105) therefore, it is established that training rules were established even before this.

Having heard the way of cessation of cause,
He quickly understood the means to cessation;
Born of discernment, completely this,
The world saw, the Sugata’s foremost disciple.

He, the Dhamma General, the foremost disciple,
Of the Saddhamma King, the Tathāgata;
Himself by the Sage, fame attained,
In many ways, sixteenfold praised.

Therefore, the time of the binding of the training rules,
Even to know is very difficult in the world;
How much more so the difference in the nature of the training rules,
How much more so another in both places there.

Even Paccekabuddhas, that duality,
Cannot know, how much more to lead;
Without doubt there, the Tathāgata alone,
Will know, thus spoke the Tathāgata.

Having known this matter here, a bhikkhu,
The order and difference in nature of the training rules;
To know oneself, not to lead others,
A suitable path should be sought here.

Vitakka means thought. Yācanā means request, which proceeded with "Etassa bhagavā kālo" and so on. Kālo means the time of attaining seniority, vastness, gain, great learning and greatness. Kālaññū means the All-knowing alone. Kāraṇaṃ means the manifestation of things that are the basis for influxes. Phalaṃ means the warding off of things that are the basis for influxes, from the statement, "For the sake of warding off those very things that are the basis for influxes." Payojanaṃ means the long standing of the Dispensation and the Holy Life, from the statement, "So that this Holy Life may be long lasting." Here there is the following:

"Thought, request, time, knowing the time, cause, fruit,
Purpose, these seven are the basis of the Vinaya here."

22.Antimamaṇḍalaṃ means the inner circle. For that is inside the others, or the smaller circle. Datvā, having given to those monks in the manner of giving approval. Veneyyasattā, beings to be tamed by the Buddhas' wanderings. Ocinantā viya, like gardeners who, going to a place with many flowers, pick them for a long time; in the same way, living for a long time in villages and so on with many to-be-tamed beings, wandering while collecting the merit of those to-be-tamed. Santaṃ sukhaṃ, peaceful bliss, not agitated like the bliss of feeling. Dasasahassacakkavāḷe, in the ten thousand world-system, is said in terms of the gods. But humans who can be taught arise in this world-system itself. Mahākaruṇā, great compassion, constantly observes beings equally. Otiṇṇe, having come into the middle of the assembly, or having been announced. For what reason should we give you alms-gifts? How is it possible to obtain that? For the life of a householder is full of many duties. In the second alternative, taṃ means the alms-gift. Anugaṇṭhipade it is said, "From where did you obtain that?" Some say, "First, he looks at the action, second, the alms-gift." The Ācariya, however, says, "For the first arrangement, from where is it possible to obtain the merit of giving? For the life of a householder is full of hindrances to merit. For the second arrangement, he shows how can I give within three months what I should give, since the time has passed." Dhammaratanavassaṃ, the rain of the Jewel of the Dhamma, such as showing the qualities of morality, etc.

23.Pattuṇṇa means excellent cloth in a bowl. Mahāyāgaṃ means a great gift. Paripuṇṇasaṅkappaṃ means "it should be heard for three months, let it be heard today."

Tatridaṃ means this is the reason.

Ācariyaparamparato, from the line of teachers. Regarding the external and internal basis, and the unique basis, which is the place of establishment of the training rules, he said, ‘‘nidānassa pabhedadīpanato’’, from the exposition of the divisions of the basis. Vatthuppabhedo, divisions of the subject matter, such as the Theravāda, etc. Parasamayavivajjanato, from the avoidance of other doctrines, such as destroying the bhikkhunī Mettiya by one's own pledge, etc. Vibhaṅganayabhedadassanato, from showing the divisions of the Vibhaṅga method, such as the three women on the ground, on the land, etc. Here he says – does the Blessed One not have the power to ward off Māra's circle? He does, but still, he accepts it because it is a cause for faith in the time of Upagutta afterwards. Here the determination of Upagutta should be stated. If one asks, what is the purpose of seeing the crow for the Buddhas who are accustomed to it? The purpose is that it is a hindrance to the merit of the Brahmin, which is a cause for Māra's circle.

The crow too, the desire of Māra,
Breaking, to the foremost of Jinas,
With his disciples, gave a gift,
Completely, various kinds of allowable goods.

Did the Blessed One, with his disciples, make such a great amount of allowable goods into a burden and depart? He did not depart; but the Teacher, not rejecting the alms-gift, which was a portion for three months, gave it to the Brahmin by a means.

Otherwise, the desire of Māra,
Would be fulfilled, not the crow's anymore;
Evil, great, he might attain,
With wrong conceit, in the Tathāgata.

Therefore, the Blessed One, approving that alms-gift, not rejecting it, having made the Brahmin's mind meritorious by a means, and having thwarted Māra's desire, departed; they say that "this method is established even without the commentary, according to the Pāḷi method." How?

"If the Teacher, with his disciples, had taken,
That robe of the crow from the beginning;
For the Protector, not in twenty years,
Would the request of Jīvaka be contradicted;
Still, having considered everything well,
It is proper to think of a proper method."

‘‘Atha kho bhagavā verañjāyaṃ yathābhirantaṃ viharitvā’’tiādi, he said. Staying here –

The training rules, of all,
The order of difference he declared;
With that established, of the bases,
The establishment of order from whence it would be.

In the Aṭṭhakathā it is said, "By this same method, they applied it to the Khandhaka and Parivāra too," etc. (Pārā. Aṭṭha. 1.paṭhamamahāsaṅgītikathā). Moreover, in the Pāḷi, "By this same method, he asked about both Vinayas. Asked and asked, venerable Upāli answered," only this much is said; therefore, Mahākassapa asked only about both Vibhaṅgas. But venerable Upāli, in answering, explained everything without remainder, including the Khandhaka and Parivāra. And then, the Khandhaka and Parivāra Pāḷi was made separate; this is the order of the teaching. If so, should the Niddānuddesa be taught first? No, because that is not possible. For that, proceeding in the manner of "Whoever has an offense," (Mahāva. 134) and so on, is not possible without showing the offenses included in the training rules first. From the statement, "Those training rules that I have established for the monks, he should permit the recitation of the Pātimokkha for them," only the training rules should be taught first, and thus the order of the Pārājikuddesa is possible.

This statement in the Parivāra is contradictory; with that, in the Pārājikuddesa, which attained the state of being taught first by the previous three orders, Thera Upāli, wishing to teach the Methunadhamma Pārājika first because it arose first, brought it to Vesālī and established it there. Otherwise, if there was an intention to teach those established in Bārāṇasī, such as "Human flesh should not be eaten, monks," (Mahāva. 280) etc., he would have brought it to Bārāṇasī and established it there.

The Abbhantaranidānakathā is finished.

The Verañjakaṇḍavaṇṇanā is finished.

1. Pārājikakaṇḍa

1. Paṭhamapārājika

Sudinnabhāṇavāravaṇṇanā

Here in the first Nidāna, staying, of the Pārājika it should be understood;
The way of accusation and avoidance, and the exposition of the individual and the event.

There, the Blessed One, having spent the rainy season in Verañjā, while wandering on tour in due course, reached Vesālī in the dark fortnight of Kattika. From then until the promulgation of the first pārājika training rule, it appears according to the Pāli order as if he dwelt in Vesālī for eight years. But the Blessed One did not dwell there for such a long time. For, having permitted going forth and full admission in the presence of Sudinna's followers, and having dwelt there as long as he pleased, while wandering on tour, he reached Bhesakaḷāvana and spent the thirteenth rainy season there. In the same sequence, having reached Sāvatthi, he spent the fourteenth rainy season there; the fifteenth in Kapilavatthu; the sixteenth in Āḷavī. Then, having spent the rainy season, while wandering on tour, having reached Rājagaha, he spent the seventeenth rainy season. In this same sequence, he spent three more rainy seasons there. Thus, the Blessed One, having completed twenty years, reached Vesālī in due course from Rājagaha. Then, Sudinna, being eight years after his full admission, engaged in sexual intercourse in Vesālī itself. Therefore, it should be understood that the Blessed One promulgated the first pārājika concerning that matter. Here, since the Elder Upāli intends to show the training rules promulgated there in Vesālī earlier than this, and intends to show the first pārājika immediately after the Vinaya Nidāna, therefore, having combined the first residence in Vesālī and the residence at the time of the promulgation of this training rule, he said, "There, indeed, the Blessed One was in Vesālī," etc. Therefore, it was said, "Here in the first Nidāna, having stayed …pe… for declaration." Therefore, in this Nidāna, which is the location for the promulgation of the first pārājika, "Then, at that time, near Vesālī, there was a village named Kalandagāma…pe… dwelling dependent on a certain Vajjian village," in this declaration of the individual for this training rule, and "Then, at that time, the Vajjians were in famine…pe… he engaged in sexual intercourse three times" (pārā. 30), in this declaration of the incident, the way of questioning and the way of refutation should be understood. Here, this is the declaration: Why did the Elder not mention the individuals and incidents of other training rules in brief, as he did here, but instead, without leaving anything out, mention in detail where he originated, how he was pleased with the Dhamma, how he went forth, and how he caused this incident to arise, all the individuals and incidents? It is said:

Thus, with faith, with difficulty, with great wealth being renounced;
Even those who went forth, and those who are entirely virtuous.

In this Doctrine of all gains, if sexual intercourse should occur;
Not just by Dhamma teaching alone, is complete restraint achieved.

Therefore, even in the nine-factored Dhamma, taught by the Teacher;
Vinaya must be promulgated, then by purification of Dhamma.

Without Vinaya, thus, transgression will occur;
Therefore, the promulgation of Vinaya, is meaningful even for the virtuous.

Not seeing danger, because of what evil he committed;
Vinaya alone, for the faithful, reveals the dangers.

Therefore, for those following faith, Vinaya is indeed meaningful;
Dhamma for those following Dhamma, therefore both teachings.

Moreover, the declaration of the obviousness of the transgression is to show that even for one not transgressing the rule, regret is spread as far as the Brahma realm, let alone for others. How? –

Incapable of arahantship, was Sudinna, the mother of his child;
The rule was not made for those capable, it was not made for that purpose.

Surely, the Elder revealed the arising of arahantship in the mothers of germinating seeds to show this meaning: that he teaches the Dhamma for the benefit of his parents, having overlooked Māgaṇḍika. The statement, "Then, at that time, near Vesālī, there was a village named Kalandagāma, at the time when Sudinna engaged in sexual intercourse with his former wife," or "at the time when the Blessed One promulgated the first pārājika," does not fit here. Why? Because the commentary statement, "Here, both the causal meaning and the instrumental meaning are possible," is not found here. For that village is long-established, not just at that time. However, since that long-established village deserves to be said to exist at all times from the time of its establishment, therefore, in that way, it is said, "Then, at that time, near Vesālī, there was a village named Kalandagāma."

25-6. "Were you permitted?" The Blessed One asks to show the monastic duty. "Not permitted by my parents," it is said that he asked to show that he was not permitted by his father alone. "Tathāgatas do not, Sudinna..." Indeed, he said this in the manner of a request, "May the Blessed One ordain me," not that the Blessed One himself gave the refuges and ordained him. "Of suffering..." Here, there is a remainder of the reading, "even a small part." "In both alternatives..." In the second and third alternatives. "Of the first word..." Of the word "kiñci". "By the latter word..." By the word "dukkhassa". "Same inflection..." Is a possessive expression. As what? It should have been said, "kassaci dukkhassa," but it was said, "kiñci dukkhassa," this should be understood. "We will involuntarily be without you..." We will live unwillingly without you, without dying with you. Even if we do not die, we will involuntarily experience separation from you. Even while you are alive, our death might occur; even by death, we will involuntarily experience separation from you.

30. "Having gathered strength for a few days..." Why, though he was so eagerly willing for ordination, having been permitted, did he linger at home for a few days and not gather bodily strength? Because he was pleased with his parents and friends by their giving consent, for the sake of their happiness. In some commentary books, some teachers write, with the idea that "this Sudinna, after the Jīvaka incident, became a rag-robe wearer by way of the rag-robe practice," that "having rejected the householder's robe, he becomes a rag-robe wearer by way of the rag-robe practice," but that contradicts the statement "newly fully admitted." "Thus, Sudinna went forth in the twelfth year after the Blessed One, and entered his relatives' house for alms in the twentieth year, having himself been eight years after his going forth," and it contradicts the commentary statement, "From the time the Blessed One attained Buddhahood until this incident, in these twenty years, no one used a householder's robe, all were rag-robe wearers," being eight years after going forth, not after full admission. However, he obtained full admission after the Jīvaka incident (mahāva. 326), so is it necessary that he entered his relatives' house for alms? No, because it is said together immediately afterward, "Sudinna Kalandaputta obtained going forth in the presence of the Blessed One, he obtained full admission." For immediately after going forth, he was fully admitted, living with the thirteen ascetic qualities, having dwelt in the Vajjian village for eight years, being independent due to being free from dependence, and having considered, "Now the Vajjians are in famine," etc., he approached Vesālī. Therefore, only that reading which appears in those books, "He becomes a rag-robe wearer by way of the rag-robe practice," should be taken as authoritative. By "a forest dweller," the five connected with dwelling in the forest are included, and the practice of sitting, because it is part of the dwelling. By "an alms-food eater," the five connected with eating alms-food are included. By "a rag-robe wearer," the two connected with robes are included. The practice of wandering for alms from house to house is stated separately, with the intention of explaining the reason for approaching his relatives' house, this should be understood. "Do not delay too long," is said in terms of timeliness. Because it is a greater obstacle to the Dhamma, "this is not the way," it is indeed a non-way.

For usually, when the destruction of beings is at hand;
A non-way, in the guise of a way, stands occupying the wise.

36. "A training rule not yet promulgated..." Here, there are two kinds of training rule promulgation. How? "And thus, bhikkhus, should you recite this training rule," in this way, there are two kinds, by way of recitation and non-recitation. There, the five aggregates of offenses that come in the Pātimokkha in their own form are called the recitation promulgation. That too is of two kinds, by way of specifying individuals and not specifying individuals. There, that promulgation in which an individual is shown along with or without the offense is called specifying individuals. The other is to be understood as not specifying individuals. Specifying individuals is also of two kinds, by way of offenses shown and not shown. There, the eight pārājika Dhammas are called offenses not shown. For there, only the individual is shown, "He is defeated, he is not in communion," not the offense. In the bhikkhunī Pātimokkha, "Seventeen saṅghādisesa Dhammas, a saṅghādisesa requiring expulsion," there the offense is shown along with the individual, so offenses are shown. Likewise, not specifying individuals is also of two kinds, by way of offenses shown and not shown. There, the sekhiya Dhammas are called offenses not shown. The remaining are to be understood as offenses shown. That too is of two kinds, by way of not specifying the agent and specifying the agent. There, not specifying the agent means the fifteen kinds by way of the training rules of emission of semen, lying, reviling speech, tale-bearing, injury to vegetation, speaking beside the point, inciting, communal meals, successive meals, liquor and intoxicants, snapping the fingers, jesting, lack of respect, striking with the palm, and making a bed of leaves. The remaining are to be understood as specifying the agent by way of specifying individuals.

A word-division training rule is, for example, "One should not come naked. If one comes, there is an offense of wrong-doing (dukkaṭa)" (pārā. 517). An intervening offense training rule is, for example, "I allow, bhikkhus, when withdrawing during the day, to withdraw having closed the door" (pārā. 75). A removal of unsuitables training rule is, for example, "One who causes a flow of blood, bhikkhus, not yet fully admitted, should not be fully admitted; one fully admitted should be expelled" (mahāva. 114). An offense of wrong-doing and serious offense promulgated in the Khandhakas a promulgation training rule is, for example, "Whatever bhikkhunī should go to see dancing, singing, or instrumental music, there is an offense entailing expiation (pācittiya)" (pāci. 834). Whatever kind of offense or Vinaya act visible in the commentary similar to that said by this, "Whatever bhikkhunī should dance, sing, or play instruments, there is an offense entailing expiation," an unstated-success training rule is. This sixfold (training rule) is not worthy of recitation for six reasons, it should be understood as a non-recitation training rule. That is to say: because serious offenses and wrong speech are dissimilar from the five recitations as appropriate; because the two, the offense of wrong-doing and the serious offense, are similar in incident but dissimilar in offense; because the intervening offense promulgation training rules are offenses of various incidents; because the rejection training rules and some of the removal of unsuitables promulgation training rules are offenses not shown; because the serious offense that follows division is an incident not shown; and because the unstated-success training rules are incidents and offenses not shown. Thus, what was said, "There are two kinds of training rule promulgation, by way of recitation and non-recitation," that is declared in brief.

"A training rule not yet promulgated" is to be understood as said referring to the recitation training rule. Some teachers, it is said, describe it thus: "Having asked a question such as, 'How many years after enlightenment were the four pārājikas promulgated by the Blessed One?' in those, the first pārājika was promulgated in Vesālī, five years after enlightenment, in the first month of the winter season, in the second fortnight, on the tenth day, at half the forenoon shadow, facing east, while sitting amidst one hundred and thirty-five bhikkhus, concerning Sudinna Kalandaputta." That is not fitting. Why? –

Since in the twelfth year, the Victorious One dwelt in Verañjā;
And in that, the Saṅgha was pure, therefore no pārājika then.

The Elder Sāriputta's request for the training rule promulgation;
In that it was accomplished, a serious offense did not exist then.

And the Ovāda Pātimokkha, did the Teacher, four years old;
Reject? And what was commanded, he approved completely.

Relying on Ajātasattu, he caused division in the Saṅgha;
Devadatta, therefore, the Saṅgha-division, in the final enlightenment.

"Bhikkhus requested me before," the Sage spoke;
The Sutta alone is the authority, not that time so insignificant.

Vālakābya arises, the incident of Vālakābya should be told. Maṇḍabya, it is said, by merely touching the navel. However, in the seeing of form, physicians say –

"The seed of women, when seeing, sometimes moves in the vulva;
That doing the village-Dhamma, coming together equally;
Is the way of conception," this is the way, women seeing men.

Thus they also say –

"In a pure field of flowers, seeing a man and a woman, ‘He is leading the foetus away,’ thus the meaning of ‘kāso’."

Rājorodho viya: Like a royal obstruction—in the island of Sri Lanka, it happened to a certain woman; therefore, it is said thus. Although the sound rose up to the Brahma realm, it was not within the sphere of humans, like their form. Therefore, the monks asked, "Surely, friend Sudinna, you are not dissatisfied?"

39. Kali means anger; its teaching, kalisāsana, is strife. Gāmadhamma here means the custom of the country, the accomplishment of the inhabitants of the country. Attā means mind and body. Asuttantavinibaddha means not included in the Vinaya-sutta, not included in the Sutta and Abhidhamma, meaning pāḷivinimutta (outside the Pali canon). Kusumamāla refers to various qualities. Ratanadāma refers to the attainment of wealth. Paṭikkhipanādhippāyā like Bhaddāli. Word definitions and etymologies are simply synonyms, as in "nāmaṃ nāmakammaṃ nāmadheyyaṃ niruttī" etc. (Dhs. 1315). Abstinence without alternative is called a training rule (sikkhāpada). In the case of unwholesome factors, misconduct (dussīlyaṃ) is the name for volition (cetanā). Even in the case of wholesome factors, in the Vibhaṅga it is called "sikkhāpada" in terms of cetanā. Saṅghasuṭṭhutāyā: Here, the well-being of the Sangha occurs when an offense against the world (lokavajja) is declared, due to obvious faults. The ease of the Sangha occurs when an offense by regulation (paññattivajja) is declared, due to obvious benefits. Of these, the first is the restraint of the stubborn, the second is the comfortable dwelling of the virtuous. The first is the prevention of defilements (āsavas) relating to future lives, the second is the prevention of those relating to the present life. Likewise, the first is the arising of faith in those without faith, the second is the increase of faith in those who have faith. Because it was said, "Due to past meritorious deeds, a capable clansman being urged," some say that "Sudinna, having dispelled that remorse, realized arahantship; therefore, ordination was permitted," but it should be examined. Thus, it should be understood that the first is the stability of the true Dhamma, the second is the support of the Vinaya.

Lokavajjaṃ means that even in the absence of volition to transgress either the subject matter or the regulation, if one does what is prohibited or does not do what should be done, there is a possibility of an offense (āpatti). Apart from all that, drinking alcohol should be understood as paṇṇattivajja. The duties for newcomers, residents, travelers, rejoicing, the meal hall, alms-round, forest-dwelling, lodging, hot-bath hall, latrine, co-resident, preceptor, pupil, and teacher—these, when counted by the method of taking what has not been taken, are fourteen; however, these, in detail, are called eighty-two great duties. Restraint through the seven groups of offenses is saṃvaravinayo, the training rule of regulation itself. Here, paññattivinayo is for the purpose of calming-restraint (samathavinaya); samathavinayo is for the purpose of restraint-restraint (saṃvaravinaya); saṃvaravinayo is for the purpose of abandoning-restraint (pahānavinaya)—this connection should be understood. Yaṃ saṅghasuṭṭhu, taṃ saṅghaphāsū: What is good for the Sangha is ease for the Sangha—it is said as if it were one, to show that ease for the Sangha will occur when there is well-being for the Sangha. Pakarīyanti: here, the purposes, known as specific advantages—therefore, purpose is called "pakaraṇa." By making each of the ten bases a root, a hundred words are stated by joining them ten times. Therein, based on the last word, there are a hundred meanings; based on the first, there are a hundred Dhammas; based on the etymologies that illuminate the meanings, there are a hundred etymologies; based on the etymologies that are Dhamma, there are a hundred etymologies—thus, two hundred etymologies. In the hundred meanings, there are a hundred knowledges; in the hundred Dhammas, there are a hundred knowledges; in the two hundred etymologies, there are two hundred knowledges—thus, four hundred knowledges should be understood. Here, saṅghasuṭṭhutā means the well-being of the Dhamma-Sangha. It is said that "Atthapadāni are the commentaries. Dhammapadāni are the Pali texts."

Methunaṃ dhammaṃ: The act of sexual intercourse—having thus frequently obtained its name—by one's own engagement or by the engagement of another, if one enjoys, in the introduction, insertion, staying, and withdrawal of one's own organ in one's own passage or in another's passage or of another's organ in one's own passage, any one act as a way of consenting, he is defeated and not in communion. However, some say, "If he enjoys four, three, two, or one of the introductions, etc., he is defeated. For it was said, 'If he enjoys the introduction, insertion, staying, withdrawal, he incurs an offense entailing defeat'" (Pārā. 59). According to their view, he incurs four offenses entailing defeat in each of the four. They themselves say thus: "Let him incur an offense entailing defeat for the act of sexual intercourse, related to the offense entailing defeat for the act of sexual intercourse." "Since that person, having incurred an offense entailing defeat and an offense requiring a meeting of the Sangha due to his own transgression, having renounced the training and having committed an offense entailing defeat for sexual intercourse, etc., while a householder, and having ordained again and having been fully ordained, after expiating one or many offenses requiring a meeting of the Sangha, is free from offense, therefore, he is subject to offense as a householder," therefore, even for one who has committed the final matter, there is still a rising from the offense. However, it is not said "for each attempt, there is an offense entailing defeat" because he is not purified by declarations of rising and because there is no purpose in counting. Although it is not said, nevertheless, in the Padabhājana, this meaning is established by the statement "there is an offense entailing defeat," and it is also a valid argument. If so, in the Mātikā also, it should be said, "yo pana bhikkhu methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiseveyya pārājika," and the non-residual statement of the pārājika would not be fitting. Indeed, since in all the groups of offenses, the counting of monks also remains without residue, by making the statement non-residual, the offense is only in the introduction, not in the insertion, etc., and the statement in the introductory section should be understood as referring to that one alone, including even the offense entailing defeat, "yassa siyā āpattī." Therefore, in the Mātikā, without saying "pārājika," the statement "pārājiko hotī" is a designation of the person, to indicate his inability for higher ordination due to that bodily bond. The statement in the Padabhājana, "Āpatti pārājikassa," is to indicate the state of being a thief-communicant of a person who has committed the final matter, since there is non-communion of the pārājika. Indeed, even though he enjoys communion, he is not a thief-communicant; therefore, he is called "a monk who has been fully ordained." Therefore, he said, "A person is impure who has committed one of the offenses entailing defeat, and if, being of pure view, he makes an accusation without grounds, intending to scold, he incurs an offense of wrong speech" (Pārā. 389). Since this does not apply to one who is not fully ordained, it is established that he is called "a monk who has been fully ordained." By that, it should be understood that he does not produce corruption of Dhamma or cohabitation, but he does produce slander of monks, etc. However, in the Sanghādisesas for nuns, even after making a designation of the person, "ayampi bhikkhunī…pe… āpannā" (Pāci. 679), to show the difference in the procedure for rising from a Sanghādisesa for monks, the name of the offense, "nissāraṇīyaṃ saṅghādisesa" (Pāci. 679), is also stated, to show a different intention from the pārājika. To this extent, the pair of offenses, shown and not shown, in personal designation, is expanded. In the absence of personal designations, the reason for showing the offense in the Sekhiyas is stated in the Aṭṭhakathā of the Sekhiyas themselves. In the absence of that, the showing of the offense is stated in the others. The pair of offenses, shown and not shown, is also expanded in the absence of personal designations.

The Commentary on the First Promulgation Story is Concluded.

The Sudinna Recitation Section is Concluded.

The Commentary on the Story of the Female Monkey

40-1. In the second promulgation, as in "here the Mallas are fighting," etc., the present tense "paṭisevatī" is stated in terms of frequent engagement. "And that must be with a human female, not with an animal," he said this first promulgation, complete in meaning, due to his own wrong grasp or for the sake of concealing a fault. To determine its completeness, it was said, "Surely, friend, that is so." Therefore, the story of the female monkey is placed among the decided cases because there is no difference, as is the story of the Vajjiputtakas. The investigation here will become clear in the third promulgation. "Surely, friend, by the Blessed One in many ways," etc., is stated to show that it is established not only by the uddesa-training rule, but also by the anuddesa-training rule, "pārājika even with animals," etc. Or else, if he promulgated the uddesa-training rule as incomplete, it is stated to show that with this anuddesa-training rule, why is it not established? "Then, monks, I will promulgate a training rule for the monks," meaning that I will promulgate that same training rule, the first promulgation itself, making the fault-seekers without opportunity for fault-finding, making it for the sake of repetition. Otherwise, as in "a Pācittiya for one who speaks differently, harasses," etc. (Pāci. 101), he incurs two offenses with two incidents, but he does not incur them. That same meaning is clearly revealed by another statement, and the intention is that it is made stronger by making it well-expressed and very clear. It is thus clarified in the third promulgation and in others.

In yassa sacittakapakkheti, etc., first the method of the knot-words is stated. Sacittakapakkhe (in the case of what is with volition) is said referring to what is without volition, such as drinking alcohol. However, in the case of what is with volition, that which is entirely produced by only unwholesome intention: both are called lokavajja. For in drinking alcohol, knowing "this is alcohol" or "it is not proper to drink," it is only unwholesome. Likewise, for nuns, there is no fault in applying it for the sake of color or fragrance, or applying it for medicinal purposes; therefore, only "avicāraṇīya" (not to be investigated) is stated. There, the statement "jānitvā" (knowing) does not fit in "it is not proper," since it would cause the offense by regulation to also be an offense against the world. Desiring to avoid this undesirable consequence, it is stated in Vajirabuddhi Thera's knot-word that "here, investigation of both 'with volition' and 'without volition' occurs only in the knowledge of the object, not in the knowledge of the regulation. If it were in the knowledge of the regulation, all the training rules would only be offenses against the world, but not all training rules are offenses against the world; therefore, it occurs only in the knowledge of the object." This fits. Why? Because in the Sekhiyas, knowledge of the regulation alone is the measure, not merely knowledge of the object. However, what is stated there, "if someone were to pour alcohol into the mouth of one who is asleep, and if it enters inside, there is an offense; there, just as for a nun who, when someone touches her unsupported knee joint, etc., does not move her body but enjoys it with her mind, it is said that 'there is only action' because action is generally possible, so too, at that time, there is only action," that is well-considered because it establishes a state of not being entirely unwholesome. However, the entirely unwholesome nature of the offense of drinking alcohol is stated because even one who is conscious of alcohol drinks it with one attempt.

Here, the meaning is this: taking the offense as the heading of the training rule, that training rule for which the mind is only unwholesome in the case of what is with volition, that is an offense against the world. Compiling this meaning: "that for which the mind is only unwholesome in the case of what is with volition," including both what is with volition and what is without volition, even that—such as drinking alcohol—is an offense against the world. For this statement "sacittakapakkheti" refers to what is without volition. Indeed, there is no purpose in the specification "sacittakapakkheti" for what is with volition in one sense. Since here, in the offense by regulation, with a mind that knows the regulation, the mind is only unwholesome in the case of what is with volition, but with a mind that knows the object, the mind in the case of what is with volition could be wholesome, could be unwholesome, could be indeterminate, therefore, it is not said that "for that, the mind is only unwholesome in the case of what is with volition," and "the rest is an offense by regulation" is stated. Since there is no transgression in the supernormal state (adhimāna), and there is no possibility of communication in a dream, the shadow of transgression existing in a dream is also said to be without possibility of communication. However, this statement is also stated because it is for the purpose of strengthening the deed or weakening it. Therefore, that which is stated in the section on external causes, "the purpose is generally to strengthen the deed or weaken it," etc., should be understood as well-stated.

The Commentary on the Story of the Female Monkey is Concluded.

The Commentary on the Story of the Vajjiputtakas

43-4.The Vajjīs dwell in the regions of the Vajjī country, their sons are called Vajjinos. Yāvadattha means: to whatever extent there is a purpose or intention. What was said there, "without renouncing the training, without declaring weakness," is fitting when the enactment concerns the renunciation of the training and, at the same time, the declaration of weakness; not otherwise. Even so, it is said with reference to something that should be enacted now. For how could the Chabbaggiya monks wear extra robes (pārā. 459), the Āḷavaka monks have huts built that are immeasurable (pārā. 342), the nuns ordain a sikkhamānā who has not trained in the six rules for two years (pāci. 1077), and ordain someone without the Saṅgha's consent, etc. (pāci. 1084)? For before that, neither the taking on nor the assigning was allowed, due to the absence of which one might say "extra robes," or a measure was not enacted, due to the absence of which one might say "immeasurable." This should be seen as properly connected. Having requested ordination, saying, "Let the Sangha lift me up, venerable sirs, taking compassion," (mahāva. 71, 126) immediately upon being ordained it was enacted, "A bhikkhu who has been ordained should not engage in the sexual act; he is no longer a son of the Sakyans," (mahāva. 129) and if one intends to go to a state of non-asceticism etc., surely one should first renounce the training one has undertaken, or declare weakness in that regard. However, it should be understood that they "engaged in the sexual act without renouncing the training, without declaring weakness" was said to provide an opportunity for the subsequent enactment. Although it is stated here, "That one, having come, should not be ordained," it should be understood as appropriate for the other pārājikas as well. For one who commits a pārājika offense—taking what is not given, considered theft, or taking the life of a human being, or falsely claiming superior human qualities when aware of it—without renouncing the training or declaring weakness, that one, having come, should not be ordained. Subsequent enactments serve the purpose of strengthening strict rules and relaxing lenient rules. Indeed, it serves the purpose of showing the fixed rule for one who has a pārājika or another offense, due to the characteristic of subsequent enactment. It is like the subsequent enactment stated at the beginning, not at the end, "in a village or in the wilderness" (pārā. 91). But in this training rule, which is complete—

"The basis is the division of the synopsis, the analysis is its regulator;
Then the division of the offense, the non-offense is otherwise." –

Vibhaṅgo taṃniyāmako: The analysis is the regulator of the intended meaning of that synopsis. In the Analysis, the rule is made by closing off all opportunities with passages such as, "There are three women. There are three hermaphrodites. There are three eunuchs. There are three men. In a human woman, there are three paths…pe… in a male animal, there are two paths," etc. (pārā. 56).

Tato āpattiyā bhedo: Then, from that Analysis, there is a division of the offense, such as "if the body enjoys it, it is a pārājika; if it mostly enjoys it, it is a thullaccaya." Anāpatti tadaññathā: Then, from that very Analysis, the difference between non-offenses is in a manner different from the manner in which the offense was stated. For it is not evident in the absence of the Analysis that "if he enjoys it, there is an offense of pārājika, if he does not enjoy it, there is no offense." Thus, the meaning of the verse has been stated in brief. And here—

"The basis is the division of the synopsis, the purpose of the analysis;
And the kind of non-offense, the first is without purpose." –

Nidānabhedo: The synopsis is twofold: depending on a cause and not depending on a cause. There, the training rules beginning with the fourth pārājika depend on a cause. For the monks Vaggumudātīriyā did not themselves utter the untrue superior human state, which is characterized by false speech. Indeed, they praised each other's superior human qualities to the laypeople, but that was not a pārājika offense. There, using that pretext, the Buddha made that event the cause and enacted the pārājika; therefore, it is said "depending on a cause." Knowing the training rules that depend on a cause in this way, the training rules contrary to them should be understood as not depending on a cause. This is the mātikābhedo.

The division of the synopsis is begun in consideration of three reasons in all cases: to show the division of the synopsis in terms of the manifold ways of viewing the origin of the offense, the use of the basis-object, and the regulation of the mind; for the purpose of showing the division of offenses when there is transgression due to their insufficiency or the absence of one of those factors; and for the purpose of showing non-offenses when there is no transgression. Here, however, whether it is expressed merely in terms of revealing the meaning of the term, such as "bhikkhu means a bhikkhu, a bhikkhu who has undertaken the mendicant life, a bhikkhu who wears cast-off robes," or whether it is expressed merely in terms of revealing the place where the term "bhikkhu" is used, without considering the arising of the state of being a bhikkhu by convention, "a bhikkhu by convention," or whether it is expressed in terms of revealing the establishment of the state of being a bhikkhu immediately after ordination, such as "a bhikkhu by 'Come, bhikkhu', a bhikkhu ordained by taking refuge, a bhikkhu ordained by the ñatticatuttha-kamma," or whether it is expressed in terms of revealing a bhikkhu endowed with qualities that make one a bhikkhu, such as "a good bhikkhu, a substantial bhikkhu, a trainee bhikkhu, a non-trainee bhikkhu," the Analysis is disregarded because it is a term of general usage. Similarly, the Analysis expressed in terms of having intention in training rules in other sections, or in terms of showing the case, etc., is disregarded, because it does not exist elsewhere.

There, the Analysis expressed in terms of showing the fixed basis, such as "there are three women," the Analysis expressed in terms of showing the fixed application, such as "when one engages in the sexual act in the three paths of a human woman, there is an offense of pārājika," the Analysis expressed in terms of showing the fixed mind, such as "the bhikkhu's mind of enjoyment is present," the Analysis expressed for the purpose of showing offenses and non-offenses depending on the presence or absence of the fixed mind when there is a fixed basis-object application, such as "if he enjoys it, there is an offense of pārājika; if he does not enjoy it, there is no offense," the Analysis expressed for the purpose of showing the division of offenses when there is transgression due to the insufficiency of the object, such as "if it is mostly eaten by a dead person, there is an offense of thullaccaya," the Analysis expressed for the purpose of showing non-offenses due to the absence of transgression because of the absence of the fixed mind, such as "if he does not enjoy it, there is no offense." In this way, in the other training rules as well, this purpose should be understood according to what is appropriate.

In the eḷakaloma training rule, the words, "If, indeed, eḷakalomas should arise for a bhikkhu traveling on a journey, a bhikkhu who desires it may accept them" (pārā. 572), are merely words that reveal the object, so they are called meaningless; there is no offense for them. The purposelessness is shown by not taking it otherwise, such as "if eḷakalomas arise for one not traveling on a journey, there is no offense; if he accepts it, desiring it." What is said in the synopsis, "should engage in the sexual act," is meaningful. For the purpose of showing its purposeful nature, it is said, "there is no offense for one who does not know, one who does not enjoy." Because there is an offense when there is knowledge and enjoyment, and no offense for one who does not engage, therefore the intention of what is said in the synopsis is, "Whatever bhikkhu should engage in the sexual act, he is defeated and no longer in communion." For the purpose of resolving even those places where an offense is likely, where the five factors said, "taking a heavy item of equipment belonging to another with the thought of theft with the perception of it as belonging to another," are complete, it is said, "there is no offense if it belongs to a ghost" etc. (kaṅkhā. aṭṭha. dutiyapārājikavaṇṇanā). "There is no offense if he says, 'Know this, give this, bring this, there is a need for this, make this allowable'" etc., should be understood as said for the purpose of showing the gradual performance of what is otherwise. Thus, the meaning of the verse said beginning with "nidānamātikābhedo" has been revealed.

Here, the first enactment was enacted after exceeding the first enlightenment, and was enacted when Āyasmā Sudinna was eight years old, so it was enacted when he had attained great seniority. The second subsequent enactment arose when he had attained great learning. Just as a female animal is not intended in the training rules related to women, so too, Āyasmā Makkaṭipārājiko, with that perception, said, "Indeed, friend, the training rule was enacted by the Buddha, but that was for a human woman, not for a female animal." The third subsequent enactment arose when he had attained great gain. Indeed, those Vajjiputtakas, having attained great gain, having eaten as much as they wanted, bathed, and slept in excellent beds, caused a basis for the third subsequent enactment. And it arose in the Sangha, which had attained great abundance, and he himself had attained great abundance, so it is said, "great abundance is attained here." This first pārājika training rule should be understood as having been enacted in consideration of the three kinds of basis and having reached that time in four ways.

yo panā: the term for complete inclusion. Bhikkhū: the term that restricts excessive application. Bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhāsājīvasamāpanno: the term that distinguishes him. For not every so-called bhikkhu is one who has undertaken both the training prescribed by the Buddha as the minimum standard of training for bhikkhus ordained by any ordination whatsoever, and the livelihood said as "living together here." When did he undertake it? Immediately upon being ordained by any ordination whatsoever, whether he knows both of these or not, he is called one who has undertaken them, because he has undertaken them. Saha jīvantī: until he renounces the training or attains the state of pārājika. But what was said in the Andhaka commentary, "one who fulfills the training has undertaken the training, one who does not transgress the livelihood has undertaken the livelihood," that was said in terms of the highest standard. For one who does not fulfill the training, or who is full of thoughts of sensual pleasure, or who transgresses some of the livelihood, is not called one who has undertaken the training and livelihood. However, with the highest standard, four types are obtained: there is a bhikkhu who has undertaken the training, reviewing the precepts, but has not undertaken the livelihood, transgressing a training rule without intention; there is one who has not undertaken the training, full of thoughts of sensual pleasure, but has undertaken the livelihood, being without offense; there is one who has not undertaken the training and has not undertaken the livelihood, having committed every offense; there is one who has undertaken the training and has undertaken the livelihood, fulfilling the training and not transgressing the livelihood. This fourth bhikkhu, who is the highest, may be intended here. But if the Buddha should not say what is not the highest? No, because of the contradiction of the statement "there, the higher morality training, this is the training intended in this meaning." If the intention were to take the highest, it would be sufficient to say only "training means the three trainings." For one who has undertaken the three trainings is the most excellent of all.

In the Analysis, without touching on the training, it is said, "he trains in it, therefore he is called one who has undertaken the livelihood," thus it is shown that this is one meaning. And since he is entitled to train from the time he undertakes ordination, he is called "one who trains" and "one who has undertaken." One who is reckoned in this way as "one who has undertaken the training and livelihood," depending on such a condition, in the subsequent part, without renouncing the training called livelihood, and without declaring weakness in that very thing, should engage in the sexual act; this meaning is fitting. However, the method of the commentary has been rejected. And since it is not worthy of rejection, one should be in accordance with that.

Herein, the intention (adhippāya) should be sought out; now that is being stated: In all the training rules (sikkhāpadesu), this characteristic of a bhikkhu is common: namely, “one who has undertaken the training and livelihood of a bhikkhu.” A disciple who is a Khīṇāsava also incurs an offense unintentionally (acittakaṃ), and so does a sekkha. But an ordinary person (puthujjano) incurs even an intentional (sacittakaṃ) offense. Therefore, considering this characteristic of a bhikkhu to be common to sekkha, asekha, and puthujjana bhikkhus, and combining them into “sikkhāsājīvasamāpanno” using the method of stating the essence, a part, and the whole, and since the mention of the highest includes the lower, the highest is mentioned in the commentary. To accomplish just that, the commentary, after stating a modification regarding the non-mention of the training rule in “tasmiṃ sikkhati, tena vuccati sājīvasamāpanno,” and saying that since he has undertaken even what is not to be trained in, therefore it should be understood that he has undertaken the training, the intention of the commentary should be understood as what was stated: “yaṃ sikkhaṃ samāpanno taṃ appaccakkhāya yañca sājīvaṃ samāpanno tattha dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā.” In this intention, the undertaking of the higher training in morality (adhisīlasikkhā) is to be taken because it is comprehensive, and because the Vinaya pertains to morality. Just as when one undertakes a training rule, it is said that one undertakes morality, so it is fitting to say that when one renounces a training rule, one renounces the training called morality; therefore, it is said there, “yaṃ sikkhaṃ samāpanno, taṃ appaccakkhāyā”. By allowing ordination to one who has engaged in sexual intercourse after renouncing the training, he does not uproot. For he did not engage in it as a bhikkhu, and it is prescribed as, "yo pana bhikkhū". To this extent, what should be said about "sikkhāsājīvasamānno" has been said in brief.

What is the purpose of this specific statement? Wouldn't it be sufficient to say, "yo pana bhikkhu sikkhaṃ appaccakkhāya dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā…pe… asaṃvāso"? It should not be said so, because of an undesirable consequence. One who has undertaken the training and livelihood (sikkhāsājīvasamāpanno), such as one involved in association with thieves (theyyasaṃvāsādiko), who is merely a bhikkhu by common agreement or by declaration, also has a renunciation of the training. And for one who engages in sexual activity (methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭisevantassa) without renouncing the training, there is a Pārājika offense. And for one who, after incurring a Pārājika offense, is no longer one who has undertaken the training and livelihood, and for one who, due to being a eunuch by nature (pakkhapaṇḍakattā), has adopted the state of a eunuch and is not one who has undertaken the training and livelihood, both of those apply; thus, an offense occurs. “And in the case of being a eunuch by nature, a pakkhapaṇḍako is not eligible for ordination,” it is said, therefore it is established that he is eligible in the other case; one ordained in that case, due to being a eunuch in the case of being a eunuch, is not one who has undertaken the training and livelihood. He, without the absence of the training to be relinquished, might engage in sexual activity, such as grasping the genitals of another with his mouth (mukhena parassa aṅgajātaggahaṇādayo methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiseveyya) without renouncing the training. How could there be a Pārājika offense for him? This is the idea. This method is applicable only if one does not obtain the non-eunuch state from another; but for one who obtains it, just as there is no death at the moment of the cessation of existence (bhavaṅgavicchede) during the attainment of wholesome states by beings without form (arūpasattānaṃ kusalānaṃ samāpattikkhaṇe), so too, in the case of being a eunuch, there is bhikkhuhood. Or, for one who approves of association, there is no state of association with thieves, like one who has committed the last object (antimavatthuṃ ajjhāpannassa). Nor does he generate cohabitation, etc. But one who completes the quorum (gaṇapūrako) does not become like one who has committed the last object; he is not one who has undertaken the training and livelihood, but in the other case, he is; this is his distinction from that. Is this with a cause (sahetuko) or without a cause (ahetukoti)? It is not without a cause. Since ordination is allowed for him in the non-eunuch state, due to having a causally conditioned rebirth (sahetukapaṭisandhikattā). If it is asked why it is not allowed even in the case of being a eunuch? Because of being a eunuch (paṇḍakabhūtattā), like an opakkamikapaṇḍaka.

Even to a female animal (Antamaso tiracchānagatāyapī): this is said beginning with a human female. It is not fitting to say, "let alone in a paṇḍaka or a male." The rest is as stated in the respective places.

This is the analysis of the preamble to the first pārājika.

Description of the Fourfold Vinaya-Talk

45. Having Expelled (Nīharitvā): Here, the meaning is having expelled from the Teaching (sāsanato). "A bhikkhu endowed with five factors should not engage in Upāli. Which five? He does not know the Sutta, he does not know what is in accordance with the Sutta," (pari. 442) from this beginning, having expelled the Sutta and what is in accordance with the Sutta from the Teaching of the scriptures (pariyattisāsanato), they declared it. In the Bhārukaccha incident, "Āyasmā Upāli said thus: 'There is no offense, friend, from dreaming'," (pārā. 78) from this beginning, having expelled their own opinion from the Teaching of the scriptures, they declared it. By that own opinion, the Elder attained this foremost position. Moreover, this was said by the Blessed One: "If an unordained person or one who is declared or undeclared…pe…shows disrespect, there is an offense of wrong-doing (duukkaṭa)" (pāci. 343). There, declared (paññattaṃ) means the Sutta. The remaining three are called undeclared (apaññattaṃ). Therefore, this verse "catubbidhañhi vinayaṃ, mahātherā" is well-said. With reference to which it was said by Nāgasena Thera. By the term "striking" (Āhaccapadenā): the meaning is by a collection of terms spoken striking eight bases for expression (vaṇṇaṭṭhānāni), the idea is by a group of words raised up and spoken distinctly (kaṇṭhokkantena padasamūhenāti adhippāyo). By the flavour (Rasenā): by the flavour of that spoken striking, the meaning is by a judgement drawn from that. What is in accordance with the Sutta is like the shadow of the Sutta. The teachers' tradition (Ācariyavādo) is called "ācariyavaṃso", to show that what is brought by the lineage of teachers spoken in the Pali is the standard. Intention (Adhippāyo): an inference arising from reason and proof, resembling an immediate evidence. Intention (Adhippāyo): Here, some say the meaning is "one's own opinion."

In the Commentary to the Parivāra, and here, although it is said that "what is in accordance with the Sutta is the four great authorities," but in fact what is rejected, unrejected, permitted, unpermitted, suitable, and unsuitable, established by the method of the great authorities, is stated in meaning. There, since place, opportunity, and location are synonyms for reason, from the Teaching, "This is impossible, Ānanda, there is no opportunity," (pārā. 43) etc., and from the world, "place of censure" (niggahaṭṭhāna), "place of wrong view" (asandiṭṭhiṭṭhāna), and "and a place of wrong view" (asandiṭṭhi ca pana padeso), therefore great authorities (mahāpadesā) means great reasons. Reason (Kāraṇaṃ) means an informing cause, which is intended here. The greatness of those, however, is due to their being great objects, like the great elements. These two kinds of great authorities are the Vinaya great authorities and the Suttanta great authorities. There, the Vinaya great authorities are applied in the Vinaya, the others are in both places, therefore in the Parivāra, in the section on investigation (anuyogavatte), it is said, "He does not know the Dhamma, he does not know what is in accordance with the Dhamma," (pari. 442). There, Dhamma (dhammaṃ) means setting aside the Vinaya Piṭaka, the remaining two Piṭakas. What is in accordance with the Dhamma (Dhammānuloma) means the four great authorities in the Suttanta. There, one who knows the Dhamma and what is in accordance with the Dhamma, but not the Vinaya and what is in accordance with the Vinaya, by "protecting the Dhamma" corrupts the Vinaya, the other, by "protecting the Vinaya" corrupts the Dhamma, one who knows both accomplishes both.

Here is a mere introduction: There, the first is disputed in "if he enjoys the entering, the entered, the standing, the extracting, there is an offense; if he does not enjoy, there is no offense." That venerable one, cognizing the agreeable tangible object that is associated with the body sense-organ, by merely the arising of the bodily pleasant feeling, defining it as enjoying, brings about the possibility of an offense of Pārājika even for one who has no intention of intercourse. Similarly, for one who has painful, disagreeable feeling due to the mattress or due to the fault of the womb, or for one who has no bodily feeling due to the body being struck by the wind, by showing the Suttanta "there is no offense for one who does not enjoy" (pārā. 76), even for one who has the intention of intercourse, brings about the possibility of no offense. Similarly, if, when attempting due to lust for release, there is a Saṅghādisesa when released, let alone by lust for sexual intercourse, taking the place of a wrong-doing (dukkaṭaṭṭhānaṃ gahetvā), he makes it a Saṅghādisesa, thus, he corrupts the Vinaya. The other, saying, "since it is said 'there is no offense for one who does not know', for one who knows, just by knowing, whether there is pleasant feeling or not, there is enjoying," even for one who has no intention of intercourse, in the place of no offense, brings about an offense, he makes the blameless blameworthy, thus, he corrupts the Dhamma. But one who knows both, saying that "The bhikkhu's thought of intercourse is present" (pārā. 57) and thus the thought of intercourse is the standard here, with its presence there is an offense of Pārājika, with its absence, there is no offense, protects and accomplishes both. In this way, in all the training rules, as is possible, it should be done with a purpose.

Free from the Pali (pāḷivinimuttā): in meaning, in method, and in accordance with the Pali. Involved in judgements issuing from the Pali (okkantavinicchayappavattā): the meaning is proceeding by way of judgements not entered. Even knowing, the Blessed One, merely to show that "Let the later generations take their opinion as the standard, as if it were my word," said thus at the time of his Parinibbāna, "If the Sangha wishes, Ānanda, after my passing away, let it abolish the minor and lesser training rules (khuddānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni samūhanatū)," (dī. ni. 2.216), therefore this is established: "If a training rule has been prescribed, abolishing which is allowed to the Sangha by the Blessed One, then clarification of additional meaning in accordance with what has been prescribed is already allowed by the Blessed One." Furthermore, to show that there should be no mutual dispute among the teachers' schools regarding the deficient or excessive training rules. Why should the Sangha not abolish? Because it is seen as a cause for mutual dispute. And it was said by the Blessed One, "By all should be trained in harmony, rejoicing, without disputing (sabbeheva samaggehi sammodamānehi avivadamānehi sikkhitabba)." There, since some elders said thus, and since there was a view of another teaching, it became that one should train disputing, due to the absence of that, by announcing a motion with a second announcement of a motion, he made it so that one should train without disputing.

Moreover (Apicā): the beginning is for making clear one's own opinion. There, this talk should be known as common to the three Piṭakas, because of "in the Suttanta, Abhidhamma, Vinaya, and Commentaries," but "atha panāyaṃ kappiya," etc., belongs only to the Vinaya. Similar to the Saṅgha of Reciters (Kārakasaṅghasadisa): similar to the Saṅgha of Reciters of the Saṅgīti. "Without rejecting the fourfold beginning with the Sutta, the act which is not opposed to it is similar to the Saṅgha of Reciters," it is said in the Gaṇṭhipada of Dhammasiri Thera, that is not fitting, because of these words "The Sutta is more powerful. For the Sutta is not to be refuted, it is similar to the Saṅgha of Reciters." But in the natural Gaṇṭhipada, "having decided on that matter, it is similar to the Saṅgha of Reciters," it is said. Opponent (Paravādī): the speaker is one from another sect (aññanikāyikoti), who knows our tradition. The opponent is what is in accordance with the Sutta (Paravādī suttānuloma): How? "Except for water for tooth-cleaning," (pāci. 266) the Sutta is for one of his own view, and according to that, the water of a coconut is also just water, and is for the opponent.

"The water of a coconut, when old, binds bile;
That same young water cures bile and binds strength." –

The opponent is the teachers' tradition (Paro ācariyavāda): In "he avoids the toll," although he avoids it by transgressing propriety, it is just appropriation, thus, when the opponent said, "Doing so, he incurs a Pārājika," one of his own view, showing the Sutta "he avoids the toll, there is an offense of wrong-doing" along with the statement of the Great Commentary that came there, refutes it, thus, there is just a wrong-doing for one doing so. The opponent is one's own opinion (Paro attanomatī): Here, in "he appropriates another's property before the meal, he is endeavoring to appropriate before the meal, but it is after the meal, that is just the effort before the meal, therefore, the principal thief is not freed, according to your Theravāda tradition, there is just a Pārājika for the principal thief," when the opponent said this, one of his own view, showing the Sutta "whether before or after the meal, he appropriates that property by prior agreement, there is no offense for the principal thief" (pārā. 119), refutes it.

"Paro sutta": Concerning the Paro sutta, the opponent, citing a sutta written in the Paṭṭhāna as, "A condition not having a fixed cause is a condition by way of object-condition for a condition having a fixed sameness cause," argues that the Noble Path does not have only nibbāna as its object. The proponent refutes this by saying, "It does not accord with suttas such as the object triad." A sutta is, in fact, one that accords with the suttas, not otherwise. Therefore, it is said that even with just the statement, "it is evident from the Pali," it is established that "it is evident from the Pali that has come down through the three recitations," etc. For the teacher says that such is a careless writing. As it is said, "Heedfulness is the path to the Deathless, heedlessness is the path to death" (Dhp. 21; Netti. 26), one who, having eaten the offered food, avoids dangers, establishes mindfulness, and dwells thus, is constant. Even a sutta that seems to agree with such a meaning should not be taken; therefore, it is said that even if it is established with "if it does not seem so," "if it does not seem so, it does not accord, it does not agree." Since "or an outside sutta" is said, even one's own sutta that does not agree with the meaning should not be taken. In the two methods, starting with "another's teaching," the commentary statements that have come in various places due to careless writing should be understood by connecting them with the Theravada.

Now, concerning this teacher's doctrine."Paro sutta": When the opponent says, "'A root-seed, such as turmeric, ginger, vacā…pe… one who, being aware of seed in seed, cuts or has cut or breaks…pe… there is an offense of expiation (pāci. 91) according to your text, there is an expiation for one who cuts a turmeric bulb'," the proponent refutes this by showing, "Whatever other things arise in the root," etc., with the teacher's doctrine in the form of its commentary. For a bulb does not grow on a bulb. "Paro suttānuloma": When the opponent says, "'There is no offense; thus, our teachers have learned it.' In accordance with the statement, 'Our ancient monks, having blocked off a chamber in a single building, used to have an unordained person sleep there; therefore, it is permissible for us,' when some of you say thus, nothing can be said to you," the proponent prohibits it by showing the commentary statement, "The sutta and the sutta-conformity are the learning of only those teachers who have learned [correctly]," etc. "Paro attanomati": Here, in "When the door has been opened, who are exempt among those sleeping without permission?" both people are exempt: the one possessed by a spirit and the one who has been bound and laid down. [The proponent] prohibits [the opponent's claim that] "From your Theravada perspective, all others, even those laid down in whatever manner, are also exempt."

Now, concerning this self-opinion."Paro sutta": When the opponent says, "They incur an offense," the proponent prohibits [this] by showing the commentary statement (Parā. aṭṭha. 1.77), "One who is tired during the day sits on a cot and falls asleep without removing his feet from the ground, there is no offense for him," [implying that] even those who are laid down in one movement are exempt. "Now, concerning this self-opinion."Paro suttānuloma": When the opponent says, "Due to the connection with statements such as, 'I declare, Devānaminda, sorrow in two ways: to be cultivated and not to be cultivated' (Dī. Ni. 2.360), there is no fault for you who support a wife and children; therefore, it is said, 'Association with children and spouse' (Khu. Pā. 5.6; Su. Ni. 265)," even if the proponent is not very learned, he refutes [this] by saying that it must be with unskilled [thoughts] accompanied by lust. In the remaining [instances] also, [the meaning] should be connected appropriately in other ways by this method. All this was said by the Elder Upatissa and others. But the Elder Dhammasiri says, "Here, 'paro' refers to a member of another school, who brings forth only his own suttas, etc. The proponent, having applied them to his own sutta, etc., accepts [them] if they agree; if not, he rejects [them]."

The Explanation of the Fourfold Vinaya Discussion is Finished.

Explanation of the Analysis of Terms

In the Sikkhāpada-Vibhaṅga, although "yo panā" is a term of all-inclusiveness, still, since "bhikkhū" is in apposition to it, its analytical terms are stated corresponding to that other term. Although the three definition terms of bhikkhu are common to any renunciate, whether he is in the state of being a bhikkhu or not, still, the person who is fit to be discussed is one who, "being impure, has fallen into one of the pārājika offenses, and if, being of pure view, he requests no opportunity and declares with the intention of expulsion, there is an offense of saṅghādisesa and dukkaṭa," etc. (Pārā. 389). It is stated to show that in this case, the subject matter is that, not another one who is in the state of a householder. Indeed, the Buddha began with the characteristic of bhikkhu, which is common to the entire Vinaya Piṭaka. One who is pure but remains in the guise of a householder for some reason is the subject matter precisely because of his state of being a bhikkhu; [and so is one who is] impure but remains in the guise of a bhikkhu. This meaning is shown. Even if one is impure, if he is eager in robes due to relatives or adversaries or fear of the king, etc., and has removed his robes, he is the subject matter, precisely because he does not undertake the state of a thief-inhabitant by taking the robes again. It is said [that he is] not one who has relinquished the burden in the meaning of the definition of bhikkhu. But one who is a guise-thief, having himself undertaken [ordination] for the meaning of the definition of bhikkhu, stealing cohabitation, if, being of pure view, he requests no opportunity and declares with the intention of expulsion, there is an offense of saṅghādisesa and dukkaṭa—this meaning is also shown.

In the commentary, it is said of him, "Those whose highest [aim] is wrong view are those whose highest [aim] is wrong view" (A. Ni. 1.310). The idea is that the five deeds entailing immediate result are greatly blameworthy, but wrong view is even more greatly blameworthy. Why? For those [deeds] have a limit; even the strongest one lasts only for the duration of a kappa. But fixed wrong view has no limit; there is no rising up from existence for one endowed with it. Therefore, it cannot be said, "There are skillful qualities existing for making this [person] a bhikkhu," or "He is pure." Because it is said that "due to the calamity of view, he incurs two offenses," it cannot be said, "He is impure" or "He has fallen into one of the pārājika offenses." For he does not belong to either side; therefore, it is said, "A bhikkhu by convention and by avowal, but not in the ultimate sense."

But why did the Blessed One not prescribe a pārājika for fixed wrong view, which is such a greatly blameworthy [thing]? Because it is difficult to know. By nature, this view is difficult to discern as "right" or "wrong," let alone as "fixed" or "unfixed." If a pārājika offense were prescribed for it, monks, thinking each other to be of wrong view regarding pārājika, without performing the uposatha and other [duties], would quickly destroy the sāsana, and they themselves would generate demerit by engaging in opposition in relation to even pure monks. Therefore, with skillful means, without prescribing a pārājika, having prescribed for him the act of suspension and the proper conduct, the saṅgha made him not associate and not cohabit [with them]. For the Blessed One saw this method: if his view is unfixed, having fulfilled the proper conduct, having obtained rehabilitation, he might become as before. But if it is fixed, this is impossible, there is no opportunity for him, being of fixed wrong view, having fulfilled the proper conduct, having obtained rehabilitation, to become as before. Only, seeing this method, he will be just a bearer of a name, "a bhikkhu by convention, a bhikkhu by avowal," and after death, like Ariṭṭha, he will become only a stake in saṃsāra.

Out of the eight ordinations, only three are stated here, not the others because they are individual and not possessed by the monks. For here, the ordination by acceptance of instruction and answering questions belongs only to two elders; the remaining three belong to the nuns, so they are not intended here. Among the three ordinations, four terms beginning with "bhadro bhikkhū" are stated because they are common to the three. For one ordained by the "Come, bhikkhu!" formula or by the threefold refuge formula with the fourth is noble, essential, a trainee, and a non-trainee. But the statement of ordination is for the purpose of showing their state of being disciples. For only these incur an offense, not Fully Enlightened Buddhas or Paccekabuddhas.

"Ayaṃ imasmiṃ atthe adhippeto": Here, only those who have been ordained by the ñatticatuttha procedure are capable of incurring an offense. For others who have been ordained by the "Come, bhikkhu!" formula, the threefold refuge formula, acceptance of instruction, or answering questions are not capable of incurring an offense. Therefore, since these were rejected, only the last was stated as "ayaṃ imasmiṃ atthe adhippeto bhikkhū," so it is said by the Elder Dhammasiri. That is not right. Only this much is said: "Two individuals are incapable of incurring an offense: Buddhas and Paccekabuddhas" (Pari. 322). Otherwise, the "Come, bhikkhu!" formula, etc., should also be stated. Moreover, it is said generally that "Two individuals are capable of incurring an offense: bhikkhus and bhikkhunis," and also because fear of offense is seen. How? The Venerable Sāriputta, being scrupulous, did not accept the lodging-alms food. And Mahākassapa, fearing the separation of his robe, having taken all three robes and crossing the river, was agitated in mind. Moreover, regarding one who is ordained by the threefold refuge formula, it is seen that dukkaṭas are prescribed for them when they do not fulfill the duties toward their co-resident and other duties. Therefore, this has been poorly considered. "Ayaṃ imasmiṃ atthe adhippeto bhikkhū": The Elder Upatissa [says that] there is fear of permissibility of what has been rejected by the threefold refuge formula. Even if it is said regarding capability of [committing] an offense, [the fear is that] a wrong grasp or doubt arises for the bhikkhus, [thinking that] "Even what has been previously rejected has been permitted again by saying this," therefore it was not said. It agrees with this: "A bhikkhunī is one who is ordained in both saṅghas" (Pāci. 161). This was said because of the fear of uninterrupted permission for those ordained with the Sākiya [formula], etc.

Here is our opinion in this matter: after indicating the term bhikkhu, all those who come under the scope of that term and who are seen in the Vinaya Piṭaka in various places, either by way of themselves incurring an offense or by way of causing others to incur an offense in [acts such as] declaring or concealing serious offenses, after showing all of them, now, with regard to this term "one who has undertaken the training and livelihood," which is stated as a qualification of that term bhikkhu, this is said: "ayaṃ imasmiṃ atthe adhippeto bhikkhū". For he has undertaken the training and livelihood immediately after the formal statement; from that point on, the arising of the training rules according to the textbook is seen, and the renunciation of the training is seen only for him, not for the other. The renunciation of the training is possible only for him, because he has undertaken [the training], saying, "Let the saṅgha lift me up, O Venerable Ones, out of compassion" (Mahāva. 71, 126). And because the stating of the grounds for non-commissioning is seen immediately after the ordination, [and] because of the completeness of the characteristic of renunciation of the training, such as "I renounce the Vinaya, the Pātimokkha, the textbook," etc., it is said that only he is intended here, taking the renunciation of the training as the basis.

"Maṅguracchavi" means dark-complexioned.

"'Sātasahagatā': 'accompanied by pleasure, accompanied by the pleasure of the first jhāna, both in repulsiveness and in mindfulness of breathing'" is said in the Gaṇṭhipada. "Uddhumātakasaññā": the perception of the first jhāna attained based on the bloated [corpse] sign. "Rūpasaññā": the perception of the rūpāvacara jhāna, such as the earth-kasiṇa. He explained that, "The bloated [corpse] perception is not manifest, Venerable Sir, because it should not be developed in the case of the repulsive [objects]; the form perception is manifest, Venerable Sir, because it should be developed in the case of the kasiṇas." The order of the five ordinations is taken from the Mahāvagga. "Ñatticatutthenā": Although the ñatti is mentioned first in this case, since there is no difference in meaning or wording of the three announcements, "ñatticatuttha" is said because the fourth is the three announcements whose meaning and wording are different from the ñatti. Corresponding to the wording, it is said in the commentary, "with three announcements and one ñatti," but according to the order of the occurrence of meaning, it should be said, "with one ñatti and three announcements." Since here even an offense is sometimes called "kamma" because of the statement, "There are these four kinds of kamma, O monks (Mahāva. 384), there are these six kinds of kamma: unjust kamma, group kamma" (Mahāva. 387), therefore, "akuppenā" is said.

It is called campeyyakkhandhaka(mahāva. 395 ff.), therefore it is said "ṭhānārahena." If so, should only this word "ṭhānārahena" be stated, and not the preceding word, to establish akuppa (immovable)? No, because it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that one ordained with aṭṭhānāraha and akuppa is not intended in this context. However, when both are stated together, this meaning is understood: "Only one ordained with akuppa is intended as a 'bhikkhu' in this context, and one ordained with ṭhānāraha is also intended as a 'bhikkhu' in this context, but one ordained with kuppa (movable) is not intended." This also establishes the meaning that "whoever, as a bhikkhu, knowingly ordains a person under twenty years of age, that person is not ordained" (pāci. 403). Until it is known, even though he has attained the status of a bhikkhu by convention, by acknowledgment, and by condition, he is not like other bhikkhus who have been ordained by convention, by acknowledgment, and by condition, standing in the place of the ordained, becoming an object of omasanavācittiya, but only stands in the place of the unordained, becoming merely an object of offense for "thinking of the unordained as ordained, he recites the Dhamma word by word, there is an offense of pācittiya" (pāci. 47). However, one ordained with akuppa, even if later defeated (pārājika), still stands in the place of the ordained by birth. Among the individuals to be avoided mentioned in the manner of "a paṇḍaka, bhikkhus, is not to be ordained, if ordained, he must be expelled" (mahāva. 109) etc., it should be understood that some individuals are called "ordained" and do not stand in the place of the ordained, while others do.

satthusāsana’’nti is said in gaṇṭhipada. Wherever ‘‘gaṇṭhipade’’ is said, there ‘‘dhammasirittherassa gaṇṭhipade’’ should be taken.

Explanation of Sājīvapadabhājanīya

anugaṇṭhipade. Wherever ‘‘anugaṇṭhipade’’ is, there ‘‘vajirabuddhittherassā’’ should be taken. Among the three bodhi: sāvakabodhi, paccekabodhi, and sammāsambodhi, those beings who are bodhisattas in sammāsambodhi are called mahābodhisattā. adhikaṃ, because of the abundance of Pātimokkhasīla, because of it's bhikkhu sīla, because of it's nature of covering the kilesas, and because it is established by the supreme Buddha; uttama because it exists only in the time of a Buddha's arising; in one gaṇṭhipade. Although paccekabuddhas are also endowed with Pātimokkhasaṃvarasīla by nature, it is limited by that method, because it ‘‘buddhuppādeyeva pavattatī’’. Therefore he said ‘‘na hi taṃ paññattiṃ uddharitvā’’ etc. Moreover, sīla combined with the path and fruit is adhisīla, but that is not intended here. It is not included in the Pātimokkhausdesa. Because the Samantabhadraka is a causal word, and all the rules of training share a common characteristic, it is proven that even noble individuals commit some offenses in this non-promulgation, therefore, the commentary statement ‘‘na hi taṃ samāpanno methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭisevatī’’ seems insufficient? It is not insufficient, it is indeed sufficient, since the commentary proceeds based on whichever rule of training the discussion pertains to. Thus, in the kaṅkhāvitaraṇīyaṃ(kaṅkhā. aṭṭha. nidānavaṇṇanā) in the section on water-raising boundaries, it is said, "by the bhikkhuni covering the three robes, and lifting up the antaravāsaka," because it appears in the bhikkhunivibhaṅga. The same method applies to other similar instances. Why is that? To follow the order of the Pāḷi and to show the Pāḷi order. Here is a summary of the meaning: In the case of the word-by-word training rule, if one is ordained thinking the ordained as ordained, there is no offense; in the case of one ordained according to the unestablished training rule, if one is ukkhittaka, there may be an offense, as with the sahaseyya training rule, etc. The meaning here will become clear later.

In the aṭṭhakathā, it is said, "Moreover, only the mind associated with the path and fruit is adhicitta, but that is not intended here," and "Moreover, only the wisdom associated with the path and fruit is adhipaññā, but that is not intended here. A bhikkhu who has attained that does not engage in sexual intercourse." This contradicts the Pāḷi statement, "Among these, the adhisīlasikkhā is the training intended in this context." This Pāḷi shows that only adhisīlasikkhā is intended here, not the others. The commentary statement shows that all three worldly trainings are intended. Here is the commentary's intention: All three worldly trainings are possible in this first pārājika, even a bhikkhu who has attained adhicitta and adhipaññā may, due to an unsuitable condition, revert from adhicitta and adhipaññā and experience a break in sīla, this is a possibility, but not for one who has attained supramundane citta and paññā. This method is available in all other instances of sacittaka such as adinnādāna etc., but in acittaka, the other is also possible. Nevertheless, because it includes only the vinayapiṭaka and the Pātimokkhasīla, it should be understood that in the Pāḷi, "Among these, the adhisīlasikkhā is the training intended in this context" is said to show that only the adhisīlasikkhā that is worthy of renunciation in the latter word, "sikkhaṃ appaccakkhāyā," is worldly.

sikkhā means both abstaining from bodily and verbal misconduct and intention, but elsewhere it should be understood as only intention. Sikkhāpada means a training rule that is recited, and sometimes also a training rule that is not recited. Cittassa adhikaraṇaṃ katvā is said to show that the locative is in the sense of the basis, meaning "he trains in that,". Yathāsikkhāpada is said in terms of reflection. Reflection on sīla is indeed sīla, therefore, even one who engages in intention disconnected from abstaining in the duties beginning with suppaṭicchannādi is counted as fulfilling the training. One who does not transgress the boundary stated in "There is a pācittiya for intentional lying" (pāci. 2) is said to "train in that training rule." However, in another gaṇṭhipade it is said ‘‘sikkhā means the cittuppāda occurring in the manner of training in that training rule. Sājīva means the concept. This was previously a designation for the restraint from sexual intercourse, to show that meaning." Since there is no tantī due to the absence of the quality agreed upon, or the merit agreed upon by the training, the weakness of the world is not possible there. That is desirable, therefore "he having undertaken that which is his way of life, not revealing weakness" is said. Weakness is possible by command, according to Āyasmā Upatissa.

Explanation of the Sikkhāpaccakkhānakathā

Etthayāmī means in such and such a titthāyatana, or in a house etc. Bhāvavikappākārenā means, because "I will be" has come, with the manner of imagining that state of being that he wants to be, the manner of imagining a state of being other than bhikkhu, that is the intention.

46. Handā is by word only. Gihibhāvaṃ patthayamāno etc. shows the intention of the mind. Renunciation of training occurs with a single mind, not without it.

51. Buddhaṃ dhamma etc. shows the field of application. There, the first fourteen words show the renunciation of essence, and the latter eight show the acceptance of another state of being. Paccakkhāmi dhārehī shows the time constraint. Vadatī shows the effort constraint. Viññāpetī shows the knowledge constraint. Ummattako sikkhaṃ paccakkhāti, ummattakassa santike sikkhaṃ paccakkhātī etc. shows the person constraint. Ariyakena milakkhassa santike sikkhaṃ paccakkhātī etc. shows the impossibility of the knowledge constraint even when there are person constraints etc. There, ācariyo said, "It is not our opinion that renunciation of training is effective even if the time constraint is expressed in a language that does not have a time constraint for milakkha language." Davāyā etc. shows that it is not effective due to the absence of mental intention, even when the field and time etc. are present. Sāvetukāmo na sāvetī shows that it is not effective due to the absence of the effort constraint even when the mental intention is present. Aviññussasāveti, viññussa na sāvetī shows that it is said to show that when there are the mental, field, time, effort, person, and knowledge constraints, it is not effective if he makes it heard to someone other than the person he intends to address, therefore it is said in the aṭṭhakathāyaṃ "if he specifies and announces, 'let only this one know,' and only that one knows, the training is renounced. But if that one does not know... the training is not renounced." Sabbaso vā pana na sāveti, appaccakkhā hoti sikkhā is said to show that training is renounced only with the intention etc., not otherwise. Up to this point, the word-by-word explanation of the phrase "sikkhā… dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā" has been shown in three ways. There, two are unmixed, and the last one should be understood as mixed. Teneva vacībhedenā means making it known by that same verbal expression after hearing only the word that expresses that meaning. Cittasampayutta means associated with the mind of wanting to renounce. Samayaññū means one who knows only the intention.

53. Vaṇṇapaṭṭhānaṃ is a sutta that illuminates the Buddha's qualities. upāligāthā is said to be stated by Upāligahapati. Paññāṇa and saññāṇa are the same in meaning, therefore bodhipaññāṇa means bodhisaññāṇa, the seed of awakening, is said.

Dvinnampi niyametvā here, in one gaṇṭhipade it is said "if it is said with the intention that 'I renounce' when both know, and if one of them knows, it is not renounced," that does not agree with the commentary. Even if "Gihī homī" or "gihimhī" is said, it is a present tense statement. And because there is no meaning in "dhārehī," and when "dhārehī" is said, it goes over to another, therefore it is not. Sandiṭṭhikaṃ dhamma means the dhamma word stated everywhere. To show what it refers to when he says "sandiṭṭhika." Otherwise, if "I renounce vijitavijaya" is said, and that would also apply to a cakkavatti etc., the word Buddha would also have to be stated at the end. However, in the teachings of the teachers, yo maṃ pabbājesī etc. is stated referring to the upajjha without taking the upajjha, or referring to one who has gone forth by being addressed by another. Okallako means a designation for a miser. Moḷibaddho means one who has a hair knot, or one who has a mukuta that has been removed. Cellako is an elder. Ceṭako is a middle one. Moḷigallo is a mahāsāmaṇera. In the presence of nāgarūpa etc. of humans, beings, nāgas etc., or bhāsājānanakinnara etc. "Devatā nāma mahāpaññā" is the reading. Davāyā means suddenly. Ravābhaññenā means with broken utterance. Ravābhañña occurs due to unfamiliarity with the arrangement of letters, or due to the indistinctness of the organs. ‘‘potthakarūpasadisassā’’ is said due to the incomprehensibility of the sense faculties, garumedhassa means of dull intellect. How much dullness of intellect is required? Due to unfamiliarity with the occasion.

The Explanation of the Sikkhāpaccakkhānakathā is completed.

Explanation of the Mūlapaññattikathā

55."Paṭisevatināmā" is not in the mātikā, therefore he said, ‘‘paṭiseveyyāti etthā’’ etc. "Eso methunadhammo nāmā" is quoted in all Pāḷi books and in the commentary as "eso vuccati methunadhammo nāmā". Itthiyā nimittena attano nimitta is shown because it is difficult to understand. It is not shown that the woman's nimitta is the man's nimitta because it is easy to understand. Cattāri ṭhānāni muñcitvā here, is said referring only to touching the inner surface, there is no offense for removing without touching. Majjha means the tip. Uparibhāgamajjha means the tip of the upper part. Naṭṭhakāyappasāda here, if there is an offense because an offense is possible for one whose senses are impaired, is there also an offense here? ‘‘matacammaṃ vā’’ etc. is said to show that there is no offense. Matacamma is unappropriated, there is only a pārājika offense for what is appropriated. Apidhāya means without covering. The intention is that one should sit covering oneself so that the teeth are not visible.

Gonasoti goṇapiṭṭhiko means a ringed snake, a snake with circular marks of red color visible on its back. Although sea creatures like kalala and paricayavāricāra fish are capable of swallowing even an elephant's body with a single gulp in the ocean, and even larger ones are caught, sexual intercourse is not possible in their mouths, hence there is no fixed location there, according to some. This should be considered carefully. Etadeva hīti refers to immediately preceding. Saddhiṃ yojanāya means connecting through letters. "The promulgated training rule is called 'equal training' (samasikkhatā) because it should be learned equally by all conscientious individuals; therefore, all training rules should be learned by all monks. There is nothing less or more for anyone," as stated in its gaṇṭhipada. In the Parivāra:

"Not one under suspension, nor one undergoing penance,
Not one who has split the Sangha, nor one who has gone over to a faction;
Standing on the ground of equal communion,
How could he be unequal in training?" (pari. 479) –

And in the Tadaṭṭhakathā: "This question is stated with reference to a former barber. He is not allowed to carry a razor case, others are allowed. Therefore, he is unequal in training." All that should be understood in such a way that it fits and agrees. Monks also learn training rules that are specific to nuns. Similarly, another monk who was formerly not a barber also learns that training rule, therefore, by considering the skill in meaning, all the training rules are named 'equal training'. That which was stated is the connection. ‘‘Tisso itthiyo’’ti etc. are stated for the purpose of defining the object, as it is a characteristic that determines the limit of the Vibhaṅga. Therefore, it rejects those made of gold, silver, etc., done with the possibility of a non-human female. From here on, those that were previously stated as "the Vibhaṅga occurs because of considering three reasons" should be understood by connecting them as appropriate.

Explanation of the First Quaternary

57. Āpatti pārājikā assa hotīti (He incurs a pārājika offense) because that unwholesome offense overwhelms the monk’s virtue. In that case of being overcome by lust, it attains the name pārājika, having overwhelmed and destroyed the offenses of dukkata, thullaccaya, etc., that were incurred in the earlier part, and stands alone. According to some, it is not itself overwhelmed by other offenses of the same kind as pārājika, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous in object. That has been considered before. But when all four pārājika offenses are together, then they overwhelm that monk's monkhood, make him a non-monk, make him unordained, and he is not even a monk by convention. According to some, he does not produce an omasavāda pācittiya. With the second meaning alternative, the attainment of the nature of a pārājika is included, hence the meaning is an offense attainment, thus it is included in the proponents of offense attainment, and this is suitable, being dependent on others. That monk is called sāpattiko (one with an offense), otherwise he would be free from offense at the moment of dissolution, but he is not. When does he become so? When he dies and when he disavows the training and stands in the state of a novice, etc. If that is the case, when the training is disavowed, the pārājika offense is disavowed, and both the training and the offense exist for him together, why are the saṅghādisesa etc. offenses not disavowed by disavowing the training, and why must they be confessed again by the re-ordained? Disavowing the training is the arising of the exiting of the offense, a non-monk exits from the offense, a householder exits, a novice exits, therefore, there is no exiting from the violation of the Vinaya. If he exits as a householder or a novice, he would be virtuous, attainer of jhāna, attainer of the fruit of stream-entry or the fruit of arahantship, an arahant with a pārājika offense. The one who is under suspension or the one who has been expelled, or the one who is worthy of parivāsa, worthy of mānatta, or the one who has been re-expelled, would be virtuous, an attainer of jhāna, an attainer of the fruit of stream-entry, or of arahantship, an arahant with an obstructive offense, so he must be re-ordained, having given parivāsa or mānatta, and the one under suspension must be reinstated, so this kind of thing is found.

Here is the judgment in this matter: Having committed a pārājika offense, as long as he acknowledges and approves of being a monk and sharing communion, due to his being obstructive, even if he independently undertakes the precepts like a householder on days such as uposatha, the undertaking of precepts does not take root, let alone jhāna etc. If he does not approve of being a monk, does not acknowledge it, does not approve of sharing communion, but only wears the robe due to aversion to monks or out of fear of royal enemies, thieves, etc., he is unordained, produces coitus, and shares in virtue and jhāna etc. For this was said by the Blessed One:

"For one who has committed an offense and expects purification, the existing offense should be revealed. For the revealing of it brings him ease, for the attainment of the first jhāna, etc." (mahāva. 134-135).

santī āpattīti (existing offense) means any offense that has been committed, of all kinds with or without remainder is intended. Even so, he would share in jhāna etc. while standing in the state of a householder etc., because he is standing in purity. But he who is under suspension and not reinstated, or who has committed a grave offense and not exited, having disavowed the training and standing in the state of a householder etc., he does not share in jhāna etc. because he is not standing in purity and because he has something to do, therefore it was said by the Blessed One "so he must be re-ordained and reinstated," therefore, those obstructive qualities incurred during the time of that person's monkhood, by generating remorse, prevent the occurrence of joy etc., which are rooted in non-remorse, not in one's own faults. If they do not prevent, it occurs. Having committed a grave offense and revealed it to the monks, he would share in jhāna etc. because he has been expelled, having become pure, because it was said, "For the revealing of it brings him ease." Let alone during the time of monkhood, but not so for the one under suspension, because he has something to do, according to some. However, one who follows that and abandons that view would share in it. "Monks, not in an assembly together with householders (mahāva. 154), of one who has disavowed the training and has committed the last offense, in an assembly that is sitting (mahāva. 183)" Here, a householder (gahaṭṭho) means one who is naturally standing in the guise of a layman. One who has disavowed the training, standing in the guise of a monk, is one who has disavowed the training. He, desiring the state of a novice due to being dependent on his own faults, becomes a novice with that very guise by taking the three refuges. One who has committed the last offense, even though he approves of the communion, but later, not approving in the manner stated before, desiring the state of a novice, becomes a novice by taking the three refuges, like one who has disavowed the training, and he should not be made to receive the robe again by the monks, because he is already standing in the guise given before. But if a pārājika who is being accused, having been defeated, says, "Venerable Sir, I will become a novice, give me the refuges," he should not be told, "Good, take them," but having established him in the guise of a householder, he should be made to receive the robes again and be ordained. The teacher says, "Since all this has been said according to one's own opinion, it should be considered and taken." Pavesanaṃnāma (insertion) is the touching of the organ by the inserting of the organ. Paviṭṭhaṃnāma (entered) is the time of effort when inserting all the way to the base, or during the time of reversing. At the time of semen emission, the organ is called ṭhitaṃnāma (standing). Uddharaṇaṃnāma (withdrawal) is the time of removing. In the Gaṇṭhipada, it is said that "The place after falling short of the effort is called 'standing'," that is said to show the non-confusion. Semen emission occurs even during the times of insertion, entry, and withdrawal.

The Explanation of the First Quaternary is Finished.

Explanation of the Sixty-Ninth, Two-Hundredth Quaternary

59-60. Because of the statement "mostly eaten until dead" (Mataṃ yebhuyyena akkhāyita), it shows that even that which is mostly eaten until not dead is still a pārājika object. It shows that what is completely eaten, or uprooted, is a thullaccaya object, similarly, because of the statement "mostly eaten," it shows that eating until dead or completely uprooting is a dukkata object. Na ca sāvasesaṃ paññapenti (and they do not prescribe with remainder). Why? Idañhi sikkhāpadaṃ lokavajjaṃ, na paṇṇattivajjaṃ (Because this training rule is blameworthy in the world, not blameworthy by prescription). There, sikkhāpadanti (training rule) refers to pārājika. There, even thullaccaya is blameworthy in the world, not blameworthy by prescription. Or, both are prescribed completely without remainder. For in the field of pārājika, having brought and placed it at the lower limit, from there on, it is only prescribed as thullaccaya. There, the field of thullaccaya should be understood as being stated with the lower limit, like the field of pārājika. Upaḍḍhakkhāyite thullaccayanti (thullaccaya for half-eaten) where the sign is eaten, that should be understood as a dukkata object. Here he asks - does the Blessed One only prescribe what is blameworthy by prescription with remainder? No. However, we will explain it in detail as appropriate in each case. But why did the Blessed One not prescribe pārājika for half-eaten? This inquiry is beyond the Buddha's realm because it is the prescription of the Vinaya. Here is a suitable reason: "because the state of being half is difficult to determine." "Mostly eaten" means that eating that has crossed two parts out of the four parts of the anal passage, the urinary passage, and the mouth, up to the end of the third part, and crossing the third part up to the end of the fourth part is a dukkata object.

Yadipi nimittaṃ sabbaso khāyitanti (Even if the sign is completely eaten) "it is said with reference only to the living body," they say. That should be taken after investigation. Allasarīreti (fresh body) means in a fresh or uncorrupted living human body, thullaccaya only in the eyes, nose, etc. Tiracchānagatānaṃ hatthiassādīnaṃ nāsāya vatthikose ca thullaccayanti (thullaccaya in the nose and scrotum of animals such as elephants and horses) is stated here with a special meaning from the statement pāḷiyā "He inserts a non-path into a non-path, the offense is thullaccaya." Upakacchakādīsu dukkaṭaṃ, sabbesampi tiracchānagatānaṃ akkhikaṇṇavaṇesu dukkaṭaṃ, avasesasarīrepi dukkaṭamevāti (dukkata in the armpit etc., dukkata in the eyes, ears, and wounds of all animals, dukkata even in the rest of the body) is in the Vinītavatthu, "Come, venerable sir, let us practice sexual intercourse." "Enough, sister, this is not fitting" (pārā. 79) This shows the absence of lust for sexual intercourse. "Come, venerable sir, rub against the perineum...pe... so the monk did so," this shows the taste for release. Therefore, the Blessed One said, "the offense is saṅghādisesa." It is stated, having concluded that "Whoever rubs the perineum with sexual desire, the offense is dukkata."

cammakkhandhake the word pāḷileso should be understood. ‘‘Jīvamānakapurisassāti jīvamānakasaddo mate addirittura natthīti ñāpanatthaṃ vutto’’ti vadanti. (The word "living person" is said to indicate that there is absolutely no question of the dead) Mahāaṭṭhakathāyaṃ panāti (However, in the Great Commentary) even though it is said, "having made the Great Commentary into a body," but because in other commentaries there is no mention of "with lust for sexual intercourse in the mouth," and thus it exists there, that statement is said to show by comparing it with the word of the Pali. In the Anugaṇṭhipada, ‘‘taṃ sabbampīti (all that) even in the Great Commentary, it is said that "He touches the female's organ without inserting it, the offense is thullaccaya." "With lust for sexual intercourse in the mouth" also exists somewhere, and in the Pali it is said without distinction that "Monks, the organ should not be touched with a lustful mind," therefore "all that" is said. Purimaṃ pasaṃsantīti (praising the former) comparing with the commentary statements...pe... in the manner stated, such as "thullaccaya, dukkata due to bodily contact, and lust." ‘‘Taṃ sabbampi…pe… purimaṃ pasaṃsantī’’ti (All that...pe... praising the former) this is said to be a judgment stated by comparing the words stated in the Pali and Commentary by the teachers in the island of Sri Lanka after the Sangiti. Here, itarathā hīti (otherwise) means naturally by the mouth. Why dukkata? Because it is fitting, since it is said, "For one inserting finger seeds etc., the offense is dukkata." Tiracchānagatitthiyā passāvamagganti (urinary passage of an animal female) even in the Great Commentary, having said "sign" before, but having said "urinary passage" here, it seems fitting that the offense is dukkata in the remaining sign. Vuttanayenevāti (In the manner stated) with lust for sexual intercourse. Thullaccayanti ca (and thullaccaya) and the khandhake should be examined and taken because it comes only with reference to the urinary sign.

The Explanation of the Sixty-Ninth, Two-Hundredth Quaternary is Finished.

Explanation of the Santhata Quaternary Division

61-2. Itthinimittaṃ khāṇuṃ katvā: "Having made the sign of a woman into a post," means having inserted the end of a post into the sign of a woman, whether making it level or pushing the protruding post, there is a dukkaṭa for lack of insertion. But if having slightly inserted, the post remains and he touches the sexual organ with it, there is a pārājika. It is said that the island dwellers also read "Uppalagandhā uppalabhāvā." Suttaṃ bhikkhumhī: Means with the intention of sexual intercourse present, as in (pārā. 57). And they also read "Suttabhikkhumhī," that is quite straightforward.

The Explanation of the Section on the Dissection of the Fourfold Mattress is Finished.

The Explanation of the Word Analysis is Finished.

The Explanation of the Miscellaneous Discussion

Pakiṇṇake: In the miscellaneous, those sikkhāpada that are called "actions" (kiriyā) should be understood in terms of body and speech, together with intimation (viññatti). Those that are non-actions should be understood without intimation. Here, the mind is immeasurable, because the action arises from revealing a falsehood, and because of being non-mental. There, an action (kiriyā) should be understood as arising from the consciousness immediately following the offense. Some things that do not generate intimation are also called "action" in a general sense, as in the first pārājika, even in the absence of intimation, it is said, "if he enjoys it, there is an offense of pārājika," and "if he does not enjoy it, there is no offense." Even the action (kiriyā) that is counted as intimation does not occur without the intention of sexual intercourse, because it is mind-produced, because it is a distorted form, and because it transforms according to the mind. Therefore, this form of intimation counted as action, like the other mind-born form, does not exist without a generating mind, unlike the other sound-element which exists. Therefore, it is concluded that if there is action, then the sexual intention which generates it certainly exists, and therefore it is not reasonable to say that if he does not enjoy it, there is no offense. Since even the sexual intention that generates the intimation does not always generate intimation, it is said "if he enjoys it, there is an offense of pārājika," concluding that it arises by itself even without intimation. If it does not arise, it is called not enjoying, for that there is no offense. Therefore, the Blessed One determines the offense by the mind itself, asking "what was your intention, bhikkhu?", and not by the action. Up to this point, there are six sources of offenses, and those same things are called offense-making qualities; and the sutta passages, "one incurs an offense in four ways: by body, by speech, by body and speech, and by declaration" are not contradictory. How? Because what offense one incurs by declaration, there is no body etc., it follows, then, that with declaration there are seven offense-making qualities. But there, too, the body etc. are obtained either together or separately. "In four ways" is not appropriate; it should be said, "one incurs an offense in three ways," thus they are contradictory. How are they not contradictory? Because of the difference between those with and without intimation in body etc. Some offenses that are actions are incurred by the body with intimation, some by speech with intimation, some by both body and speech with intimation. But some offenses that are non-actions are incurred by declaration, and that is only by the remaining non-intimating body and speech, not without it, because of the statement, "if he does not give up by body or speech, at the conclusion of the declaration, there is an offense of saṃghādisesa" (pārā. 414, 421). Or without distinction, some offenses are incurred by body, some by speech, some by body and speech. Of those incurred by body and speech, some are incurred by body and speech alone, some are incurred by declaration; this meaning should be understood thus, so they are not contradictory.

kāyena āpajjatī: "One incurs an offense by body," means one incurs some offenses by doing what should not be done by the body with intimation, or one incurs an offense by not doing what should be done without intimation, and both of these are called bodily action. For even in the world, what is not done is called "done," as in "this is a dukkaṭa for me, that I did not do merit," and in the Dispensation, as in "this is a dukkaṭa for you, Āvuso Ānanda, that you did not ask the Blessed One" (cūḷava. 443). Thus, in this Vinaya context, even what should not be done by the body is called "bodily action." The same method applies to "one incurs an offense by speech" and so on. There, the samuṭṭhāna (source) reference is for the purpose of showing that one incurs an offense only in dependence on the distinction of body etc., whether by what should be done or what should not be done, not otherwise. The kiriyā (action) reference is for the purpose of showing the distinction of body etc. as with or without intimation. The saññā (perception) reference is for the purpose of showing the distinction of the parts and non-parts of the offense, and the special consciousness. Therefore, the consciousness that is present in the characteristic of action or the characteristic of non-action, or from which an action or non-action occurs, is not without distinction a part or non-part of the offense. But the consciousness associated with that perception which is called "perception-release" (saññāvimokkha) is a part, the other is a non-part, thus it is shown. Now, that consciousness by which a sikkhāpada is intentional is called "intentional" because of its absence, but the intention is not specifically called sāvajjā (blameworthy), only the state of being worldly-blameless is stated. However, the lokavajja (worldly-blameworthy) reference is for the purpose of showing that though being blameworthy, some are worldly-blameworthy and some are declared-blameworthy. Since only consciousness is called "worldly-blameworthy," mental action might be an offense, to prevent this undesired consequence, the kamma (action) reference is made. To prevent the undesired consequence that the action (kamma) here that is the characteristic of non-action might be free from the wholesome triad, the kusalattika (wholesome triad) reference is made. To prevent the undesired consequence that some of the unindicated offenses are incurred even without feeling, because one who is attained to cessation of perception and feeling incurs an offense, the vedanāttika (feeling triad) reference is not obtained here, it should be understood that the vedanāttika (feeling triad) reference is made. Indeed, a sikkhāpada according to the intentional person has the designation "threefold consciousness, threefold feeling," and even when one incurs an offense unintentionally, it is still called "threefold consciousness, threefold feeling." Here, this sutta states, "There is an offense; an unintentional person incurs an offense; an unintentional person emerges from it (pari. 324). There is an offense; a person with wholesome consciousness incurs an offense; a person with wholesome consciousness emerges from it" etc. (pari. 470). In the Anugaṇṭhipada, however, it is said, "Perception always causes non-offense; consciousness causes offense; unintentional means not knowing the object, not knowing the transgression of perception-release; this is their difference."

Sabbasaṅgāhakavasenā: "In terms of all-inclusiveness," means in terms of the inclusion of all the sikkhāpada. Giving robes to a bhikkhunī is kiriyākiriyato (both action and non-action). Accepting gold and silver etc. siyā kiriyato (may be action). In rejecting what has been deposited, siyā akiriyato (may be non-action). In making a hut exceeding the designated dimensions, siyā kiriyato (may be action); in making one exceeding the undesignated dimensions, siyā kiriyākiriyato (may be both action and non-action). Yaṃ cittaṅgaṃ labhatiyevā: "Whatever consciousness is obtained as a part," such as bodily consciousness, verbal consciousness. Vināpi cittenā: "Even without consciousness," here the meaning is with consciousness and without consciousness. That body which has been spoken of as with and without intimation, its action is bodily action, likewise verbal action. There, the body with intimation accomplishes the action by arising, the other by not arising. It should be understood likewise with speech. sikkhāpada: "Sikkhāpada," because of the statement "whatever is name-group and word-group," it is said that it is connected to transgression. "Laughing, producing, and determining are also consciousnesses that give rise to offenses. Even this is not defined by me; when one sees while laughing, then determination is swift," thus it is said in the Anugaṇṭhipada. Knowledges (abhiññā) should be taken as instances of not knowing the declarations (paññatti) at the time of psychic powers and transformations.

Here, however, that bhikkhu who shares the livelihood and training of the bhikkhus… and engages in sexual intercourse, is there any pārājika which is non-association, is there any which is not a pārājika and is non-association. Engaging in the cases of dukkaṭa and thullaccaya, is there any which is not a pārājika. A hermaphrodite ordained in the non-hermaphrodite group, engaging in sexual intercourse in the hermaphrodite group, he does not incur a pārājika offense, thus he is not a pārājika. For indeed, there is no offense for a non-bhikkhu. Since he is without offense, when he comes to the non-hermaphrodite group, is there non-association or not? There is, for it is said, "he is incapable with that physical condition" (pārā. 55; mahāva. 129). Because it is said, "That bhikkhu who… is non-association" (pārā. 44), only that person who engages in sexual intercourse in the state of a bhikkhu is incapable. If it is said that this is not a pārājika, no, just as in the statement "the Sangha should be informed by an articulate, competent bhikkhu" (mahāva. 86), even when the declaration is proclaimed by a non-bhikkhu, the action takes effect because the fault of the action is impossible, so this should be seen. Here is the reason: Only if one who was previously ordained proclaims the declaration, and the Sangha perceives him as ordained, only then does the action take effect, not otherwise, thus, there is no agreement, says the teacher. If a householder or a sectarian or a hermaphrodite proclaims the declaration, not perceiving himself as ordained, the declaration is not proclaimed by the Sangha. "The Sangha should ordain, the Sangha ordains, he is ordained by the Sangha" (mahāva. 127), because the Sangha should proclaim the declaration, it should be understood that when one included in the Sangha, or one perceiving himself as included in the Sangha, proclaims it, it is as if the Sangha proclaimed it. This is the same reason in all actions. Likewise, if one engages in sexual intercourse, someone should be expelled, just as it is said, "that one who defiles a bhikkhunī should be expelled," but that one is unordained, and causes the offense of cohabitation etc., and there is a dukkaṭa in touching her. One who engages in sexual intercourse with a non-bhikkhunī should not be expelled, because there is no pāḷi stating "one who has fallen into the final matter, bhikkhus, if unordained… should be expelled." Therefore, he goes to the count of ordained, and does not cause the offense of cohabitation etc., only non-association, and so he is not a quorum-filler, for even a single act, a single recitation, is called association. Samasikkhatā (sharing the same training) is also called association, and so he does not have it, but he does generate the padasodhammāpatti, a shadow of the reason is seen. Just as for the Sangha of bhikkhus, because of the absence of association with the bhikkhunī Sangha which shares a single action etc., the bhikkhunī is non-associated to the bhikkhu, likewise the bhikkhu is non-associated to the bhikkhunī, but he does generate the padasodhammāpatti. Likewise, by this example, because it is not said "also one who has fallen into the final matter, someone should be expelled," that shadow of the reason does not go to acceptance.

There is no pāḷi, although in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī, it is said "for one who insults, there is ordainment, insulting with birth etc. without indirect reference, knowing 'he insults me,' absence of honoring the meaning etc., these are the four factors here" (kaṅkhā. aṭṭha. omasavādasikkhāpadavaṇṇanā), even so, in the sikkhāpada on malicious accusation, "a person is impure, having fallen into some pārājika offense, and if being of pure view he asks for permission and speaks with the intention to insult, there is an offense of malicious accusation" (pārā. 389), thus there is a pācittiya for one who insults perceiving an impure person as ordained. There is a dukkaṭa for one of impure view. But because of the statement "a person is pure, not having fallen into some pārājika offense, and if being of pure view he asks for permission and speaks with the intention to insult, there is an offense of malicious accusation" (pārā. 389), in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī it is not said "his ordainment, perceived as ordained," because that factor is of uncertain status, it should be understood.

Although in the Pāḷi, it seems to be allowed that "that bhikkhunī, bhikkhus, who has transitioned from being your own to a sectarian hermitage, when she comes back, she should not be ordained," thus she who first deviated and later transitioned to a sectarian hermitage, when she comes back, she should be ordained. But because the Sangīti teachers said "twenty-four pārājika," she should not be ordained again. Therefore, the rejection of the training (sikkhāpaccakkhānaṃ) is not allowed by the Blessed One. However, a bhikkhunī who has fallen into the final matter is. A hermaphrodite bhikkhunī likewise. Kiṃ: what, why is a question.

The Explanation of the Settled Case

67.Vinītavatthūni are matters that have been adjudicated and decided. The term vatthūnaṃ refers individually to each of those matters, such as, "At that time, a certain bhikkhu..." The term uddānagāthā refers to summaries, drawn out and arranged to eliminate deficiencies and excesses, along with verses (gāthā) composed in the style of matrādisiddhigāthā with characteristics of metrical variety; de, sodhane is the form of the root, and uddāna should be understood in that sense. These uddānagāthā were established by the Elders who compiled the Dhamma during the Council. Where were they placed? At the end of the Padabhājanīya. In the Gaṇṭhipada, it is stated that Vatthugāthā means "the nidānas of these vinītavatthūni, such as 'At that time, a certain bhikkhu...'" Therefore, it should be understood that, in the manner stated there, only the vinītavatthūni are referred to as "vatthugāthā." Here is a brief indication of the meaning: The vinītavatthūni are those matters that have been adjudicated and decided, whether through indicating a root offense (mūlāpatti) by saying, "Bhikkhu, you have committed a pārājika offense," or through indicating the different types of offenses by saying, "Bhikkhu, there is no pārājika offense, but there is a saṅghādisesa offense, a dukkaṭa offense," or through indicating a non-offense by saying, "Bhikkhu, there is no offense for one who is not enjoying." The tantī that illuminates the nidānavatthu of these vinītavatthūni is called vatthugāthā. Some say that the uddānagāthā is itself called "vatthugāthā." This contradicts the statement "By this characteristic, future vinayadharas will adjudicate the Vinaya." Indeed, no characteristic of adjudication is seen in the uddānagāthā. The specific purpose of the uddānagāthā is stated as "vinayadharas will easily learn it." Therefore, this difference should be understood due to the difference in purpose. Here is the analysis: vatthūni eva gāthā, vatthugāthā: vatthugāthā are simply the vatthu. The term gāthā is included here to distinguish it from vinītavatthu. The term vatthu is included to distinguish it from uddānagāthā. Some, however, say, "Instead of saying 'gāthānaṃ vatthūni,' it is said 'vatthugāthā.'" In the Makkaṭi case, other bhikkhus reported it; here, he did it himself. The Vajjians are different, since the reason was stated as "the Blessed One established the training rule." In one Gaṇṭhipada, it is stated, "There, it was Ānanda Thera; here, it was they themselves." The teacher's intention has been stated previously, therefore it should be examined.

67-8.Ñatvā: having known oneself without asking. Pokkhara: the body, like the pokkhara (drumhead) of a drum. Laypeople say "sundara" (beautiful) completely, therefore, vaṇṇapokkharatāyā means having an excellent complexion, according to the first meaning; according to the second, it means beauty of complexion. In the Gaṇṭhipada it is said, "Because her complexion was the color of an uppala bud, she obtained the name Uppalavaṇṇā, the color of gold." The statement Nīluppalavaṇṇā kāyacchavī indicates a dark complexion. However, in the world, "One who is dark is praised like an uppala," and "She who is dark, of dark complexion, with a slender waist, she is to be served; my dwelling is in heaven," thus, women with dark complexions are praised. Yāvassā naṃ andhakāra is also a reading. One who is not attached to vatthukāmas (sensual objects) among kilesakāmas (defilement-sensual pleasures).

69.Itthiliṅgaṃ pātubhūtaṃ: the female form appeared, specifically through the disappearance of the male organ (purisindriya) and the appearance of the female organ (itthindriya). The same applies to the appearance of the male organ. This shows that it is not like the case of a Brahma, where the male organ does not arise, only the male form arises; nor is it like the case of a paṇḍaka (eunuch), where the male form arises without the male organ. For them, the disappearing female or male organ disappears in reverse order, starting from the seventeenth moment of consciousness, like those who are dying. When one organ ceases in the present, the opposite organ appears. Because the opposite organ appears to one who has just entered deep sleep, therefore it is stated ‘‘rattibhāge niddaṃ okkantassā’’. Since it is said, "I allow, bhikkhus, that same one as preceptor and the same one for higher ordination," the pavattinī (one who gives pravrajyā) is the preceptor, and the bhikkhunī is the teacher for upasampadā. Should this bhikkhu then go to the bhikkhunī residence every day at dawn to perform the duties of a preceptor and teacher, and should they come to this monastery and perform the duties of a co-resident, etc.? Because of the statement "I allow, bhikkhus, to associate with bhikkhunīs," which indicates non-separation, it should be understood that the "I allow, bhikkhus, that same one as preceptor" etc., is stated only to show that they should not take another preceptor, nor should they perform upasampadā again. Here, bhikkhunīhi saṅgamitu means "I allow to be in harmony with bhikkhunīs only, without being apart from bhikkhus." Therefore, by this Pāli passage, the commentary's statement "she is not subject to offense from going to another village, etc." is established. It is possible to come and associate with them. Since the Blessed One has permitted going, how could there be an offense due to going to another village, etc.? The Blessed One does not impose an offense; this is indeed fitting. Otherwise, from the Pāli statement "Those offenses that are not shared by bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, she is free from those offenses," there would not be freedom from offense from going to another village, etc., thus an offense would occur. If the offenses are shared, then it is indeed an offense. If it were said that "those offenses that are not shared by bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, and the offenses of going to another village, crossing a river, staying overnight, or being influenced by a group while associating with bhikkhunīs, she is free from those offenses" was not stated, why? It was not stated due to an undesirable consequence. Even when she has gone with bhikkhunīs, if she leaves them and associates with others, there would always be no offense from going to another village, etc.; this undesirable consequence is why it was not stated that way. Here, even if she intentionally commits the offense of going to another village, etc., at that time, due to the reason of the appearance of the (opposite-sex) form, she is free from offense because she does not incur an offense. She should be known as "risen" (vuṭṭhāti) only in the sense of not incurring an offense. Similarly, a yogi stops defilements before they arise. Even a bowl without ties is called "having less than five ties." Or, one does not entirely acknowledge the training, the training is not disavowed. Similarly, here, even though an offense has not been incurred, it should be known as "risen."

In the Parivāra, it is stated "Furthermore, one incurs an offense in four ways: in the midst of the Sangha, in the midst of a group, in the presence of an individual, through the appearance of the (opposite-sex) form" (pari. 324). As for what is stated in the Parivāra: "One rises while incurring an offense, and incurs an offense while rising" (pari. 324), it should be understood that this refers to both incurring a sahaseyya (sleeping together) offense and rising from non-shared offenses. A monastery is far away, five dhanus (bow-lengths) and one hundred hatthas (cubits) behind, meaning that entering a village starting from the monastery is going to another village. Saṃvidahanaṃ parimocetvā: without making arrangements for traveling a distance. Tā kopetvā: having abandoned them. ‘‘Paripuṇṇavassasāmaṇerenāpī’’: From this statement ("even by a fully aged sāmaṇera"), it appears that a sāmaṇera who is not fully aged cannot take a preceptor. Vinayakammaṃ katvā ṭhapito: having set aside after a vikappana (agreement). If the ten days pass without a vikappana, it should be known as nissaggiya. Puna paṭiggahetvā sattāhaṃ vaṭṭatī: However, "I allow, bhikkhus, to receive a store from bhikkhunīs and use it" (cūḷava. 421) is the reason it was stated. Anapekkhavissajjanenā: by an anapekkhavissajjana (renunciation without expectation) of the object, or by receiving it back, thinking "I will receive it again and use it." Pakkhamānattakāle punadeva liṅgaṃ parivattati chārattaṃ mānattameva dātabba: if, during the period of being on probation (mānatta), the form changes again, only six nights of mānatta should be given; if the offense was not covered up during the bhikkhu period, it is not received; this is the teacher's opinion.

Parivāsadānaṃ pana natthī: it should be understood that this is stated because there is no possibility of covering up for a bhikkhunī. If a bhikkhunī commits a non-shared pārājika offense and regains the male form, she does not receive upasampadā among bhikkhus, but she receives pabbajja (ordination as a novice). If, without taking pabbajja, she remains in the state of a bhikkhu, she does not generate a sahaseyya (sleeping together) offense. When the male form appears in a deranged bhikkhunī, she does not receive upasampadā among bhikkhus, it is a pārājika offense. If the female form appears in one who is not deranged but a householder who has defiled a bhikkhunī, she neither receives upasampadā among bhikkhunīs, nor, if the form changes again, does she receive it among bhikkhus. When the form changes in a bhikkhunī, she becomes a bhikkhu; if he then renounces the training and becomes deranged and regains the female form, she receives upasampadā among bhikkhunīs because she did not previously attain the state of pārājika in either state. If a bhikkhunī who has completed twelve years regains the male form, he is a bhikkhu who has received upasampadā. If he comes back after renouncing the training, he should not be given upasampadā because he is not yet twenty years old. If the form changes again, she receives upasampadā among bhikkhunīs. Similarly, if the form changes in a boy who has completed twelve years and has already had intercourse, he becomes a woman who has gone to the household life; she should be given upasampadā when she has completed twelve years. If a bhikkhunī's female form disappears or a bhikkhu's male form disappears, they might become a pakkhapaṇḍaka (one whose gender changes periodically). That bhikkhunī should not be destroyed by the bhikkhunīs, nor should the bhikkhu be destroyed by the bhikkhus, because there is a possibility of returning to their original state. It is said that "a paṇḍaka should be destroyed" referring to a permanent paṇḍaka. A pakkhapaṇḍaka should be destroyed by saṃvāsa-expulsion, while the other should be destroyed by both types of expulsion. If they return to their original state, this rule applies: "I allow, bhikkhus, that same one as preceptor and the same one for higher ordination, to associate with bhikkhunīs for those years." If another form appears in them, then that rule applies, and this rule also applies: Those offenses that are shared by bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, to rise from those offenses in the presence of bhikkhunīs, they are free from the non-shared offenses. As for what is stated in the Parivāra: "With the regaining, it abandons the former, it is established in the latter, the communications are stilled, the regulations cease, with the regaining, it abandons the latter, it is established in the former, the communications..." etc., the teacher's opinion is that it is stated referring to the aforementioned rule. When the female or male form disappears, does it disappear taking the entire body, or does it disappear by itself? What is the case here? If it disappears taking the entire body, this person would have died (cuta). Therefore, generally, they would have died, and when receiving upasampadā again, they would become an opapātika (spontaneously born being). But if it disappears by itself, that state contradicts it. The female organ, etc., completely pervade the entire body, therefore their disappearance should be understood like the cessation of a moment (khaṇanirodha), thus the absence of the aforementioned fault should be understood. Like the place of the other remains even when one light ceases in lamps whose lights are intertwined, the remaining body's place remains there.

71-2.Muccatu vā mā vā dukkaṭamevā: because of the absence of desire to release. Avisayo: asādiyanaṃ nāma, meaning that it is difficult to do in such a place. Methunadhammo: sexual intercourse happens with the effort of both, because it is said, "for him there are two pairs of offenses," therefore, you should not make an effort; thus there will be no offense for you. This is a training rule involving action. Because it is said, "Bhikkhu, you have committed a pārājika offense," this training rule is mostly called "action" (kiriya) even though it is non-action (akiriya); thus it is established.

73-4.Some say, "If one, fearing a pārājika offense, does entering, etc., having made it go into the air, and accidentally touches the palate or sides or genitals, it is only a dukkaṭa offense." Why? Because there is no sexual desire. This should be investigated. It is said that the exterior of the teeth is a thullaccaya matter, like the exterior of the lips, "thullaccaya with the tongue outside the teeth." Taṃ puggalaṃ visaññiṃ katvā: by this statement ("having made that person unconscious"), it is shown that that person is called khittacitta (of deranged mind). However, if a person who has not been made unconscious enjoys their own genitals with the perception of friction, the trickling sound of semen, etc., because of the absence of sexual perception, it follows the unconscious side, thus the appearance of no offense for them. "I think this is sexual intercourse with some non-human," if one enjoys knowing this, there is indeed an offense. Paṇḍakassa methunadhammaṃ: sexual intercourse with a paṇḍaka, either in the anus or in the mouth, or it is a locative use. Even if they are not feeling it (avedayantā), there is an offense because of the intention to engage, just like engaging with a mattress.

"Sīsaṃ na pāpuṇātiti, it does not reach pārājika, it remains only a dukkata for the initial attempt," is written in one gaṇṭhipada. Uccāliṅgapāṇakadaṭṭhenāti, here, the suffix implying result (bhāva-niṭṭhā-paccayo) should be understood. For, daṭṭhena, daṃsena, and khādanena, in meaning, are the same.

76-7. Just as a warrior in the front line of battle exerts himself, so does a bhikkhu; therefore, "saṅgāmasīsayodho bhikkhū" is said. Rukkhasūcidvāraṃ, a door stuck with thorns, should be fastened with one or many thorns; this is a kaṇṭakadvāraṃ. Dussadvāraṃ and sāṇidvārañca, a cloth door and a screen door are called dussasāṇidvāraṃ. Even all that is mentioned beginning with "kilañjasāṇī" is included as dussasāṇī. Because of the uniformity, it is called "eka." Ākāsatale, means on the roof terrace. Ayañhettha saṅkhepo, this was said in reference to what needs to be said presently. "Because it has been said that they remain seated while doing something, asking permission from those lying down is not proper," some say. Although it is said without distinction that "Just as it is measured out, so it is not exceeded; for him, there is an offense," in that case, only a dukkata offense due to disrespect is intended. How is this known? Because it is said that "Having opened the door at night and lying down, he gets up when the dawn breaks, there is no offense"; and because in the mahāpaccariyaṃ, specifying, it is said that "He does not escape even the dukkata due to disrespect," therefore, the intention is that he escapes the other dukkata. Yathāparicchedameva ca na uṭṭhāti, tassa āpattiyevāti, here it is not said referring to the dukkata due to disrespect. Because of the emphasis that it is just as it is measured out, it is said that he is not inside the limit. It is said taking the determination, just like in the place where "supatī" is said again. Evaṃ nipajjanto, this is said referring to the dukkata that is to be incurred at the time of lying down, therefore it is said that for one who gets up according to the limit, there are two dukkatas. In the Andhakaṭṭhakathā also, it is said that "If, having not closed the door at night, he lies down thinking, 'I will get up in the daytime', there is an offense of dukkata due to disrespect." Here too, it should be known because it is said "nipanno (lying down)" and because it is not said "aruṇe uṭṭhite uṭṭhāhī (get up when the dawn breaks)". Some say, "Mahāpaccariyaṃ is said referring to dukkata due to disrespect only, not the dukkata mentioned in the aṭṭhakathā." Tassa anāpattī, this is said because in reality he did not lie down. "But if, having closed the door at night, someone opens it at dawn, for one who lies down without having taken precautions such as guarding the door, there is indeed an offense. Why? Because it is a field for offenses," they say.

What is said in the mahāpaccariyaṃ, that one who deliberately lies down during the day initially does not escape even if he later becomes unconscious like one possessed by a demon, is said with the intention that he incurs the offense at the very moment of the act of lying down. Bandhitvā nipajjāpitova muccatī, he escapes not only in cases of being possessed by a demon, etc.; even he escapes as long as his own intention to lie down does not occur. When, being exhausted, the intention to lie down arises out of a desire to sleep, then he should be put to sleep after having the door closed, or after having it guarded, or after having made an ābhoga. Otherwise, there is an offense. If there is no companion, or he cannot see, or he cannot go, and after enduring for a long time, he lies down without making an ābhoga due to pain, for him, according to the statement "anāpatti vedanāṭṭassā," there is no offense. Because even for him the range of offense is not seen, it is not seen that one sleeping in a state of unconsciousness incurs an offense, according to the statement "anāpatti khittacittassā." Ācariyā pana evaṃ na kathayantī, the teachers do not speak in this way, without specifying, "it is not seen." If he sleeps without regaining consciousness, because he is not in control, the offense is not seen; if, even after regaining consciousness, he sleeps consenting to the lying down due to an exhausted body, for him, since it is not seen that he is not in control, therefore they say that there is indeed an offense. That is the intention.

In the Mahāpadumattheravāda, one possessed by a demon and one of deranged mind are exempt. One who is put to sleep after being bound is exempt because he does not intend to lie down, and because he is in pain. That is the intention. Thus, the Pāḷi, Aṭṭhakathā, and Theravāda are in agreement. Therefore, the teacher says that he is not satisfied that this itself is the intention of those various judgments. But in the anugaṇṭhipada, one possessed by a demon or one who has fainted does not escape, for he is capable of incurring a pārājika if he intermittently regains consciousness. That is the intention. If, according to the Kurundī statement "bandhitvā nipajjāpito vā," one who lies down in one posture does not escape? He does escape. Why? Because, in reality, he does not lie down intentionally. The Mahāaṭṭhakathā doctrine agrees with the Kurundī doctrine. Why? Because of the similarity of not being in control. Although it agrees, the teachers do not speak in this way. Not only they, the "mahāpadumattherenā" is said to show that even Mahāpadumatthera does not say this. In the Mahāpadumattheravāda it is also said, "One possessed by a demon is not capable of incurring a pārājika." There, the teachers say thus, "If one, having fallen asleep, unknowingly puts his feet on the bed, there is indeed an offense," therefore, "for one who falls down and sleeps right there and does not get up, there is an offense whether he intermittently knows it or not." To show, compiling together, the statements mentioned in all the commentaries, "idha ko muccati ko na muccatī" is said. One possessed by a demon or one who has fainted is not only capable of incurring a pārājika, but incurs all offenses. Thus, according to the statement "bandhitvā nipajjāpitova muccatī," because even for him there is no control, they do not say that "āpatti na dissatī (the offense is not seen)". Because he is not one of the insane, deranged, of confused mind or afflicted by pain, therefore they say "āpattiyevā (there is indeed an offense)". It seems that all this has not been included in the Saṅgīti. In the anugaṇṭhipada it is said that "Because it is said 'he approves of the entering', some say that there is also no action; that should not be taken, for when he approves, even a subtle intimation is present; therefore, here there is indeed action."

The explanation of the First Pārājika is complete.

2. The Second Pārājika

Explanation of the Dhaniya Story

84. In the second pārājika, because it was surrounded by kings, it obtained the name "rājagaha"; on Mount Gijjhakūṭa, which has the locative suffix indicating proximity and the locative suffix indicating location, implying that they were dwelling with four monasteries. Its connection should be understood with "vassaṃ upagacchiṃsū." For only three establish the ñatti and perform the sanghakamma, not fewer or more, because it would be ineffective. There, this miscellaneous section should be understood for skill in the sangha, gaṇa and puggala kammas according to the method of the Vinaya: There is sanghakamma that only the sangha performs, not the gaṇa or the puggala; setting aside a part of the defining characteristic of apalokanakamma, the other four kinds of kamma should be understood. There is sanghakamma that the sangha performs, and the gaṇa performs, and the puggala performs. What is that? That which was established earlier. This was said in the parivāraṭṭhakathā: "In whichever monastery two or three people dwell, even what is done by them having sat down is just like what is done by the sangha. In whichever monastery there is one bhikkhu, even what is done by that bhikkhu on the Uposatha day, having done the preliminary duties, having sat down, is just like the katikavatta done by the sangha" (pari. aṭṭha. 495-496). Again it was said, "But even if the prior agreement is announced by one bhikkhu in a monastery with one bhikkhu, it comes to rest." There is gaṇakamma that the sangha performs, the gaṇa performs, and the puggala performs; that should be understood by way of the three pārisuddhiuposathas that are done in the presence of others. There is gaṇakamma that only the gaṇa performs, not the sangha or the puggala; that should be understood by way of the pārisuddhiuposatha that is done by way of announcing to each other. There is puggalakamma that only the puggala performs, not the sangha or the gaṇa; that should be understood by way of the adhiṭṭhānuposatha. There is gaṇakamma that only some of the gaṇa perform, and some do not perform; there, only two perform the unannounced action, not three. Only three perform the announced action, not fewer or more than that; therefore it was said, "tayo eva hi ñattiṃ ṭhapetvā gaṇakammaṃ karonti, na tato ūnā adhikā vā akiriyattā". Therefore, it should be understood that only three are quite numerous by the method of the Vinaya, not more than that. But in the Anugaṇṭhipade, "Although only three perform the defining characteristic of the kamma, but what is done by them is just like what is done by the sangha; therefore, by one method, three people are also the sangha by the method of the Vinaya," it is said; this is said including all the Vinaya kamma, but including the gain, even at least one who is not fully ordained is called "sangha." They are called "vutthagassā" immediately after the sunrise of the Pavāraṇā day, in the way of emphasizing, it is said "paṭipadadivasato paṭṭhāyā (starting from the first day after the full moon)," therefore, "mahāpavāraṇāya pavāritā" is said. Otherwise, if they are not invited due to an obstruction, they are not called "vutthavassā"; an objection arises. Thambhādi kaṭṭhakammanti should be understood as woodwork such as pillars. Some make an earthen pillar after placing a thin wooden pillar inside, but this one did not do so, therefore it was said "sabbamattikāmayaṃ kuṭikaṃ karitvā." With red clay mixed with oil.

85. "Mā pacchimā janatā pāṇesu pātabyataṃ āpajjī", by this anuddesasikkhāpada, it shows that a bhikkhu who knows about permissibility should not even utter a word of permissibility in places where the later people would come to a state of obvious wrongdoing, such as firing bricks, cooking food in a pot, making huts, having monasteries built, doing new construction work, repairing damaged structures, sweeping monasteries, offering fire, digging wells and ponds. Therefore, without stating a method, in the anāpattivāras of those precepts, it is said, "anāpatti asatiyā ajānantassā." This name itself is "antarāpattisikkhāpada." By "Gacchathetaṃ, bhikkhave, kuṭikaṃ bhindathā," it is also established that even for those dwelling there after having obtained what has been done, it is only a dukkata. Otherwise, the Buddha would not have it destroyed. This is the same principle for bhedanakaṃ, chedanakaṃ, uddālanakanti; the offenses are different. Therefore, it is not said in the breaking precept and others, "aññena kataṃ paṭilabhitvā paribhuñjati, āpatti dukkaṭassā," just as it is said in the breaking precept and others; likewise, it is also established that doing it for another, doing it for the sake of cetiyas, is only a dukkata, otherwise, as in the hut-making precept and others, he would say the principle "aññassatthāya vāsāgāraṃ ṭhapetvā sabbattha, anāpattī," and would not have it destroyed. But having made it with a mixture of wood, stone, etc., removing the condition of being entirely earthen, one may use it; there is no offense. For example, in the cutting precept and others, the Buddha has given the method "aññena kataṃ pamāṇātikkantaṃ paṭilabhitvā chinditvā paribhuñjatī." Some say that "by 'vayakammampīti,' it means that there is also what is made after giving payment; therefore, it is established that even what is done by another is not proper." That is not sound. Why? Because the occurrence of expense work is possible even for one who buys the materials and makes it himself. Moreover, when there is a trace of Pāḷi, what is the use of a trace of commentary? Iṭṭhakāhi giñjakāvasathasaṅkhepena katā vaṭṭatī, here, a dwelling that is to be made by laying bricks made of ordinary clay is called giñjakāvasatho. For it is not called "mattikāmayā," but is only called "iṭṭhakakuṭikā." Therefore, the teacher says that he is not satisfied that even a dwelling made of clay mixed with husk, cow dung, grass, and straw, or made of unbaked bricks, is called "sabbamattikāmayā." For ash and the like are taken only for the purpose of strengthening the clay; moreover, what is made of unbaked bricks does not go by the name giñjakāvasatha, and Venerable Dhaniya did not finish that hut with just one attempt, like a potter finishing a pot, but gradually finishing it by laying lumps of clay after letting it dry. A hut made of unbaked bricks is like a hut made entirely of clay, being integrated into one, but a hut made of baked bricks is not so; therefore, some say that it is allowable. If one makes a grass hut, etc., outside a hut made entirely of clay and dwells inside, it is only a dukkata. If, having made holes here and there, one fastens and integrates it, it is allowable. If one makes a grass hut, etc., inside and dwells inside, it is allowable. If only the maker dwells there, he incurs a dukkata due to the cause of making, not due to the cause of dwelling. If one plasters with stucco either inside or outside or in both places, it is allowable. Since a hut made entirely of clay is easy to break down, the bowl, robe, etc., placed there are unprotected, and can be taken away by thieves, etc., therefore it was said "pattacīvaraguttatthāyā."

Explanation of Judgments Extracted from the Pāḷi

It should be understood that by saying "na vaṭṭatī" ("it is not allowable"), it is indicated that making decorations or embellishments on all the requisites, beginning with ‘‘tatrāyaṃ pāḷimuttako’’ ("here, this is merely the wording of the Pali"), incurs an offense of dukkaṭa. Here someone might say: "Since it is said, ‘I allow, monks, all metal items except weapons, all wooden items except chairs, couches, wooden bowls, and wooden sandals, and all clay items except the kataka and kumbhakārika’ (cūḷava. 293), does that mean everything else besides what is excluded is allowable for decoration and embellishment without exception?" It is said: That is not proper, due to the contradiction with the Pali shown above. Therefore, this Pali, beginning with "ṭhapetvā paharaṇi" ("except weapons"), is to be understood as applying in a general sense. The Pali shown above applies in the sense of prohibiting decorations and embellishments. Thus, both do not contradict each other. Therefore, it is as has been said. Āraggena: with a needlepoint, according to the manner stated in places such as, ‘‘āraggeriva sāsapo’’ (ma. ni. 2.458; dha. pa. 401; su. ni. 630) "like a mustard seed on an awl point."

Paṭṭamukhe vā: or on the edge of the cloth. Pariyante: at the border of the robe. Veṇiuhumuniyupeññāma. Agghiyaṃ: a shrine. Gayamuggaraṃ: shaped like a balance, with a needle at the head, and a mouth-leaf (mukhapattā ladrā). Ukkiranti: they extract, make, establish. Koṇasuttapiḷakā: are thread tassels at the corners of cloths like gaṇṭhikapaṭṭa. Whatever robe or bowl is said to be "na vaṭṭatī" ("not allowable") here, it should be understood that its adhiṭṭhāna and vikappanā are also "ruhati" ("grow," i.e., increase the offense). Deḍḍubho: a water snake. Acchī: a guardian of elephants. Gomuttakaṃ: lines shaped like cow's urine. Because a key is a requisite for a dwelling, an image appears that one made of gold or silver is allowable. However, since it is stated, ‘‘kuñcikāya vaṇṇamaṭṭhakammaṃ na vaṭṭatī’’ ("decoration of a key is not allowable"), only keys made of other allowable metals, etc., are proper, because they are requisites to be kept put away. Ārakaṇṭako: a kind of tool for making books, etc. They say ‘‘Āmaṇḍakasārako is made of amalaka fruit." In the case of palm-leaf fans, etc., it is said that ‘‘vaṇṇamaṭṭhakammaṃ vaṭṭatī’’ ("decoration is allowable"). Although those are to be kept put away like keys, it is stated due to the absence of a prohibition against "uccāvacāni na dhāretabbānī" ("various kinds are not to be kept"). For those are only mentioned with "anujānāmi, bhikkhave, vidhūpanañca tālavaṇṭañcā" ("I allow, monks, a fan and a palm-leaf stalk"), etc. (cūḷava. 269). However, in the Gaṇṭhipada, it is stated, ‘‘telabhājanesu vaṇṇamaṭṭhakammaṃ vaṭṭatī, because they are requisites for a dwelling." Rājavallabhā: favored by the royal family. Sīmā: here refers to the ground, and a consecrated boundary. In the anugaṇṭhipada it is stated, "The boundary belongs to those who own the land; others should not establish it there." They say, "The land and the boundary belong to those who own them, and they alone can prevent it. But those who have established a boundary on the land of others are not powerful enough to prevent it." It is said in the Andhakaṭṭhakathā that, "Because it is a cause for schisms in the Sangha, they should definitely be prevented by saying, 'Do not do it.'"

86-7.To make a wooden hut, or to do. Khaṇḍākhaṇḍikaṃ: should be regarded like fruit and non-fruit. Āṇāpehī: because the word is only used for the undesirable, he ordered the punishment. Issariyamattāyā: it indicates that the word "matta" is in the sense of prosperity.

88.There is also a reading, "Evarūpaṃ vācaṃ bhāsitvā." Lomena tvaṃ mutto, mā punapi evarūpamakāsī: is this a statement indicating malevolence, or one indicating the accumulation of greed even for wood, befitting that Sotaapanna king who possessed mindfulness? Should he not rather have given him leave by saying, "Pubbe kataṃ sukataṃ bhante, vadeyyātha punapi yenattho" ("Venerable sir, you have previously done well; please tell us again what is needed"), and thereby have generated great joy and gladness? This is true, but because he was a Stream-enterer, an exceedingly devoted follower of the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha, and thus unable to tolerate what was unlawful for the monks, and wishing to create an opportunity for the enactment of a training rule, he spoke thus, even with a pleased mind, thinking, "My wood is well-utilized." In places such as this, ‘‘Āgatapadānurūpenā ti aññehi vā padehi, ito thokatarehi vā āgatakāle tadanurūpā yojanā kātabbā’’ti in the Gaṇṭhipada it is said that "According to the words that have come, or by other words, or by those that are slightly different from these, a connection should be made in accordance with the occasion when it arises." In the anugaṇṭhipada it is said that, "Not only in this training rule, but also in others that arise, therefore, the connection should be understood according to the words that have come." Ujjhāyanattho: only because it was not given, they were indignant.

Rudradāmako: produced by Rudradāmaka and others. In cities such as Bārāṇasī, nīlakahāpaṇā ("blue kahapanas") were produced by those kings, possessing the proper marks according to ancient texts. It seems that a Rudradāmaka is worth a third of those; therefore, a quarter of that is a thullaccaya object. However, a māsaka here is immeasurable. A kahāpaṇa is sometimes less than twenty māsakas, and sometimes more than twenty māsakas. Therefore, a fourth of that kahāpaṇa, about five māsakas, or more than or less than five māsakas, is to be understood as a quarter. To illuminate this meaning, ‘‘tadā rājagahe vīsatimāsako kahāpaṇo hotī’’ ("at that time in Rajagaha, a kahapana was twenty masakas") etc. is stated. There, a kahāpaṇo is made of silver, gold, or copper. In a land of gold, like Suvaṇṇabhūmi, where even a quarter is made only of copper, that alone is the quarter, according to the teacher. Since a quarter is worth one blue kahapana, therefore a fourth of that would be the quarter, according to some. This is not proper. For if an object worth a quarter is a pārājika object, then it is established that "that quarter is the final pārājika object." Indeed, everywhere they do not take an object and value it at the price of a blue kahapana. Because they value it according to the price of that same kahapana, therefore the quarter of that region is the quarter, and that alone is the value of the quarter. It is established that ‘‘so ca kho porāṇassa nīlakahāpaṇassa vasena, na itaresanti wherever blue kahapanas are used, it is only there," some say. It should be taken after investigation.

Description of the Word Analysis

92.Gāmā vā araññā vā: because of defining the characteristic, it is stated at the beginning of the first enactment. Yato vā apakkantā, that is amanusso nāma. In the anugaṇṭhipada it is stated that, "It is allowable to enter an amanussa village without knocking and to enter a village without asking permission." Some say that, "It is not allowable to enter a village in this way if people have just left the village to come as guests." Some others say that, "Even if it is a place under the control of yakkhas, when it is visible in places such as shops, it is called a 'village'; there is no offense in entering when it is not visible." Some say that, "It is well said in the Kurunda commentary and others, where it is taken in the karmadhāraya sense as 'gāmo eva upacāro gāmūpacāro' ("a village is an extension of the village")." The statement "Tassa gharūpacāro gāmoti āpajjatī" is rejected. Some say, "Gāmassupacāro ca gāmo ca gāmūpacāro ca," but that contradicts. "We do not reject what is said in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā concerning the characteristic of these gains, etc., as 'gharaṃ gharūpacāro,' etc." they say. In the Gaṇṭhipada it is written that ‘‘Kataparikkhepocāti gharassa samantato tattako upacāro nāmā" ("Kataparikkhepo means that which is the boundary around the house"). However, in the anugaṇṭhipada, ‘‘yo yo aṭṭhakathāvādo vā theravādo vā pacchā vuccatīti is said referring to the future, not the past. If it were said referring to the past as well, then it would follow that the Mahāpaduma Thera's opinion alone is authoritative. Therefore, the teachers say that it is said referring only to the future." Sesampī: even the characteristic of the village boundary.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo: in taking that village boundary, this is the method. Vikālegāmappavesanādīsū: here, in the Gaṇṭhipada it is said that "entering a village should be inquired about from outside." They say that "That does not agree with the commentary." It agrees, in my opinion, if it is taken as "said in reference to the boundary considered as a village." ‘‘Ādi-saddato ghare ṭhitānaṃ dinnalābhabhājanādīnī’’ti In the Gaṇṭhipada it is said that "From the word 'ādi,' it includes things like the bowls of gain given to those staying in the house." In the anugaṇṭhipada it is said that "If gains that should be obtained by those staying in the village boundary are intentionally not given, it is a pārājika." Although in the Kurundi and others, because it is said in accordance with the wording stated in the Pali, it should not be called "pamādalekhā," the judgement stated in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā has come down since the Sangiti. ‘‘Yañcetaṃ mahāaṭṭhakathāya’’ntiādi What is stated by the commentary teachers in Sri Lanka in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā is also called "vinicchayanayo" ("the method of judgement"). Leḍḍupāteneva paricchinditabbo: the place suitable for enclosure, not the boundary. For that is enclosed by throwing a clod of earth beyond that. In this Adinnādānasikkhāpada, by way of a rule it is stated according to the meaning that it is different in different places. Or, by that rule, the meaning is also suitable here according to the literal meaning. Abhidhamme panātiādinā, it shows that the establishment of meaning is also different.

is said in the Gaṇṭhipada. In the Porāṇagaṇṭhipada it is said, "The work of a thief is theyyaṃ, the object to be taken by a thief. It is called theyya." Since that theyya is the work of a thief, and since he has a mind to steal, a mind to misappropriate, therefore even the word analysis "theyyacitto avaharaṇacitto" ("a mind to steal, a mind to misappropriate") of those ancients is suitable after extracting the word "theyyasaṅkhāta". Even so, it should be taken in accordance with the method stated in the commentary. In the anugaṇṭhipada it is said that, "The initial thought of 'I will steal,' the middle thought which accomplishes going, etc., or accomplishing touching, etc., and the final portion of thought which accomplishes moving from the place—among these, this final portion of thought is intended here as 'thief,' according to others." In the case of less than a māsaka, a māsaka, a quarter māsaka, etc., it is said that "The teachers say that it is a portion of a single thought in the thoughts of misappropriation."

Description of the Twenty-five Cases of Taking What is Not Given

Pañcavīsati avahārā ("the twenty-five takings") are different only in the variety of words, but not different in meaning. Ākulā duviññeyyavinicchayā: the judgements which have not been grasped in every way from the mouths of the teachers are difficult to understand. Like the Dukatikapaṭṭhānapāḷi (paṭṭhā. 5.1.1 ff, Dukatikapaṭṭhānapāḷi), the judgements are confusing and difficult to understand. But the teachers explain that without making contradictions between what comes before and what comes after, and without destroying the method that has come down from the Sangiti, therefore it is said that "some say it is like the Paṭṭhānapāḷi." Porāṇā: the teachers of the Sangiti. Ayamettha sāmīci: this alone is proper here. If he does not give it, there is no offense, but fearing a pārājika, just as one wishing for training gives, so it should definitely be given. Whatever objects are here, those have been placed in the commentaries by the teachers in Sri Lanka with the approval of the Sangha and others, saying that "in the future, for the benefit of those living the holy life, even after the time of being put in books." Āṇattikaṃ is taken at the moment of command, it is useful even after a long time, the difference between these is with reference to a long time. Bhaṭṭhe: when it is removed. Antarasamudde: aturumuhude. Pharati: accomplishes. Navadhoto: newly made. Pāsāṇasakkharaṃ: stones and gravel.

Description of the Bhūmaṭṭhakathā, etc.

94. In the Mahāaṭṭhakathā, it is said that whether it is true or false, it is a dukkaṭa, but it should be understood that it is written due to negligence, and it should be taken according to the justification as it is now. There, instead of saying, "It is proper to do all Saṅgha acts such as upasampadā, pavāraṇā, and abbhāna, having established it with four groups," it should be understood that they write "upasampadā, pavāraṇā, kathina, abbhāna, etc." The teachers describe that as a "negligent writing," hence it is said "written due to negligence." Wherever a statement is false, it is said that there is a pācittiya. Because there is no purpose in the statement of a dukkaṭa, it is said, "in the initial effort of taking what is not given." For others also, in the place of pācittiya in the initial effort, there is only pācittiya. Taking what is implied here in "written due to negligence", it seems to agree with what is said in the commentary. However, the teachers, saying "pācittiya in the place of pācittiya", say "negligent writing" because of the general statement of "true or false" when a dukkaṭa should be stated separately. It is like there is no offense with the statement "I will give a gift" because it is said, "there is no offense in going with a wholesome mind."

One is not freed from a dukkaṭa in the place of a pācittiya means one incurs a dukkaṭa along with a pācittiya. Even if there are many offenses, having committed ten offenses each in digging, destroying, and removing, one is freed by confessing ten pācittiyas in the removing. According to the lineage, "one is freed by confessing only one" is said in the Kurundī, therefore it agrees with the former. Since it is said, "duukkaṭa in the effort of showing after combining," it indicates many dukkaṭas in similar efforts. Many in digging does not subside because of the similar effort. According to the authority of the Aṭṭhakathā teachers, the meaning is that just as in this case, such statements that come in the commentary, which have come from the Saṅgīti onwards, should be taken. It seems that Dhammasiri Thera said, "Here, it should be taken in the second pārājika, not in others." However, in the Gaṇṭhipada, it is said, "The initial digging subsides when it reaches the later one, therefore one is freed by confessing only one," and it is also said, "or the former subsides when it reaches dissimilar action."

In a pot means a word for the ground. When lifting upwards, even if the tip of a hair is freed from the ground, it is a pārājika This agrees with "moving from the place should be understood in six ways" when the space touched by the mouth rim is freed with a lump. Without saying so, they strongly say, "when it is freed from the ground, even if the tip of a hair is exceeded, it is called freed from the ground," it should be taken after investigation. Here, some say the meaning thus: "The remaining places have been separated by the one digging earlier, it is a pārājika when that is freed." The state of negligent writing of the statement said in the Saṅkhepamahāpaccariyādi is shown by the statement, "or makes it go into one's own vessel, or breaks a fistful."

"Pārājika when drunk" is said, that should be transformed by expecting the statement, "things arisen are those with arisen bases and arisen objects" of the sentence "the five consciousnesses are those with arisen bases and arisen objects" as "rejection of the future by those with arisen bases", similarly it should be transformed by those like that. Indeed, the Aṭṭhakathā teachers do not speak contradictory things, earlier and later. However, what the teachers reject by removing it saying "this is negligently written" and recite at the time of speaking, teach, that same thing is rejected as "negligently written" by this teacher as well. And what they reject by showing a sutta, that same thing is rejected by this teacher who is showing it, therefore it is said "but that is only there" etc.

Only non-offense is stated means just to show that the difference is only in the expression, not in the meaning, that neither removal nor throat is an offense. That is negligently written, by whom? If one asks, by the types stated earlier or by the writers, this is the way everywhere. "Indeed, it is not possible that the same thing, not being a pārājika due to justification in many places, becomes so somewhere," all of that is said in the Anugaṇṭhipada. Or establishes what is badly placed, because the moving from the place is done with reference to the fact that it will drip from there, it is a pārājika. But whether one takes that or not, it should be understood from the statement "breaks" etc., right there. It is said in one Gaṇṭhipada that "Right there" means it should be known from the commentary statement "breaks" only because one wishes to move it from its place without moving it from the place itself. Similarly, others say "it is said with reference to the taking because it is possible to take the tintapaṃsuṃ having dripped, by putting it in water and cooking it". "Does it over an empty pot? It is a bhaṇḍadeyya," is said, that contradicts the command, "when you are able, then take that property," it is a pārājika only at the time of the command that achieves the purpose. Moreover, ditches etc., and fixed efforts are proofs here. There are no pārājika objects with efforts done at a time, therefore it should be investigated, according to some. Wherever "others" or "some" is said, there, having well investigated, what is justified should be taken, the other should be discarded. Say means the teachers say. No, because of the meaning to be taken differently is said for the sake of preserving the Pāḷi. Some say thus that should not be taken. Why? Because the meaning is the same since "or throws away urine" and "or does what is not for use", and also because the commentary says "breaks by hitting with a mallet."

This is the essence here In the story beginning with "this is the essence here," Dhammasiri Thera said, "it is the word of our teacher." Some say it is the doctrine of the Saṅgaha teachers. Those who were said earlier are also the same, therefore according to convention, even when doing so to something that one does not want to discard, they call it "discarding." Thus the meaning of these words should be taken, When it is so, it agrees greatly with the commentary statement "dukkaṭa because of the absence of moving from the place", there, the meaning should be taken that even the falling from the place is not called "fallen from the place" because of the absence of the mind of moving from the place. Even otherwise, a dukkaṭa is justified even for one who wants to move it from the place due to the absence of the mind of stealing.

96. Just like a fallen peacock feather, a thullaccaya results from doing this and that. In the decision of what is established in the sky, it is said that it should be taken thus for the sake of non-confusion even when it has gone into the sky etc. with that connection. It is said in the Gaṇṭhipada, "Thus elsewhere also, in what is mixed." Because of the statement "moves without moving from the place," it is said that there is no thullaccaya in moving from the place. Some say dukkaṭa and thullaccaya even in moving from the place without shaking. Some say "they should be prevented by showing this commentary statement that they do not move from the place," it should be investigated.

97. Cutting, freeing etc. are said with reference to the upper part. Necessarily makes it go into the sky from the place. Here, some say, "with reference to making it go into the sky for the sake of one standing on a bamboo that has been taken out and placed for one koṭi." However, they should be prevented by showing the commentary statement, "without cutting the root, moves the ring this way and that, protects. But if, without taking it out from the root, he makes it go into the sky by grasping with the hand, it is a pārājika." Bhittinissita means said with reference to what is supported by the wall, according to some. Bhittiṃ nissāya ṭhapita means said with reference to what is standing in nāgadanta etc. Chinnamatte means said with reference to what is standing having risen above.

98. Of one standing above, on the back here means said with reference to lowering down. When lowering down, pārājika when the space standing with the lower one on the back of the upper one is exceeded. When lifting upwards, pārājika when freed from the water. "Thus, when taken, it agrees with what is said about what is on the ground," they say. The place where dead fish stand is said to be the place. If one kills and takes with the mind of stealing, if it is less than a quarter, it is a dukkaṭa, because of the simultaneous effort, there is no pācittiya, according to some. Madanaphalavasādīni here, in Sinhala language, vasa means poison, or what is made to be drunk in the form of a Garuḷa.

99. As said earlier in the example of the pig tied with a noose. "The reading is 'only the space not touched by a boat placed on land.'" "Since the effort is made at the time of the absence of wind because of the statement 'wind comes,' there is no removal, if it is done at the time of existence, or there is removal," they say. It is said in the Anugaṇṭhipada "But if the property should be given, to whom? To those in whose hands the kahāpaṇas have been taken, or to the owner of the boat if the boat has not been taken by the owner of the boat, or to the owner of the boat."

104. Without suspending, above. Or establishes what was not done, means or establishes what was not established before.

106. In the village, "what is called a village" is not said, because the characteristic of a village has been said completely at first.

107. In the forest, what is called a forest is not only the characteristic said earlier that is intended here as a forest, but it is also what is taken by others, that is what is intended here, it is said to show that. Therefore, the taking of the forest is done even in the meaning. Cut at the top and at the root here, some say, "it is said with reference to what is about to fall having been cut, not standing having been wrapped." Tacchetvā ṭhapito means cut and placed by the owners of the forest who have received it from others. Addhagatopī means even what has been there for a long time. It is said in the Gaṇṭhipada "Should not be taken" means even with the permission of the forest owners. Challiyā pariyonaddhaṃ hotī By this, it shows the independence of the owners. Therefore, it is said "It is proper to take". If there is dependence of the owners, it is not proper.

108. There, "From here onwards, there are three tens of times that cows call in vessels, ponds, and lakes, having shown only the beginning, they have been summarized," is said in the Anugaṇṭhipada. Nibbahanaudakaṃ means the water that exits through the excess water exit door for the sake of protecting the lake. It is said in the Anugaṇṭhipada "It is not allowed to take" means it is not a sāmīcikamma. Whenever "said" is said from here onwards, it should be taken as the Anugaṇṭhipada. Anikkhante udaketi is the remaining reading, the intention is that it is not even a bhaṇḍadeyya because it is used for dry soil. Because the field is made relying on the lake, it is said with reference to the fact that "the lake is common to all" which was said at first. "Since even though water gone into the lake is common to all, it is not proper to take it exceeding that when there is a mātikā, therefore, it is said "removal in the Kurundī etc." with reference to that," others say. It does not agree with this characteristic because what is called a place common to all is that lake which is common to all, and because of the absence of an agreement, the teacher said that what is said in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā is justified.

109. "From then onwards, there is no removal" because even if one takes it with the mind of stealing, therefore, just as it must be shaved and is a great debt, is not to be protected, and is common to all, this does not belong to the Saṅgha even in another way," is said in the Gaṇṭhipada.

110. Stands straight, here it is said, "If it stands straight leaning slightly because of being supported by a branch of a tree etc. nearby, it is a removal. If it stands like a cut bamboo, there is no offense," that is well said. In the decision of that, because it is said, "if they protect those," No, otherwise means if one clears the wind opening when the wind arrives, it is a pārājika.

111. But in others, there is no investigation at all, it is said that this is the decision because it is not rejected in those. It is said, "By this, it is shown that there is no offense in challenging and taking what is brought by thieves even after throwing away the burden."

112. Eseva nayo: "Just this is the way," meaning one should determine the pārājika offense. Why? Because the recognition is commonly mentioned in relation to other objects. Padavārena: "By following the trail," meaning having taken something given by a thief who carried it away. Gāmadvāra: "Village gate," is merely a conventional expression; "village" is the meaning and should be understood by command. For both, the pārājika occurs at the determination itself. Asukaṃ nāma gāmaṃ gantvā: "Having gone to such-and-such village," means up to the boundary of that village, all this is the command. It is written: "If, whether standing, or sitting, or resting, the intention of former theft subsides, and the goods are not put down with the intention of going, they are just as they were taken; it should be done by following the trail. If they are put down, it is by determination." However, when simply ‘‘likhita’’ "written" is said, it should be taken from the gaṇṭhipada (chapter of knots). Theyyacittena paribhuñjanto: "Enjoying with the thought of theft," meaning without moving from the place, and enjoying by wearing, wrapping, or using, with the thought of theft, thinking, "I took this before." It is written, "It seems that compensation for the lost item is to be given." ‘‘Añño vā’’: "Or another," by the statement, it is indicated that there is no offense if it is given by the one by whom it was placed, like giving to a herdsman. It is said, "However, here, 'compensation for the item' is what others say." ‘‘Añño vā’’: "Or another," because of the statement, even the one by whom it was placed can be obtained, one should consider and take it. By the word "vā," the one in whose hand it was placed, he gives it, like the accountant in Rājagaha to the owner; therefore, the pārājika seems fitting.

Tava thūlasāṭako laddho: "Your thick cloak has been found," at the moment of saying that, there is a dukkaṭa for false speech. Tassa nāmaṃ likhitvā: "Having written his name," here it is said, "Because it was commanded 'having taken it, you should place it,' there is no offense at the time of writing the name, like kusasaṅkamana (creeper bridge)." Na jānantī: "They do not know," meaning they do not hear. If, even knowing, they do not accept it with their mind, just this is the way. But it should be known to be said that it should be rejected by one knowing and unwilling to protect it. Ummaggenā: "By the tunnel," meaning by which tunnel was dug after digging the ancient waterway.

sampattavāraṃ aggahetuṃ na labhanti, "They are not able to obtain [their] turn which has arrived," it is said, "Tassa vā sabhāgā adātuṃ na labhantī" "Or they are not able to give shares to him." Attadutiyassā: "For the one with a second," indeed, what is brought by one is not enough for two; to show that if it is enough, it should be given, ‘‘yassa vā’’ "or for whom" etc., was said. ‘‘Paripucchaṃ detī "He gives a full question," it is written, "he answers a question that has been asked." It is said that the burden of the Saṅgha is "simply the recitation of the Dhamma," and it is also said, "even a construction worker is called [burden of the Sangha]", ‘‘ito bhaṇḍato vaṭṭantaṃ puna anto pavisatī "That which turns away from this property and enters again," it is written that the meaning of the passage in the Great Commentary has been explained by the Kurundi Summary Commentary.

113. Gacchante yāne vā: "In a moving vehicle," here Upatissatthera says, "It was said in reference to one standing outside the customs post." It is said, " 'In a moving vehicle,' etc., should be understood as inside the customs post." There is simply nothing to be said of one standing outside, and because it is said in the context of "having stood inside," this is fitting—if it is placed in vehicles, etc., and they leave without his involvement, there is no pārājika. Why is there no compensation for the item? Because of standing outside the customs post. In the wilderness, it is said, "Even for one passing by without an owner, there is indeed compensation for the item" (pārā. aṭṭha. 1.107), because those are possessed. But here, because of the statement "for one who has entered here," it is not for one standing outside; it seems that is the customs boundary. Aññaṃ harāpetī: "He has another carry it," there is no offense because of the word "sahatthā" "with his own hand." Nissaggiyāni hontī: "They become subject to forfeiture," according to the Commentary, it is a pācittiya, and because of the fault in avoiding [paying customs] after transgressing the boundary, it is a dukkaṭa.

Suṅkaṭṭhāne suṅkaṃ datvāva gantuṃ vaṭṭatī: "It is only proper to go having paid customs at the customs post," Dhammasiritthera [said] that this is now the mother of things to be said. "At the four gates of Anurādhapura, they collect customs; among those, in front of the southern gate, the path is situated having circumambulated from Thūpārāma to Ānandacetiya, near the inner enclosure of Jetavanavihāra, which, not entering the village, transgresses the boundary. And having circumambulated from Thūpārāma to Mahācetiya, going to the King's Monastery, it does not transgress," it seems that it comes in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā. Ettha cā: "And here," in customs evasion, it is written that "with two clod-throws is what has been brought down through the lineage of teachers." Dvīhi leḍḍupātehī: "With two clod-throws," it is fitting when established in the definition of customs evasion, but if established, even an excessive yojana becomes customs evasion, so after that two clod-throws should be understood as the boundary. But that here is twofold, due to the difference between outer and inner. There, in reference to the outer boundary defined as the second clod-throw, a dukkaṭa is stated in the Pāḷi and Mahāaṭṭhakathā. The Kurundī does not approve regarding the inner [boundary]. The teacher says, "Indeed, the place designated 'let them collect customs from one who has entered here' is definitely a pārājika area, and that is enclosed; one clod-throw is a dukkaṭa area, and if unenclosed, the second clod-throw is the intention."

114. Dhanaṃ pana gataṭṭhāne vaḍḍhatī: "But wealth increases in the place to which it has gone," here it is written, "compensation for the unrecoverable together with the increase." He took it, thinking "I will give that increase"; it was said with the assumption that it increases for one not doing work there. However, it does not increase for the area that has been demarcated. They say, "There is a pārājika for not giving the increase of the unrecoverable to one giving the wealth, that increase."

Nāmenā: "By name," either by a name with meaning or by one made by the owner.

116. Rājagharassa antovatthumhi, "Within the inner grounds" of the royal palace, either the enclosed royal courtyard is the inner grounds. For one standing in the unenclosed royal courtyard, the entire city is the place. Because it is said that "for the ox standing in the unenclosed [area], the area that it treads is the place," khaṇḍadvāra: "broken door," means a hole broken by oneself. Tattheva ghātetī: "He kills it right there," is there a pācittiya for the intention of killing because it is an object of the life faculty? There is not. Why? Because it is an effort of taking what is not given. That thought of theft is just an object of formations. Here, both are obtained together with the preliminary and subsequent parts, it is said.

118. Tassuddhāre sabbesaṃ pārājika: "At his determination, there is a pārājika for all," if the one who is commanded will necessarily carry away that item, there is a pārājika at the moment of command itself. "Why is there a pārājika here for three? Surely, because it was said 'you, bhikkhus, three carry [it],' there should be a thullaccaya, and for the others, because of the command to each one in order, and by each one, there should be a dukkaṭa. How could it be, one having stolen a strainer worth a month's wages, and having shown [it], and being without enthusiasm, or even being listless, again making a needle worth a month's wages in the same way, and again worth a month's wages in this way?" It is not like that, just as the thief of the lotus was pārājika due to enthusiasm as long as the object was filled with property, these ones are enthusiastic, but did not show [it]," it is written. In the Pāḷi and Commentary, it is said even though it seems that having conspired and gone, there is a pārājika for all at the determination of one, without a command, but then after saying "this is its meaning," and in the later mentioned judgments, and in the many cases of one item, one place, etc., one commands [them], having only determined the command, it is said. Therefore, the command should be desired, it should be investigated. They say, "The reading 'one item, one place' is because of the statement 'property of one family.'"

119-120. Ocarake vuttanayenevā: "In an opportunity, just as was said," in the case of an item that is necessarily to be carried away. Taṃ saṅketaṃ: "That signal," of that signal. Or even after transgressing that signal. Or before reaching. This is the way taṃ nimittaṃ: "that sign" in this case too. The act of digging out the eye, etc., is light, a short time, it is not possible to carry away the item at that moment, some items are far away, some are heavy; while going to take that, while lifting [it], [the event] happens after the sign. If that item is attainable, like being near, and light, and it is possible to carry away at the moment of the sign, it is said in reference to that, isn't it? No, even what was said earlier is called "from then on, he carries it away by that very sign," because of having begun. If so, the measurement is the turn "this is an application before the meal," and that measurement is not the authority because of being said later than the Mahāpadumattheravāda, the act of a sign should not be seen as like the act of a signal. There, there is a limit of time; here, there is not; just this is their difference.

121. Tañca asammohatthaṃ: "And that is for non-confusion," one says "having seen either before the meal, etc., or digging out the eye, etc., take [it]," one having made [the arrangement] dependent on the item to be taken, says "before the meal take an item of such color and shape," in such cases a signal and sign of this kind are shown for non-confusion, and yathādhippāyaṃ: "according to intention," meaning the second to the third, the third to the fourth, in this way, if they speak in order. If the second speaks to the fourth, it is not according to intention. ‘‘Paṭiggahitamatte: "At the moment of accepting," if he necessarily accepts, there is a thullaccaya before," it is written. A dukkaṭa for the acceptors is not stated because there is no opportunity everywhere. It seems they incur this dukkaṭa having incurred by the arising of a pārājika. The meaning is that at the moment of intention of commanding to accomplish the purpose, there is a pārājika. There, which is analogous to the path, and which is analogous to the fruit? Because it is said that "the intention to accomplish the purpose is like the fruit immediately after the path," it is established that the intention is analogous to the fruit. If the command were analogous to the path, it is not possible because it is co-nascent with intention, likewise the necessary removal of the item is also not possible. Indeed, at the moment of command, that is born necessarily to be removed, and if the remover accepts [it], that too is not possible because it is in the future. If intention is analogous to the path, one of the command, etc., or the necessary removal of the item itself is analogous to the fruit, the meaning is not possible. Indeed, the incurring of a pārājika is only fit to be analogous to the fruit, not another; thus, here, the comparison is possible: intention is analogous to the path, and its state of incurring a pārājika is analogous to the fruit. Like what? Like in the Paṭisambhidāmagga "knowledge through faith is discrimination of dhamma. Knowledge about the meaning of faith through faith is discrimination of meaning," here faith is one thing, and knowledge about the meaning of faith through faith is another. Just as "one dhamma called non-delusion is a condition by way of root condition for associated dhammas, by way of co-nascent, reciprocal, dependence, faculty, path, association, presence, and non-disappearance condition," here the dhamma non-delusion is one thing, and its conditionality as root condition, etc., is another. Just as in the Vinayapiṭaka the six arisings of offenses, likewise "seven aggregates of offenses" are said appropriately, their arising of offenses is one thing, and the state of being aggregates of offenses is another. By this method of aggregates of offenses, how many places are there of an adjudication of offenses? The seven aggregates of offenses are the places. How many objects? The seven aggregates of offenses are the objects. How many grounds? The seven aggregates of offenses are the grounds; even these, etc., should be shown. Thus, because for that intention which is analogous to the path and accomplishes the purpose, the other pārājika offense, which is a non-different aspect, defined as a particular mode, which is analogous to the fruit, exists, therefore it should be known that "the intention to accomplish the purpose is like the fruit immediately after the path" was said. Or it is possible that the teacher said so merely with the comparison to the mere rule of dhamma, so one should not seek comparison there. The teacher [said], "Because all this is said merely on the basis of reasoning, it should be taken having investigated."

The description of the Bhūma Commentary, etc., is finished.

Description of the Varieties of Offenses

122. Because it is said, "according to the method of exposition (Vibhaṅganaya)," to accomplish that, "now, here and there," etc., is begun. There, "and according to the difference in the parts of the object" means according to the difference in knowing the removal, according to the difference in the object, the article to be taken, being heavy or light. Or else, it means showing the difference in parts and the difference in offenses. "An extra māsaka, less than five māsakas," here the word "or" is not stated, because one single limit is stated by three. "Not resided in" (Anajjhāvuṭṭhakaṃ) means not possessed by anyone, such as a forest guard. "Abandoned" (Chaḍḍitaṃ) means abandoned by the owner due to worthlessness, excessive amount, etc. Destroyed, because of the broken base after searching, "with a broken root" (chinnamūlakaṃ). "Ownerless object" (Assāmikavatthū) means even that with an unbroken root, for which there is no owner, or they abandon it without concern, or what is given up to deities, etc.; all this is called ownerless property. But if what is given up to deities, etc., or to the Buddha and the Dhamma is taken by others who are guardians, it is "possessed by others" (parapariggahita). For in such a case of taking what is not given, kings, having caught the thief, might inflict punishment such as execution. But in a residence without a guardian, and what belongs to the Buddha and the Dhamma in a place without monks or attendants, it is considered as "possessed by others," similar to property belonging to a monastery without monks, since it is said, "it should be protected, guarded, and possessed by monks who come and go." This is the impression. For if any capable monk is powerful enough to prevent such requisites from being taken even by thieves, he should forcibly seize them and restore them to their place. It appears that there is no offense even if the perception of another's property exists in six ways in what is unpossessed, although the aspect "that which is possessed by others" is seen as a factor, it should be understood as referring to those who behave thus towards another's property. What is one's own property, seized by thieves, becomes possessed by others because it is possessed by thieves; therefore, if another person takes it with the intention of stealing, it is a pārājika. But if the owner himself takes it, it is not a pārājika, because he is allowed to take it after accusing and reclaiming it, thinking, "I am taking what is mine." This is the method if he puts down the burden first and then takes it with the intention of stealing. If the thief dies at the time the owner puts down the burden, and another takes it with the intention of stealing, it is not a pārājika. But if he dies before putting it down, it is a pārājika for the monk who takes it with the intention of stealing, because it remains the property of the original owner. If the Saṅgha, having divided it as "deceased's requisites" after the thief-monk dies, takes it, the original owner is allowed to take it, thinking, "This is my property."

It is stated in the Pali (pārā. 128-130) itself, and in the Aṭṭhakathā, "Or he takes by deceiving with false weights, false coins, etc.; while he is taking thus, the removal is a stealing removal" (pārā. aṭṭha. 1.138; kaṅkhā. aṭṭha. dutiyapārājikavaṇṇanā) because it comes, it is established that taking false balances, etc., goes to the synthesis in stealing removal. Deceiving, whispering, force, and gestures go to the synthesis in forceful removal that is in the Aṭṭhakathā. Or this very forceful removal is stated by dividing in the manner beginning with "an item in a village, an item in a forest" by setting down the matrix and saying "an item in a village is put down in four places." By that this is stated—it is done separately for the purpose of showing the difference in the manner of taking. Indeed, whatever is in the village or forest, such as the ground, etc. There, whatever is a false balance, all four kinds, namely, a false shape, a covered false grip, go to the synthesis in that which is in the air. In the threefold false measure of heart-piercing, tip-piercing, rope-piercing, it goes to the synthesis in "here, this heart-piercing breaks the boundary." For heart-piercing is obtained at the time of measuring oil, etc. Tip-piercing is also obtained in "He causes it to throb, he makes it go into his own vessel." It is said that it is obtained at the time of measuring sesame, rice, etc. Rope-piercing goes to the synthesis at the time of measuring a field. Bribing goes to the synthesis in "While behaving lawfully, he defeats the owner," and those too are likewise tricks of deception.

The description of the difference in offenses is complete.

Description of the Difference in Non-Offenses

131.Andhe is not pleased when taking, that which belongs to him should be given back even if taken by trusting taking—this seems not to agree with "At that time, two monks were friends. One entered a village for alms…pe… there is no offense, monk, in trusting taking" (pārā. 146). For here, displeasure is indicated by the statement "having known, he accused him, 'you are not a Samaṇa.'" If it is said that by the statement "there is no offense, monk, in trusting taking," it is indicated that trusting taking is suitable even when there is pleasure? That is not so, because it should be taken differently. Here, this is the meaning—there is no pārājika offense when taking with the perception of trust, even that monk, being a friend, accused him not angrily, but lovingly, saying "surely you are not a Samaṇa, go, having made a decision, stand in purity." Even if he were to accuse him angrily, this "there is no offense" indicates only the absence of a pārājika, not the establishment of trusting taking. But he who endures in the midst of the assembly, he does not say anything, is the meaning. It is said, "However, with the intention of wanting to give it back, he is able to have it returned." If a thief, even desiring to take it forcibly, says, "Venerable sir, may you accept my robes here," and the robes are given by the elder or he himself takes them without being given, the elder is able to accuse him again, because the previous acceptance does not count as acceptance since he was silent out of fear, "that robe which here the owner is able to have returned" is said. What is natural to the owner should be done, "this is indeed a duty" is said. If what belongs to the Saṅgha is taken by some monk, and there is assistance to the Saṅgha or the Dhamma by him, it should be given after informing of the amount taken. "Having made that which is taken natural in that way, he becomes debtless, and this is the same method for the sick, etc." is said.

The exposition of the word analysis is complete.

Description of Miscellaneous Talk

Sāhatthika and āṇattika is only one item. "Here it is heavy, having agreed 'you take one side, I will take one side,' when it is moved from its place by the effort of both, it happens by body, speech, and mind. Otherwise, it conflicts with 'either sāhatthika is not a part of āṇattika, or āṇattika is not a part of sāhatthika'" is written. Dhammasiri Thera, however, said, "This method is not obtained only in a heavy object; even if two people agree to take even five māsakas, for both individually, that action is called sāhatthika, because of the sāhatthika effort in a single item, therefore this statement 'sāhatthika is not a part of āṇattika' does not oppose this method. There, it is said 'sāhatthika-object-part means the part of the object of sāhatthika is not.' Here, however, it is suitable because it is stated with reference to the effort," it is said; that is not right, because there is no statement of bodily and verbal action. Therefore, in sāhatthika and āṇattika efforts, an offense arises from one or the other; even so, this is stated in terms of taking and causing to take in looting etc., being quick, quick. Just as, with reference to the quick, quick arising regarding the Dhamma at one's own time and at another's time, it is said "things with internal and external objects" (dha. sa. tikamātikā 21), this matter should be seen as such.

In the Dhammasaṅgaha Aṭṭhakathā, it is said "internal-external-object" not by way of things making the internal and external Dhammas into one object, but "at the time of internal and external occurrence, internal-external-object." Therefore, "the way stated in the Gaṇṭhipada is the essence, not the thought," said the teacher. There, however, the non-statement of "bodily and verbal action" is because, due to the sāhatthika effort, a single effort has many actions. If it were to be, mental action should also be stated; just as there mental action, although existing, becomes un व्यवहारic (abbohārikaṃ), so in that sāhatthika-āṇattika, verbal action should be known as un व्यवहारic (abbohārikaṃ); however, it becomes a support only for bodily action, like the mind it becomes only a factor there, therefore it is said "because of the sāhatthika effort," and "because it is said 'sāhatthika-āṇattika' referring only to the aspect of a factor, this is not the thought" should be taken after considering.

Bodily and verbal arising,
Of which offenses there might be;
There, that action is not mental,
Action is destroyed, wasted away.

What is action-inaction, etc.,
What might be action-non-action, etc.;
That is not fitting, because of contradiction,
Only one action is fitting.

Description of the Decided Case

132.There is no offense, monk, in the arising of thought—here only thought, there is no offense from the offenses to be produced by that alone, is the meaning. Here someone says—in the cases of approving what is deposited, etc., and in all the non-action training rules, there is no bodily intimation or verbal intimation, but there is an offense, why is there no offense from all offenses in this training rule alone? No, why?

A training rule with extra should be done,
An intimation, bodily and verbal;
Without doing it by body and speech,
It touches it by non-intimations.

Runs together. Then, having become associated with covetousness or associated with ill will, because it runs especially, it runs differently.

137.Having made a wound, to take—here, although there is no offense by this training rule, for some, for a woman's form, there is a dukkaṭa for touching. "A taking connected to the body is fitting, it is said with reference to that that it is suitable," they say. Both should be taken after considering.

Description of the Case of Transferring Grass Blades

138. What is said in Mahāpaccariya, etc., "it should be made only by removing the footprint," that is well said. But this is said to show that only the limit of contemplated removal is not seen. He is subject to an offense while removing, therefore, while going, seeing, it is said that "it should be made only by removing the footprint" is poorly said there. How? "A cloth-desiring person, having taken only the cloth-bag and gone outside, having known the state of being a cloth, thinking 'I will take it later,' takes it thus, he is not subject to an offense in the removing itself. When, having stood outside, he goes seeing 'this is a cloth,' then it is said 'it should be made only by removing the footprint'" but this is not said, but although contemplation is seen, it is not seen at the moment of removal in the first part, therefore that is not a contemplated removal, this meaning is stated in the Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā itself, therefore they say "it is only right." Kammanta-sālā means the houses of farmers and forest cutters. This is so far means as far as the Theravāda is concerned, up to the boundary of treatment, etc., the method of the Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā, there "some, however," etc., should not be taken because of the absence of fitting due to being Theravāda, for indeed there is no intention of accomplishing a purpose in this way in sāhatthika. There is an intention of accomplishing a purpose only in āṇattika. It is said "The rest agrees with the meaning stated in the Mahāpaccariya."

In the case of transferring grass blades, if another knows "this does not belong to me," the pārājika offense occurs as soon as it is released from the other's hand, like in the case of transferring a stake. "If he knows it belongs to himself, it does not occur," they say. Thus, it should be examined whether the five are mixed up.

140. Parānuddayatāyāti: Here, why did the Blessed One, who reached the peak of compassion for others, say "There is no offense in the acceptance of offerings made to the departed or offerings intended for animals" (pārā. 131)? It is because of compassion for others. If kings were to seize a thief who took someone's requisites and inflict punishments such as killing, the general public would lose faith in the Blessed One, thinking, "This ascetic Gotama imposes a Pārājika offense even for that, disqualifying a bhikkhu," and would be destined for suffering. Also, trees, etc., that are not owned by anyone are difficult to obtain, and it is not possible to know which trees are safe. Therefore, fearing evil, lay followers would not build image houses, cetiyas, Bodhi tree shrines, or monasteries, and they would be deprived of a great accumulation of merit. The supports mentioned, such as "dwelling at the foot of a tree, wearing robes made of rags" (mahāva. 128), would become unsupported. Bhikkhus who perceive things as unowned would not appreciate dwelling at the foot of trees or wearing robes made of rags, and ordination would not be possible. If bitten by a snake, they might die without taking hold of a tree for a splint. In times of torn robes, etc., they might wander naked without taking hold of a broken branch, proclaiming the gains of other sects as if they were true gains, and people would be pleased with those other sects, fall into wrong views, and become trapped in the cycle of existence. Therefore, it should be understood that the Blessed One said "There is no offense in the acceptance of offerings made to the departed" etc., out of compassion for others.

141. Aparampi bhāgaṃ dehīti: It is written that "because the thing has already been received and matches the request, it is neither handing over goods nor a Pārājika offense." This applies to ordinary people. They say, "But if the owner or someone authorized by him gives a share to another bhikkhu friend, saying, 'Let him take this share,' that is handing over goods."

148-9. Khādantassa bhaṇḍadeyyanti: Giving to a thief or to the owner after it has been obtained is indeed a good giving. Avisesenāti: This was said without saying "to those who are zealous," because what belongs to the Sangha does not become non-Sangha property due to the lack of zeal of a few. In the Mahāaṭṭhakathā also, it is said, "If they go with zeal, there is misappropriation if they consume it with the intention of theft," thus both are the same. In an abandoned monastery, it is not possible to know the extent of the boundary of the vicinity. However, this bhikkhu, standing outside the boundary of the vicinity, consumes and eats after ringing the bell, etc. Therefore, eating in this way is well-eaten, that is the meaning. It is said, "In other monasteries, one should act according to the established procedure there." It is written, "Well-eaten because it is inside the monastery," āgatānāgatānaṃ santakattāti: This was said because it was given saying, "I give to the Sangha of the four directions." Even if it is given saying "I give to the Sangha" without saying so, it is the same. Thus, it should be understood that one who stands outside does not obtain gain by the word of the Blessed One.

153. "Matasūkaro"ti: Because of the statement "dead pig," one cannot give that same pig, considering it as handing over goods while it is alive. It is shown that it is permissible to kill it. Maddanto gacchati, bhaṇḍadeyyanti: Here, how much is handing over goods? It is not possible to know "How many pigs have been crushed and gone, or will go?" As much as the owners are pleased when given, thinking, "My goods have been given," that much should be given. If they are not pleased, should one dig a pit and give the value of the pigs that have passed? It should not be given. Then, if one is being pressed, does a Pārājika offense occur by laying down both burdens? It does not occur. The owner should only be satisfied by giving permissible requisites, and this is the same method for others in similar cases, so there is no need to speculate, according to the teacher. It is said, "Whether he goes crushing on that same day or on the second day." Gumbe khipati, bhaṇḍadeyyamevāti: This was said in reference to one who will necessarily enter. Here, in one monastery, there is fear of an invading army, etc. Mūlavatthucchedanti: Because of the statement "These are the lords of all the dwelling places," it is shown that the others are not lords.

156. Ārāmarakkhakāti: This should be taken in a general sense. Adhippāyaṃ ñatvāti: Here, the conclusion is that it is permissible to accept the offering without concealing it, if the owners do not protect or punish the bhikkhu who is accepting the offering or a share. However, it is said that "it is not permissible in Sangha property." Ayameva bhikkhu issaroti: The meaning is that wherever he wishes, he obtains the reason for knowing himself. Moreover, they say "daharo." Savatthukanti: It is said to be with land. ‘‘Garubhaṇḍaṃ hotī’’ti vatvā ‘‘tiṇamattaṃ pana na dātabba’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ kintu garubhaṇḍanti ce, This was said in reference to a place that is not protected or guarded, and in a state of being liable to destruction. Kappiyepi cāti vatvā, Whether saying so or not, even in what belongs to one's mother, etc., when it is appropriate to take it, by the arising of the intention of theft. However, this training rule was established when a time came that attained great gain and great abundance, because of the statement "The king is greatly pleased with these" (pārā. 86), thus it is established.

End of the Commentary on the Second Pārājika.

3. The Third Pārājika

Commentary on the Originating Circumstance of the First Enactment

162. Tīhi suddhenāti: Here, tīhīti is either a detached word or an instrumental word. In the detached sense, it is pure by the doors of body, speech, and mind. Similarly, it should be connected as pure in the Bodhi-maṇḍa itself by all three defilement groups, by the unevennesses of evil conduct, by the ways of proliferation, etc. In the instrumental sense, tīhīti is pure by the doors of body, speech, and mind. Similarly, it should be connected as pure by all three qualities, by the three kinds of good conduct, by the three kinds of liberation, by the three kinds of development, by the three kinds of morality, concentration, and wisdom. Vibhāvitanti: Expanded in the teaching, or made manifest, done, performed, or enacted. Saṃvaṇṇanāti: The present tense word is close to the present.

Saparicchedanti: Having a boundary, that is the meaning. Some say saparikkhepaṃ. ‘‘Haṃsavaṭṭakacchadanenāti haṃsaparikkhepasaṇṭhānenā’’ti likhitaṃ. Kāyavicchindaniyakathanti: He tells a Dhamma talk that destroys and cuts off lust and attachment in one's own existence or in another's existence. Asubhā ceva because it is devoid of beautiful aspects. Asucino ca because it originates from the oozing of faults. Paṭikūlā ca because it is repulsive in its basis in bile, phlegm, etc. Asubhāya vaṇṇanti: He speaks in detail about the repulsive aspect, or the repulsive meditation subject. This is a dative word in the sense of ownership. Asubhanti: The meaning is that he speaks, expresses, and says in detail, a description which is counted as the manifestation and presentation of the sign of the repulsive. The jhāna mind is called a mañjūsaṃ because it is complete with the ten characteristics of those very beginning, middle, and end, and because it cannot be overcome by the thieves of defilements.

Tatrimānīti: Here is the condensed meaning: In whichever turn the first jhāna arises for a single moment of consciousness, taking that entire series of javanas including the preliminary work, access, change of lineage, and appanā divisions in a unified manner as "the first jhāna," then, with regard to the accomplishment of the task attained by the abhiññā which is the promoter of appanā of that first jhāna, paṭipadāvisuddhi ādīti should be understood in terms of its approach. Upekkhānubrūhanā majjheti should be understood in terms of the accomplishment of the task of equanimity in the middle. Sampahaṃsanā pariyosānanti should be understood in terms of the accomplishment of the task of the purifying knowledge at the end. There, paṭipadāvisuddhīti should be understood in the interval from the beginning of the initial consciousness up to the arising moment of the first jhāna. Upekkhānubrūhanā is in the arising and duration moments, and sampahaṃsanā is in the dissolution moment. By making it a characteristic as "that which is characterized by this," the preceding part is characterized by "the undertaking of purity of practice," etc., the middle is characterized by the threefold looking on with equanimity, and the end is characterized by the fourfold rejoicing. Therefore, it is said ‘‘dasa lakkhaṇānī’’ti.

Pāribandhakatoti: Because it is pure from the hindrance consisting of the nivaranas, the preliminary part of the javana consciousness up to the gotrabhu is called ‘‘cittavisuddhī’’. Similarly, because it is pure, that mind approaches the access concentration consisting of the middle samādhi-nimitta, transforming and practicing it in a continuous stream. Thus, for one who is practicing, ‘‘tattha cittapakkhandana’’nti is said because the undertaking and approach to that state occur in that samatha-nimitta. Thus, in the very moment of the arising of the first jhāna, the purity of practice should be understood in terms of its approach. Thus, visuddhassa because there is no effort for further purification for one who has attained appanā, ajjhupekkhanaṃhoti. samathappaṭipannassa ajjhupekkhanaṃhoti because there is no effort in concentration again for one who is practicing samatha. ekattupaṭṭhānassa ajjhupekkhanaṃhoti because there is no possibility of effort in the establishment of singleness again, since it is established exclusively, having abandoned association with defilements. Tattha jātānanti Because of being free from various defilements due to the state of inseparability of samādhi and paññā born in that mind, anativattanaṭṭhena. Due to the indriyānaṃ of saddhā etc., being of the same nature without overcoming one another karasaṭṭhena. Because the yogi directs and causes to flow the energy and the mind which are appropriate to it, approaching those two, that which is born of it, that form of it tadupagavīriyavāhanaṭṭhena and āsevanaṭṭhena due to the state of being in a special state, sampahaṃsanā hoti, that is the meaning to be understood. Moreover, here it is written, "The gotrabhu mind, which is immediately past, practices transforming it in a continuous stream." For those words "practices transforming it" are not possible for the past. And what is written immediately after, "The gotrabhu mind approaching the appanā-samādhi mind undertakes there." This is also not consistent, because it is said "past in the very moment of practice," the teacher said that the statement "the gotrabhu mind undertakes there" is contradictory. Because it is said "Even a single moment of supramundane consciousness is cultivated, developed, and made abundant," it is said "These ten characteristics are even for a single moment of jhāna." It is also said "From then on, it is only cultivation and development." ‘‘Adhiṭṭhānasampannanti adhiṭṭhānena sahagata’’nti likhitaṃ. Its meaning is that what is said to be "counted as the beginning, middle, and end" is complete with goodness in those three, and also the threefold goodness. Thus, the threefold mind is a basis and foundation for the attainment of qualities rooted in that attainment, or for the attainment of higher jhānas, therefore it is called adhiṭṭhānasampanna because of the mind's completion with the state of adhiṭṭhāna.

Addhamāsaṃ paṭisallīyitunti: Here, the teachers say, "If the monks saw or heard of each other's killings, without the Buddha knowing of this trouble and without him finding a solution, many people, deluded by foolishness and thinking that even the all-knowing Tathāgata is not sovereign over actions, would go to Avīci hell, saying, 'He is not all-knowing,' using a pseudo-reason as a real reason. Therefore, knowing that these monks were killing each other, and having thoroughly discerned the absence of a means to stop it, and considering only the cause for beings to attain a good destination, the Blessed One, refraining from useless talk of ugliness or sights and sounds, and precisely because of that refraining, and because it causes the attainment of a good destination, and because of the context for the Third Pārājika offense which must necessarily be declared, as if revealing his all-knowing nature to those who examine, wishing to spend that half-month making an opportunity for the fruition attainment for the benefit of those who can be guided, he said, 'I desire, monks, to go into retreat for half a month,' and so on." The teachers are the gaṇapāmokkha elders such as Buddhamitta Thera, Dhammasiri Thera, and Upatissa Thera, and what has been previously heard in the presence of the commentary teachers. Others are to be understood as "some." Is what follows, "They were disgusted with their own bodies…pe… will be," consistent with "Those monks who are not free from lust, at that time, fear arises in them, hair stands on end, there is trembling"? And does this agree with the Buddha's purpose of using the subject of ugliness? No, because the meaning is understood. Even for those who are disgusted with their own bodies, because affection has not been abandoned by the noble path, there is no absence of fear regarding death like that of those with extinguished defilements; however, the fear, subdued by the power of contemplating ugliness, does not become so great as to confuse the mind, as it would for those not disgusted. The meaning should be understood as, "He did not cause those beings to go to the lower realms." Or, this is a statement of the previous reason, since at that time they experience fear, trembling, and hair standing on end, therefore, "Then, at that time, the Blessed One spoke on ugliness," and so on, was said.

aññatarā: This clarifies that "Having seen a murderer coming like that with a raised weapon, fear arises in others as well, not to mention in them," and the Buddha first spoke to them on ugliness, and later it was not so for them. Thus, their talk on ugliness was of great benefit. The latter method here agrees with the commentary statement, "It seems that none of those monks made any physical or verbal expression; all, mindful and fully aware, lay down on their right side."

Apare panāhūti: This is stated to reject a family tradition. Does the statement "This is indeed a tradition" contradict the statement "will not overcome the realm of Māra"? It does not contradict. How? This monk, not killing, will overcome the realm of Māra because of not doing evil. But killing, he will not overcome the realm of Māra because of the strength of the action, and thinking in this way, being himself on Māra's side, "Those who are not dead are not freed from saṃsāra," is his own tradition, therefore he directs them to both paths there, thus he is called "an adherent of Māra" not "similar in belief to Māra". "What is said by this? Since he is an adherent of Māra, therefore, even thinking thus, he speaks according to his own tradition," some write. They come to me for personal attendance and learn the uddesa, etc., in the presence of their own teachers and preceptors.

Explanation of the Discourse on Ānāpānassati-samādhi

165.Ayampi kho, bhikkhave: What does this indicate? It refutes the false notion of those who might think, "Because of applying themselves to the meditation subject taught by the Buddha, those monks met their end." The life of those monks came to an end only because of past actions; however, this meditation subject was a condition for some of them to attain arahantship, for some to attain the fruits of anāgāmi, sakadāgāmi, or sotāpatti, for some to attain the first jhāna, and for some it was a condition for abandoning affection for self through vikkhambhana and tadaṅga abandonment, and for some it was a condition for arising in a good destination, thus my talk on ugliness was beneficial; but because Ānanda requested, "Venerable sir, Blessed One, may the Blessed One teach another method," I will teach another method, just as your application to the meditation subject on ugliness previously taught, so also this, monks, is to be understood. "Mindfulness is established in dependence on the in-breath" is said. For that mindfulness establishes itself by making that in-breath or out-breath the object in the preliminary stage, and in the subsequent stage by making the sign born of the in-breath and out-breath the object, thus it is said.

asubhakammaṭṭhānaṃ: The object or the place of the base of impure action is the place of impure action, here meaning impure jhāna, thus "because of the gross object" is said. Paṭivedhavasenā: By way of gaining the factors beginning with vitakka. Ārammaṇasantatāyā: Pacified by way of the statement of a succession of bodily heat said to arise by taking up the continuous time in sequence. Parikammaṃ vā: It seems that the kasiṇa preparation is up to the arising of the sign. Then, because there is no taste, it is not continuous and is not directed. Just as in proximity it is continuous by the disappearance of the hindrances and the appearance of the factors, it is not so here; however, this is stated as "from the initial application." In the second alternative, asecanako means not satisfying, thus "full of nourishment" is said. Mental happiness exists even in the jhāna moment, even so, it is said "both should be taken up only by one who has emerged from jhāna". In one's own continuum by concentration avikkhambhite: Otherwise, there might be the simultaneous arising of evil with jhāna. Because the aggregates, etc., are the basis for the supramundane, nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ, or with reference to one for whom there is especially nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ. "Having gradually attained growth in the noble path by way of the four contemplations beginning with impermanence, he eradicates; this does not exist for the rest," is written.

Tathābhāvapaṭisedhano cā: This is stated because the sixteen objects do not exist for the Tīrthikas. But only mundane jhāna exists for them by way of the first four steps; in that, there is certainly no basis for the supramundane. ‘‘Phalamuttamanti: ‘‘phale uttama’’ti – "the best of fruits" is said. Ututtayānukūlanti: Going to the forest in the hot season, to the foot of a tree in the cold season, and to an empty dwelling in the spring. For one with an excess of phlegm, araññaṃ (forest) is suitable; for one with an excess of bile, rukkhamūlaṃ (the foot of a tree); for one with an excess of wind, an empty dwelling is suitable. For one of deluded character, the forest is suitable; in a large forest, the mind does not contract. For one of hateful character, the foot of a tree; for one of lustful character, an empty dwelling. Walking and pacing are on the side of restlessness; lying down is on the side of sloth; firmness by sitting cross-legged, the pleasure of the flow of in-breaths and out-breaths by straightening the body, shows the means of grasping the object by parimukhaṃ sati (mindfulness well-established). Kārīti: One whose nature it is to do. In its explanation, instead of saying "he breathes in, he breathes out," ‘‘sato kārī’’ is said. Therefore, because having said ‘‘assasati passasatī’’ only the first tetrad is obtained, not the rest, and ‘‘dīghaṃassāsavasenāti by making an elision compound", and "non-distraction as oneness" and "knowing by way of non-confusion" and ‘‘tena ñāṇenā’’ and ‘‘pajānatoti by the knowing knowledge" and ‘‘satokārīti one who does by mindfulness and full awareness" and "the in-breath contemplating relinquishment is only the in-breath contemplating relinquishment" is written. Uppaṭipāṭiyā āgatampi is also fitting, forbidden by that means. It seems that because it strikes the palate, the newly born foal makes a snapping sound, by way of desire and joy, the first three each are nine. Ekenākārenā: By one way, by way of in-breath or by way of out-breath, thus for one developing mindfulness of breathing, kāyānupassanāsatikammaṭṭhānabhāvanā (the development of the establishment of mindfulness on the body) is accomplished in the body.

Kāyo: The in-breaths and out-breaths. Upaṭṭhānaṃ is mindfulness. Dīghanti: The in-breath and out-breath that goes quickly. Addhānasaṅkhāte: Like time measured, is the meaning of the measure of time, or in a long time. For one marks only the in-breath, one the out-breath, one both, therefore it is said "without making a distinction," or chando: Thus, from in-breathing and out-breathing, enjoyment arises, by way of that, the desire to do arises. Then pāmojjanti. Because in-breaths and out-breaths are subjects difficult to know, cittaṃ vivattati, when one only keeps in mind the place touched, abandoning counting, only upekkhā (equanimity) is established. Cattāro vaṇṇā: As in "the bowl has three colors," the meaning is four shapes.

Tathābhūtassā: For one developing mindfulness of breathing. Saṃvaro: Mindfulness-restraint. Or, abandonment of the hindrances by the first jhāna, of vitakka and vicāra by the second, of joy by the third, of pleasure and pain by the fourth, of the perception of form by the ākāsānañcāyatana attainment, or of the perception of aversion, or of the perception of diversity. "Sīla (virtue) is virtue as abstaining, virtue as intention, virtue as restraint, virtue as non-transgression" (Paṭi. Ma. 1.39 slightly different), the meaning here should be seen according to the method stated. "Things that occur appropriately in meaning are called virtue by way of the meaning of composing, known as ascertainment and concentration," is said. Thus, "this is the training intended in this meaning," here too, the meaning should be understood as virtue as intention, and somewhere virtue as abstinence. Otherwise, there would be the contingency of abstinence even in the training rules that are offenses by designation, having said "he dwells restrained by the restraint of the Pātimokkha," there would be the contingency of that abstinence as well. Tasmiṃ ārammaṇe: In that ānāpāna object. Tāya satiyā: By the mindfulness arisen there. ‘‘Tena manasikārenāti by attention" is written. By this, because it shows the occurrence of various attentions, it is shown that he trains even by various impulsive moments; however, by whatever attention, Ñāṇuppādanādīsū: Here, with the word "ādi", it should be understood up to the end. ‘‘Tatrā: In that ānāpāna object. Eva: In the way to be spoken now" is written. Tatrā: Of those in-breaths and out-breaths. For that agrees well with "in the time previously ungrasped." "The first teaching is of the long reciters. For they say, 'Having attained the first jhāna, sitting in various seats, when striving for the second, in proximity, at the time of the occurrence of gross mind by way of vitakka and vicāra, they are gross by way of the in-breaths and out-breaths that occur.' 'The middle reciters say that for one who has gained jhāna, at the time of attaining and dwelling in it, and on gaining a single seat, because of the state of tranquility by the occurrence of mind upon mind, they say subtlety in proximity to the second from the first.'" is written.

Vipassanāyaṃ panā: This is the order for one who is attached by way of the four elements, and it should be understood that it is for others as well. With reference to the sight that this much is form, not other than this, ‘‘sakalarūpapariggahe’’ is said. Rūpārūpapariggahe: Here, strong insight from the observation of dissolution that has the characteristics of impermanence, etc., as its object. Pubbe vuttanayenā: Indeed, by the opinion of all, beginning with "at a time not previously grasped." Sodhanā means rejection. Assā: Of the phrase "I will calm the bodily formation."

ānamanā: Bending across is vinamanā. Bending well is sannamanā. Bending backwards is paṇamanā. Like the position of taking the knees, iñjanāti: It should be understood that it is the excellence of making the bendings, etc., manifest. To whatever extent there is bending, etc., or trembling, etc., to that extent one calms, is the connection. Iti kirā: Iti ce—if so. Evaṃ sante: Even if there is subtle peace, one calms. Pabhāvanā: The production. Because the in-breaths and out-breaths are pacified, there is no development of ānāpānassatisamādhi. Since that does not exist, therefore he does not attain, because of the absence of attainment, he does not emerge. Iti kirā: Thus this is indeed a statement, therefore this. Sound itself is the sound-sign, having established the phrases "mindful he breathes in, mindful he breathes out," the thirty-two steps, the four tetrads, should be understood.

Appaṭipīḷana means the non-arising of those defilements, although practices such as maintaining the courtyard of a cetiya are included in the pātimokkhasaṃvara (restraint by the code of monastic discipline) in meaning, according to the statement, "For whom there may be an offense" (mahāva. 134). Nevertheless, because it is not intended here in the statement, "Not until some corrupting things appear in the Sangha, Sāriputta, does the Teacher establish a training rule for the disciples, recite the pātimokkha," it is called "ābhisamācārika" (related to good conduct). It is said, "Whatever is not an occasion for offense here is without fault."

Yathāvuttena (as has been said): because it is the basis for effort and exertion. Sallahukavutti (lightness of living): possessing only the eight requisites. Pañcasandhikaṃ kammaṭṭhāna (the five-part meditation subject): here, jhāna (absorption), the sign, the scriptures illuminating its meaning, are all called kammaṭṭhāna (meditation subject). Senāsanaṃ (lodging): such as being endowed with proper places for coming and going. Khuddakapalibodhā (minor distractions): such as washing soiled robes. "Could it have fallen in between?" he doubts.

Ajjhattaṃ vikkhepagatenā (internally distracted): distracted in one's own interior. Sāraddhā (without concentration): due to lack of concentration. Upanibandhanathambhamūlaṃ (the post of attention): namely, the tip of the nose or the facial image. Tatthevā (there itself): at the tip of the nose or other sign. "Like someone looking at both ends and the middle of a plank swing from one side only," they say.

Idha pana (but here): in the simile of the saw. Desato (in location): from the place of touching. "Nimittaṃ paṭṭhapetabba" (the sign should be established): it is said that it should be established when the sign is present. Garukabhāvanaṃ (heavy practice): because it should be cultivated earnestly. Ekacce āhū (some say): some meditators say.

Even what is said by some is valid, according to the statement, "Saññānānatāyā" (because of the diversity of perceptions), although it is not found in the commentary from the recitations onward. Even if there is no such speculation as, "Does a star-like form appear to me?" it appears in that way to one who is merely developing it, just like the arising of these elements due to the diversity of elements. "It is not proper to say 'there is no sign' because it would be conscious lying," it is said. Kammaṭṭhāna (meditation subject): here, only the counterpart sign that has been spoken of.

Nimitte (in the sign): in the counterpart sign. Nānākāra (various forms): the variety that was spoken of, "the four colors appear." Vibhāvaya (discerns): knowing and making clear. Assāsapassāse (in-breath and out-breath): in the sign arisen from that, or in the in-breath and out-breath in various ways. For it is said that one establishes the mind in the sign and discerns the variety, or binds one's mind to the in-breath and out-breath. Vaṇṇato (in terms of color): such as the star-like form. Lakkhaṇato (in terms of characteristics): such as roughness.

Aṭṭhakathāsu paṭikkhitta (rejected in the commentaries): it is rejected in the Sinhalese commentaries, giving the reason that it is close to the bhavaṅga (life-continuum). Why? Because in the sixth or seventh appanā (access), there is no opportunity for the fruition in the path consciousness. What if it occurs here? No, for even mundane access is of similar nature to the supramundane in the access path. Therefore, a monk who has regained jhāna (absorption), wishing to sit for a week in the bliss of present abiding, enters into jhāna (absorption) in the fourth or fifth, not in the sixth or seventh. For there is access there. After that, it does not go to being the basis for access. Because it is close to the bhavaṅga (life-continuum), it goes to the fourth or fifth, like a pot standing on land is situated between the impulsions, so said the teacher.

āvajjanavasī (skill in adverting): is the name. After that, the arising of four or five reviewing consciousnesses, that is called paccavekkhaṇavasī (skill in reviewing). Therefore, it is said, "But the skill in reviewing is spoken of as just the skill in adverting." Samāpajjanavasī (skill in attaining): is the entering into absorption for as long as one wishes; that, however, is the ability to establish the desired time limit. They also say, "This difference between the skill in determination and the skill in emerging is that it impels the impulsion through the power of determination, but it impels more than intended through the power of emerging." Moreover, after adverting to an object such as the earth kasiṇa (device), and after impelling the impulsion, and again after adverting, the fifth jhāna (absorption) mind occurs; this, it is said, is the highest limit. But for the Blessed One, jhāna (absorption) occurs immediately after adverting; all of this is spoken of in the anugaṇṭhipada (connecting verses).

"Vatthu" means the heart-base. "Dvāra" means the eye, etc. "Ārammaṇa" means forms, etc., so it is written. Or, the consciousness sees the form object as it is apprehended, or it sees it otherwise. How? "Or, the form object, base, and door as they are apprehended," it is said. The consciousness whose object, base, and door are the forms as they are apprehended, that consciousness also sees the object, base, and door of forms as they are apprehended, and either the word "object" is to be understood as having been elided in one case; this is my reasoning, it should be accepted after consideration.

ārammaṇato (regarding the object): in terms of insight. Asammohato (without delusion): here, pleasant feeling should be understood. But in "This is suffering, knowledge," etc., what is said as "regarding the object, without delusion" is said here in the reverse order from the way it was said there. For there, because the delusion by which that suffering is concealed and does not appear has been destroyed, or because in the knowledge proceeding thus, there is the ability to review as desired at whatever time one wishes, knowledge is spoken of as being without delusion in the three aspects of suffering, etc. In cessation, pleasant feeling connected with it regarding the object, without delusion, is not possible, because of the absence of the abandoning of delusion, and because of the contradiction with the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Path of Discrimination). There, "dīghaṃ assāsavasenā" (by way of the long in-breath), etc., is said to show it from the perspective of the object. Tāya satiyā tena ñāṇena sā pīti paṭisaṃviditā hoti (by that mindfulness and that knowledge, that joy is fully understood): the meaning here is that its object is fully understood. "Āvajjato" (by adverting), etc., is said to show pleasant feeling without delusion. By knowing, seeing, and reviewing in terms of impermanence, etc., and by determining, deciding, and concentrating energy, etc., with momentary concentration.

Abhiññeyya (to be fully known): by the knowledge of comprehension. Pariññeyya (to be completely known): by the knowledge of eradication. For all the truth of suffering is to be fully known and completely known. It is written that this joy is among them. Abhiññeyya (to be fully known), etc., is said referring to the moment of the path, it is said. Since the task of insight, known as non-delusion, is accomplished by the path, the path also is spoken of as if making the objects to be fully known, etc. Vipassanābhūmidassanattha (to show the ground of insight): it is said because of the absence of physical pleasure in serenity. Dvīsu cittasaṅkhārapadesū (in the two passages on mental fabrication): feeling mental fabrication... trains to calm mental fabrication. All of modanā (rejoicing), etc., are synonyms for joy. Impermanence contemplation, etc., are defilements, the aggregates formed conditioned by their root. Evaṃ bhāvito (thus developed): not developed by producing the fourth or fifth jhāna (absorption). Thus, having done it completely in every way, it is developed. Even in the times of insight, path, and reviewing, everything is shown only by way of the prevailing in-breath, by the Blessed One who is skilled in means.

168.Kasmā idaṃ vuccati (why is this said): the intention is "by us."

Padabhājanīyavaṇṇanā

172.Ussukkavacana (word of eagerness): it seems it is a term for a prominent word, it is said to be a synonym. Just as in "having heard, they eat," the word "deliberately" for one intending to kill deliberately is eager for the word "killing," and the intention and the depriving of life are the same, it is said. To show that it is not only by mental volition alone, but application is also to be desired, it is said that these words were spoken, so said Upatissatthero. When it should be said, "knowing, being fully aware, intending, and transgressing," since "knowing... transgression" also shows the depriving of life, therefore, without regard for the letter, the meaning is shown. For the preceding intention is the means of accomplishing the aim by accomplishing the meaning known as transgression. Sabbasukhumaattabhāva (the subtlest essence of self): is said with reference to form, not formlessness. For here, the grossness and subtlety of formless things that are called self are not intended, as in the khandhavibhaṅga(vibha. 1 ff) (Analysis of the Aggregates). Mātukucchismi (in the mother's womb): is a statement of preponderance; it is only a pārājika (defeat) even in the case of spontaneously born humans. If there is no application in the formless body, why include that? Because the life faculty of that same form body arises together with the formless aggregate. Therefore, it is established that even a living human body is so called. Here, mātukucchismi (in the mother's womb): either in the womb of a human mother or the womb of an animal mother. For it is said in the parivāra(pari. 480) –

"If one should kill a woman, or kill a mother,
And a man, or kill a father;
Having killed a mother and father,
One does not thereby touch the immediately effective karma;
These are the questions considered by the skilled."

Paṭhama (first): is only the rebirth-consciousness. For in a stream of consciousness included in one existence, the rebirth-consciousness is called the first consciousness. The death-consciousness is called the last. Otherwise, in the beginningless round of rebirth, there is no first consciousness, since there is no arising of consciousness without the conditions of contiguity, immediately contiguity, absence, and disappearance. Or, if it is conceived, there would be the fault of the appearance of a new being. Ayaṃ sabbapaṭhamo manussaviggaho (this is the very first human body): although it is not possible to deprive this of life, beginning from that, it is seen as "the very first" among the countless human bodies arising in the stream until death. But when a certain human body has attained to the stream in the order of before and after, then it is possible to deprive it of life. For one who disrupts the stream is said to deprive of life. Here, if diversity is intended in the sense of difference, the statement "the very first" is fitting, but not if unity is intended, because of the unity of the stream. And if unity is intended here, because of the statement "disrupts the stream," then the statement "the very first" is not fitting, is it? No, because of the multiplicity of the stream in the present. Since, however, the stream is called the arising of many in the order of before and after, therefore, it is said "this is the very first"; in this way both of these approaches are included, otherwise this statement "disrupts the stream" would not be established. Although here, from the statement "disrupts the stream," it seems that only the stream in the present is intended, not the near present, nevertheless, since when the stream in the present is disrupted, the near present is also disrupted, but there is no need to say that when the near present is disrupted, the stream in the present is disrupted. Therefore, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (in the commentary), it is said, "It should be understood that both of those can be deprived of life, therefore this is said referring to that: 'disrupts the stream.'" From the statement "disrupts the stream," if transgression occurs in the case of a being who has reached the limit of its natural lifespan and dies, there is no offense, because the stream is not disrupted by the transgression. If, however, transgression occurs in the case of a being dying before reaching the limit of its lifespan due to the transgression, there is an offense and it is bound by karma; there is no reasoning in this, so said the teacher. From the statement, "One might praise the act of dying, or encourage another to die, this also is a pārājika (defeat) entailing expulsion," the pārājika (defeat) offense occurs at the moment of intention alone, because it is entirely unwholesome, because it is painful feeling, because it is bodily action, because it is verbal action, and because it is non-effective, it should be understood.

Sattaṭṭhajavanavāramatta (merely seven or eight impulsions): is said in terms of similar objects, therefore, "sabhāgasantativasenā" (by way of a similar stream), etc., is said. Being endowed with its opposite, the subsequent does not become a condition as before, because it is weak. Ta (that): the disruption of the life faculty.

Īti (pestilence): means the seven kinds of calamities, such as launching poisoned weapons in battle to kill. Pajjaraka (consumption): means the burning of the body. Sūcika (needle disease): means the stake. Visūcika (cholera): means dry dysentery. Pakkhandiya (bloody flux): means bloody dysentery. Creating a great body measuring two or three hundred fathoms and standing fixed, or the act of causing a body to burn or die unnaturally from the enraged glance of a serpent is called application.

Kecīti, the Mahāsaṅghikas. Ayaṃ itthī, this is a woman. Kulumbassāti, of the embryo. Kathaṃ sā itarassāti ce? How is she different from the other? Tassa duṭṭhena manasānupakkhite, when she does not support it with a hateful mind, so ca gabbho sā ca iddhīti ubhayampi saheva nassati, both the embryo and that power are destroyed together, ghaṭaggīnaṃ bhedanibbāyanaṃ viya ekakkhaṇe hoti, just as the breaking and extinguishing of a clay lamp occur in a single moment. ‘‘Tesaṃ suttantikesu ocariyamānaṃ na sametī’’ti likhitaṃ, it is written that "it does not agree when it is brought down among their Suttanta texts." ‘‘Tesaṃ mataṃ gahetvā ‘thāvarīnampi ayaṃ yujjatī’ti vutte tikavasena paṭisedhitabbanti apare’’ti vuttaṃ, it is said that "others have refuted it threefold, saying that when their opinion is taken and it is said that ‘this also applies to causing to be fixed,’ it is refuted by way of a triad." Sāhatthikanissaggiyapayogesu, in instances of relinquishment by one's own hand, sanniṭṭhāpakacetanāya sattamāya sahuppannakāyaviññattiyā sāhatthikatā veditabbā, the state of being done by one's own hand should be understood through the bodily intimation that arises simultaneously with the seventh consciousness of determination. Āṇattike pana, however, in the case of command, sattahipi cetanāhi saha vacīviññattisambhavato, because verbal intimation arises together with all seven consciousnesses, sattasatta saddā ekato hutvā ekekakkharabhāvaṃ gantvā, the seven sets of sounds come together and become a single syllable, yattakehi akkharehi attano adhippāyaṃ viññāpeti, and by as many syllables as he makes his intention known, tadavasānakkharasamuṭṭhāpikāya sattamacetanāya sahajātavacīviññattiyā āṇattikatā veditabbā, the state of being done by command should be understood through the verbal intimation that is born together with the seventh consciousness that gives rise to the final syllable. Tathā vijjāmayapayoge, so it is with usages involving magic. Kāyenāṇattiyaṃ pana, however, in commanding through bodily action, sāhatthike vuttanayova, the method stated in the case of doing it oneself is the same. Thāvarapayoge yāvatā parassa maraṇaṃ hoti, in the case of causing to be fixed, as long as the other person's death occurs, tāvatā kammabaddho, he is bound by kamma, āpatti ca, and there is an offense. Tato paraṃ atisañcaraṇe, thereafter, in excessive movement, kammabaddhātibahuttaṃ veditabbaṃ sati paraṃ maraṇe, a great increase in being bound by kamma should be understood if the other person dies. Pārājikāpatti’dha ekā, here, there is one offense entailing expulsion. Atthasādhakacetanā yasmā ettha ca dutiyapārājike ca labbhati, because the consciousness accomplishing the purpose is found here and in the second pārājika, na aññattha, not elsewhere, tasmā dvinnampi sādhāraṇā imā gāthāyo, therefore, these verses are common to both:

‘‘Bhūtadhammaniyāmā ye, te dhammā niyatā matā;
Those phenomena that are fixed by the nature of existing things are considered to be fixed phenomena;
Bhāvidhammaniyāmā ye, teva aniyatā idha.
But those phenomena that are fixed by the nature of cultivated things, those are considered unfixed here.

‘‘Bhūtadhammaniyāmānaṃ, ṭhitāva sā paccayaṭṭhiti;
For phenomena fixed by the nature of existing things, that condition stands firm;
Bhāvidhammaniyāmānaṃ, sāpekkhā paccayaṭṭhiti.
For phenomena fixed by the nature of cultivated things, the condition is dependent.

‘‘Tenaññā hetuyā atthi, sāpi dhammaniyāmatā;
Because of that, there is another cause; that too is fixed by the nature of phenomena;
Tassā phalaṃ aniyataṃ, phalāpekkhā niyāmatā.
Its result is unfixed, (yet) the need for a result is fixed.

‘‘Evañhi sabbadhammānaṃ, ṭhitā dhammaniyāmatā;
Thus, indeed, for all phenomena, the nature of phenomena is fixed;
Laddhadhammaniyāmā yā, sātthasādhakacetanā.
That consciousness which accomplishes the purpose has obtained the nature of phenomena.

‘‘Cetanāsiddhito pubbe, pacchā tassātthasiddhito;
Before the success of the consciousness, after its success in accomplishing the purpose,
Avisesena sabbāpi, chabbidhā atthasādhikā.
Without distinction, all six are accomplishers of the purpose.

‘‘Āṇattiyaṃ yato sakkā, vibhāvetuṃ vibhāgato;
Since, in commanding, it is possible to distinguish separately,
Tasmā āṇattiyaṃyeva, vuttā sā atthasādhikā.
Therefore, only in commanding is that accomplisher of the purpose spoken of.

‘‘Micchatte vāpi sammatte, niyatāniyatā matā;
Whether in wrong view or right view, (they) are considered fixed and unfixed;
Abhidhamme na sabbatthi, tattha sā niyatā siyā.
In the Abhidhamma, it is not in all (cases); there, it could be fixed.

‘‘Yā theyyacetanā sabbā, sahatthāṇattikāpi vā;
Whatever consciousness of stealing there is, whether done by one's own hand or by command;
Abhidhammanayenāyaṃ, ekantaniyatā siyā.
According to the method of the Abhidhamma, this could be entirely fixed.

‘‘Pāṇātipātaṃ nissāya, sahatthāṇattikādikā;
Relying on the taking of life, (whether) by one's own hand, by command, etc.,
Abhidhammavasenesā, paccekaṃ taṃ dukaṃ bhaje.
According to the Abhidhamma, these each partake of that pair.

‘‘Jīvitindriyupacchedo, cetanā ceti taṃ dvayaṃ;
The cutting off of the life faculty, and the consciousness, this pair;
Na sāhatthikakammena, pagevāṇattikāsamaṃ.
Is not equal to doing it oneself, let alone by command.

‘‘Jīvitindriyupacchedo, cetanā ceti taṃ dvayaṃ;
The cutting off of the life faculty, and the consciousness, this pair;
Na sāhatthikakammena, pagevāṇattikāsamaṃ.
Is not equal to doing it oneself, let alone by command.

‘‘Jīvitindriyupacchedakkhaṇe vadhakacetanā;
At the moment of the cutting off of the life faculty, the consciousness of killing;
Cirāṭhitāti ko dhammo, niyāmeti āpattikaṃ.
What phenomenon stipulates the offense as ‘lasting long’?

‘‘Jīvitindriyupacchedakkhaṇe ce vadhako siyā;
If the killer is (present) at the moment of the cutting off of the life faculty,
Mato sutto pabuddho vā, kusalo vadhako siyā.
The killer could be dead, asleep, awake, or wholesome.

‘‘Kusalattikabhedo ca, vedanāttikabhedopi;
There could be a difference in the triad of the wholesome, and a difference in the triad of feeling;
Siyā tathā gato siddho, sahatthā vadhakacetanā’’ti.
Thus, the consciousness of killing by one's own hand could be accomplished by one who has gone."

Nayidaṃ vitakkassa nāmanti, this is not a name only for initial application, na vitakkasseva nāmaṃ, kintu saññācetanānampi nāmanti gahetabbaṃ, but it should be taken as a name also for perception and consciousness. Kaṅkhāvitaraṇiyampi evameva vuttaṃ, in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī also, it is said in just this way.

174.Kāyatoti, because it was said "from the body," vuttattā ‘‘sattiñasū’’ti vattabbe vacanasiliṭṭhatthaṃ ‘‘ususattiādinā’’ti vuttaṃ, because it should have been said "with a dart and a knife," it was said "with a dart, a knife, etc." for the sake of elegance of expression. Anuddesikekammassārammaṇaṃ so vā hoti, añño vā, the object of the undirected action is either that person or another. Ubhayehīti, although the first blow is not able by itself, kiñcāpi paṭhamappahāro na malzeme sakkoti, dutiyaṃ labhitvā pana sakkonto jīvitavināsanahetu ahosi, but having obtained the second, being able, it becomes the cause of the destruction of life, tadatthameva hi vadhakena so dinno, for it was given by the killer for that very purpose, dutiyo pana aññena cittena dinno, but the second was given with a different mind, tena suṭṭhu vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭhamappahārenevā’’ti, therefore, it is well said, "by the first blow alone." ‘‘Cetanā nāma dāruṇāti garuṃ vatthuṃ ārabbha pavattapubbabhāgacetanā pakatisabhāvavadhakacetanā, no dāruṇā hotī’’ti ācariyena likhitaṃ, the teacher wrote that "the preliminary consciousness that arises regarding a heavy object, thinking that 'consciousness is indeed cruel,' the naturally disposed consciousness of killing, is not cruel." ‘‘Pubbabhāgacetanā parivārā, vadhakacetanāva dāruṇā hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, it is said that "the preliminary consciousness is the retinue; only the consciousness of killing is cruel." Yathādhippāyanti, both realize according to intention; ubhopi paṭivijjhati, sāhatthikopi saṅketattā na muccati kira, it seems that even doing it oneself is not free from the agreement.

Kiriyāvisesoaṭṭhakathāsu anāgato, a specific action does not occur in the commentaries. ‘‘Evaṃ vijjha, evaṃ pahara, evaṃ ghāhehī’ti pāḷiyā sametīti ācariyena gahito’’ti vadanti, they say that "it agrees with the Pāli passage 'shoot thus, strike thus, kill thus,' (and) was taken by the teacher." Purato paharitvātiādi vatthuvisaṅketameva kira, it seems that striking from the front, etc., is an explicit agreement about the object. Etaṃ gāme ṭhitanti puggalova niyamito, here, only the individual is specified. Yo pana liṅgavasena ‘‘dīghaṃ…pe… mārehī’’ti āṇāpeti aniyametvā, but whoever commands, without specifying, "kill the tall one...," according to gender. Yadi niyametvā vadati, if he speaks specifying, ‘‘etaṃ dīgha’’nti vadeyyāti apare, others say that he should say, "kill this tall one." Ācariyā pana, however, the teachers say, ‘‘dīghanti vutte niyamitaṃ hoti, evaṃ aniyametvā vadati, na pana āṇāpako dīghādīsu aññataraṃ mārehīti adhippāyo’’ti vadanti kira, it seems that they say that "when 'tall' is said, it is specified; thus, he speaks without specifying, but the commander does not intend to kill one of the tall ones, etc." ‘‘Attho pana cittena ekaṃ sandhāyapi aniyametvā āṇāpetī’’ti likhitaṃ, it is written that "but the meaning is that, even intending one person in his mind, he commands without specifying." ‘‘Itaro aññaṃ tādisaṃ māreti, āṇāpako muccatī’’ti vuttaṃ yathādhippāyaṃ na gatattā, it is said that "if the other kills another like that, the commander is freed" because it did not go according to intention. ‘‘Evaṃ dīghādivasenāpi cittena aniyamitassevāti yuttaṃ viya dissatī’’ti aññatarasmiṃ gaṇṭhipadelikhitaṃ, in a certain subcommentary, it is written that "thus, it seems fitting that it should be understood as unspecified in mind even by way of tallness, etc." suṭṭhu vīmaṃsitvā sabbaṃ gahetabbaṃ, everything should be taken after thorough investigation. Okāsassa niyamitattāti ettha, here, because the place is specified, okāsaniyamaṃ katvā niddisanto, when specifying, having made a specification of place, tasmiṃ okāse nisinnaṃ māretukāmova hoti, he intends to kill the one sitting in that place. Sayaṃ pana tadā tattha natthi, but he himself is not there at that time. Tasmā okāsena saha attano jīvitindriyaṃ ārammaṇaṃ na hoti, therefore, his own life faculty is not the object together with the place, tena attanā mārāpito paro eva mārāpito, therefore, he has caused another to be killed by himself causing (it) to be killed. Kathaṃ? How? Sayaṃ rasso ca tanuko ca hutvā, having been short and thin himself, pubbabhāge attānaṃ sandhāya āṇattikkhaṇe, having intended himself in the preliminary stage, at the moment of command, ‘‘dīghaṃ rassaṃ thūlaṃ balavantaṃ mārehī’’ti āṇāpentassa cittaṃ, the mind of one commanding, "kill the tall one, the short one, the stout one, the strong one," attani tassākārassa natthitāya, because that form is not present in himself, aññassa tādisassa jīvitindriyaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā pavattati, operates having made the life faculty of another such person its object, tena mūlaṭṭhassa kammabaddho, therefore, the instigator is bound by kamma. Evaṃsampadamidanti daṭṭhabbaṃ, this accomplishment should be seen in this way.

Dūtaparamparāniddeseāṇāpeti, in the designation of a succession of messengers, he commands; the offense is a dukkata. Itarassa āroceti, he informs the other; āpatti dukkaṭassāti ācariyantevāsīnaṃ yathāsambhavaṃ ārocane, the offense is a dukkata; this is said regarding the informing of the pupils of the teacher as appropriate, paṭiggaṇhane dukkaṭaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, and refers to a dukkata for receiving (the message). Na vadhako paṭiggaṇhāti, the killer does not receive (the message); tassa dukkaṭanti siddhaṃ hoti, it is established that it is a dukkata for him. Taṃ pana okāsābhāvato na vuttaṃ, however, that is not said due to the absence of opportunity. Mūlaṭṭhena āpajjitabbāpattiyā hi tassa okāso aparicchinno, for the opportunity for the offense to be committed by the instigator is unlimited for him, tenassa tasmiṃ okāse thullaccayaṃ vuttaṃ, therefore, a thullaccaya is said for him in that opportunity. Vadhako ce paṭiggaṇhāti, if the killer receives (the message), mūlaṭṭho ācariyo pubbe āpannadukkaṭena saha thullaccayampi āpajjati, the instigator teacher also commits a thullaccaya along with the dukkata he committed previously. Kasmā? Why? Mahājano hi tena pāpe niyojitoti, because he has engaged many people in evil. Idaṃ pana dukkaṭathullaccayaṃ, however, this dukkata and thullaccaya, vadhako ce tamatthaṃ na sāveti āpajjati, the killer commits if he does not communicate that matter. Yadi sāveti, if he communicates it, pārājikamevāpajjati, he commits an offense entailing expulsion. Kasmā? Why? Atthasādhakacetanāya abhāvā, because of the absence of the consciousness of accomplishing the purpose. Anugaṇṭhipadepana, however, in the subcommentary, ‘‘paṭiggaṇhati, taṃ dukkaṭaṃ hoti. he receives (the message); that is a dukkata. Yadi evaṃ kasmā pāṭhe na vuttanti ce? If so, why is it not said in the text? Vadhako pana ‘sādhu karomī’ti paṭiggaṇhitvā taṃ na karoti. However, the killer receives (the message) thinking ‘I will do well,’ but does not do it. Evañhi niyame ‘mūlaṭṭhassa kiṃ nāma hoti, kimassa dukkaṭāpattī’ti sañjātakaṅkhānaṃ tadatthadīpanatthaṃ ‘mūlaṭṭhassa āpatti thullaccayassā’’’ti vuttaṃ. Thus, in this connection, to clarify the meaning for those who have doubts arising (thinking), 'what happens to the instigator, what is his dukkata offense?', it is said 'the instigator's offense is a thullaccaya.' ‘‘Vadhako paṭiggaṇhāti āpatti dukkaṭassa, mūlaṭṭhassa ca āpatti thullaccayassā’’ti vuttaṃ na silissati, it is not smooth to say "the killer receives (the message); the offense is a dukkata, and the instigator's offense is a thullaccaya," mūlaṭṭhena āpajjitabbāpattidassanādhikārattā, because it is the authority for showing the offense to be committed by the instigator, vadhako paṭiggaṇhāti, āpatti dukkaṭassāti vuttaṃ, it is said "the killer receives (the message); the offense is a dukkata."

Visakkiyadūtapadaniddese, in the designation of an unexplicit messenger, ‘‘vattukāmatāya ca kicchenettha vatvā payojanaṃ natthīti bhagavatā na vutta’’nti vuttaṃ, it is said that "the Blessed One did not say it because there is no purpose in speaking with difficulty here due to the desire to speak." Yaṃ pana ‘‘mūlaṭṭhasseva dukkaṭa’’nti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ, however, what is said in the commentary that "it is a dukkata for the instigator alone," tatrāyaṃ vicāraṇā – here is the consideration: ācariyena āṇattena buddharakkhitena tadatthe saṅgharakkhitasseva ārocite, even when Buddharakkhita, having been commanded by the teacher, informed Saṅgharakkhita about that matter, kiñcāpi yo ‘‘sādhū’’ti paṭiggaṇhāti, although the one who receives (the message) says "good," atha kho ācariyassevetaṃ dukkaṭaṃ visaṅketattā, nevertheless, this is a dukkata for the teacher alone because of the lack of explicitness, na buddharakkhitassa, not for Buddharakkhita. Kasmā? Why? Atthasādhakacetanāya āpannattā, because of incurring the consciousness of accomplishing the purpose. Teneva ‘‘āṇāpakassa ca vadhakassa ca āpatti pārājikassā’’ti pāḷiyaṃvuttaṃ, therefore, it is said in the Pāli that "the offense entailing expulsion is for the commander and for the killer." taṃ pana mūlaṭṭhena āpajjitabbadukkaṭaṃ, however, that dukkata to be committed by the instigator, ‘‘mūlaṭṭhassa anāpattī’’ti iminā aparicchinnokāsattā na vuttaṃ, is not said because of the unlimited opportunity by this "there is no offense for the instigator."

pāḷiyaṃ‘‘so taṃ jīvitā voropeti, āṇāpakassa ca vadhakassa ca āpatti pārājikassā’’ti na vuttaṃ, in the Pāli, it is not said that "he deprives him of life; the offense entailing expulsion is for the commander and for the killer," tathāpi taṃ atthato vuttameva, nevertheless, that is indeed said in meaning, ‘‘yato pārājikaṃ paññatta’’nti pubbe vuttanayattā ca taṃ na vuttaṃ, and because of the method previously said in "since the expulsion offense is prescribed," that is not said. ‘‘So taṃ jīvitā voropeti, āpatti sabbesaṃ pārājikassā’’ti hi pubbe vuttaṃ, for it was previously said, "he deprives him of life; the offense entailing expulsion is for all." Ettha pubbe ācariyantevāsikānaṃ vuttadukkaṭathullaccayāpattiyo, here, the offenses of dukkata and thullaccaya previously stated for the pupils of the teacher, paṭhamameva anāpannā pārājikāpattiyā āpannattā, are uncommitted from the very beginning because of incurring the offense entailing expulsion. Tathāpi vadhakassa pārājikāpattiyā tesaṃ pārājikabhāvo pākaṭo jātoti katvā, nevertheless, having made it (clear) that their state of expulsion is manifest because of the killer's offense entailing expulsion, ‘‘āpatti sabbesaṃ pārājikassā’’ti ekato vuttaṃ, it is said together "the offense entailing expulsion is for all," na tathā ‘‘āṇāpakassa, vadhakassa ca āpatti pārājikassā’’ti ettha, not thus in "the offense entailing expulsion is for the commander and for the killer" here. Kasmā? Why? Vadhakassa dukkaṭāpattiyā āpannattā, because of incurring the dukkata offense by the killer. So hi paṭhamaṃ dukkaṭāpattiṃ āpajjitvā pacchā pārājikaṃ āpajjati, for he first incurs a dukkata offense and then incurs an offense entailing expulsion. Yadi pana antevāsikā kevalaṃ ācariyassa garukatāya sāsanaṃ ārocenti sayaṃ amaraṇādhippāyā samānā pārājikena anāpatti, but if the pupils only communicate the message out of respect for the teacher, being of the same intention themselves not to kill, there is no offense entailing expulsion. Akappiyasāsanaharaṇapaccayā dukkaṭāpatti hoti eva, there is indeed a dukkata offense because of conveying an improper message, imassatthassa sādhanatthaṃ dhammapadavatthūhimigaluddakassa bhariyāya sotāpannāya dhanuususūlādidānaṃ nidassanaṃ vadanti eke, to prove this meaning, some say that the giving of bows, arrows, spears, etc., by the deer hunter's wife, a stream-enterer, from the Dhammapada stories is an example. Taṃ tittirajātakena(jā. 1.4.73 ādayo) sameti, that agrees with the Tittira Jātaka (Jā. 1.4.73 ff.), tasmā suttañca aṭṭhakathañca anulometīti no takkoti ācariyo, therefore, the teacher does not reason that it accords with both the Sutta and the commentary. Idha pana dūtaparamparāya ca ‘‘itthannāmassa pāvada, itthannāmo itthannāmaṃ pāvadatū’’ti ettha avisesetvā vuttattā, here, however, because it is said without specifying in the succession of messengers, "tell so-and-so, let so-and-so tell so-and-so," vācāya vā ārocetu, hatthamuddāya vā, paṇṇena vā, dūtena vā ārocetu, visaṅketo natthi, whether he informs by speech, by gesture, by letter, or by messenger, there is no lack of explicitness. Sace visesetvā mūlaṭṭho, antarādūto vā vadati, if the instigator or the intermediate messenger speaks specifying, tadatikkame visaṅketoti veditabbaṃ, it should be understood that there is a lack of explicitness in the transgression of that.

The method stated in the anugaṇṭhipada means: "The executioner receives, the offense is a dukkaṭa," the offense applies only to the executioner, not to Buddharakkhita, the one who ordered it. But if he inevitably causes either the death or non-death of the one to be executed, at the moment Buddharakkhita gives the order, one of the pārājika or dukkaṭa offenses may occur. Because of the context, "iti cittamano" is like the word "iti" in "cittasaṅkappo"; because of the context, "the executioner receives, the offense for the instigator is a thullaccaya," it is already stated that "the offense for the instigator is a dukkaṭa." Why wasn't it stated explicitly? To give additional guidance in reasoning. If it were said, "the offense for the instigator is a dukkaṭa," it would be limited to the instigator's perspective, and it wouldn't be known that "there is a dukkaṭa for the one who receives." But when it's said without limitation, "the executioner receives, the offense is a dukkaṭa," it's possible to apply the dukkaṭa to both. Therefore, the commentators, taking the context into account, said, "When it is accepted by Saṅgharakkhita, it should be understood that the dukkaṭa is for the instigator alone." Receiving is neither permitted nor prohibited for the receiver, but it is prohibited for Buddharakkhita only because it is not specified for him, but one of the pārājika or dukkaṭa offenses might occur for him; this meaning is clarified, therefore that too is well said. Because it is possible to apply it in terms of both, the teachers said, "this dukkaṭa is for the one who receives it." There, the instigator is neither permitted because there is no mention of "for the instigator," nor prohibited because there is no Pali passage stating "the offense for the one who receives is a dukkaṭa"; in order to give the reasoning that a dukkaṭa might occur for the executioner due to the act of receiving, because it is not stated in the Pali that "for the instigator," what was said, "this dukkaṭa is for the one who receives it," that too is well said. There, it is prohibited for Buddharakkhita, but according to the stated method, the offense for him is unspecified. Why then, in the Aṭṭhakathā, wasn't it explicitly stated that there is a dukkaṭa for the executioner due to the act of receiving, but instead the dukkaṭa was stated only in terms of the instigator? To prevent an unwanted conclusion. If it were said, "when it is accepted by Saṅgharakkhita, there is a dukkaṭa for him due to the act of receiving," it would imply that the thullaccaya for the instigator is also explicitly stated in the Aṭṭhakathā according to the immediately preceding method. To prevent the unwanted conclusion that this thullaccaya is explicitly stated, the dukkaṭa was stated for the one who receives it. According to the teachers, the dukkaṭa for the one who receives it is already explicitly stated in the manner already described. If it is asked why it was said that what is explicit is acceptable to us, it is to illuminate the practice. "Even teachers whose intellect is unhindered in the three Piṭakas, etc., practice in this way in such cases because it is not stated explicitly in the Pali and Aṭṭhakathā. How much more so should those who are like me avoid the fault of confusion and practice without transgressing the established method of exposition in the future?" Thus, others have said. However, since this passage is not in the Aṭṭhakathā or the teacher inserted such a passage later, it is not seen in some books; therefore, we will write everything. If that were the case, there would be no offense in receiving at all, and there are offenses in transmitting, receiving, and rejoicing in death; how could there not be in receiving a request to kill? Therefore, this dukkaṭa is only for the one who receives, hence "for the instigator" is not stated here. Even in the previous method, this should be understood as for the one who receives, but it was not stated due to lack of space. Therefore, whoever receives, there is an offense for each of them due to that cause; this is what we find acceptable here. As it is here, so it is in taking what is not given.

175. In Araho rahosaññīniddesā etc., although only a dukkaṭa is stated in the Pali and Aṭṭhakathā, nevertheless, if someone speaks, having heard through tradition, with the intention that he should die, and if the one designated dies upon the designation, the offense is a pārājika; if anyone dies without being designated, the offense is a pārājika. If someone designates and speaks, saying, "Let so-and-so, having heard, inform the one to be executed," it should be understood that the lack of designation is due to it being stated through a succession of messengers. If someone speaks, saying, "Let anyone who hears speak," and the one to be executed himself hears and dies, there is no pārājika due to the lack of designation. If someone who hears speaks, and he dies, it is a pārājika. If someone speaks, saying, "Let anyone who hears my words kill him," and anyone who hears kills him, it is a pārājika; if he himself hears and kills, there is no pārājika due to the lack of designation; thus, it should be understood as appropriate.

176. In Mūlaṃ datvā muccatī, it is already stated in effect that he is freed as soon as he breaks it, destroys it, causes it to decay, pulverizes it, or throws it into the fire. Yesaṃ hatthato mūlaṃ gahitaṃ, from whose hands of relatives and associates the price was taken by that bhikkhu, having taken back the price previously given from the hand of the book's owner and given it to those very relatives etc., he is freed; thus, it belongs to the book's owner alone. In the anugaṇṭhipada, however, it is said, "even if he becomes remorseful and quickly gives the price to them, he is freed"; that refers to the money with which the book was bought. Why? Because he is freed even if the book is not given back, once the money is taken from the book owner's hand. If it refers to other money, it is not right because the book has not been released from his possession. If he gives the book to the owners and does not take the price, he is not freed because it has not been released from his possession. If he offers the book to the owner while the price is being given by the instigator, saying "let it be yours," he is freed because it has been released from his possession. Here is a consideration: just as when a cetiya, an image, a pond, or a bridge is bought, the merit belongs to the one who had it made, not to the one who bought it, so too the demerit applies to the one by whom the book was written, not to the other. No, because of the statement "he should seek a copyist." It is established that there is a pārājika for one who obtains a text made by another and conceals it. Similarly, it is established that if one obtains a book written by another and conceals it so that the one to be executed sees it and dies, there is a pārājika. Cetiyādī means that the teachers considered this example because that action is a cause, and this is a condition for death. It seems to me, however, that even that meaning should be established by the example of the cetiya, etc.

Tattakā pāṇātipātā means it is written that "even one intention is called 'tattakā' due to the function, like the fourfold nature of the satipaṭṭhānas and sammappadhānas." Pamāṇe ṭhapetvā means according to the measure intended by oneself. "Imasmiṃ āvāṭe" refers to when the executioner, intending "having been dug by me, let him fall into a pit of this sort and die," specifies the size of the pit and then digs it. Now, with regard to what is to be dug, because the extent of this much is unspecified, "ekasmimpi kudālappahāre" etc. is said; although it is supported by the Suttantika Elders, the teachers say that the finalizing intention is present in both cases. If it is asked how there is a determination of object when many die, when the life faculty of one of those to be executed is taken as the object, it is as if the life faculty of all has been taken as the object. Even in the death of one person, it is not possible to take the entirety of his life as the object, neither the arising, nor the arisen, nor the ceasing; only the existing intention of killing, having the present object, and having the previously arisen object. Therefore, that too is appropriate. At the final stage, in one moment of consciousness, after that life, which has arisen previously, has been taken as the object, when effort is made by the consciousness involved in the seventh javana, in effect the entire life faculty of that being has been taken as the object and severed; it is not possible otherwise. In the same way, in the earlier part, having thought "I will kill many beings," at the time of finalizing, when accomplishing a single effort, such as throwing poison, the aforementioned type of consciousness arises, taking as its object the aforementioned life faculty of one of those beings; but once it has arisen in this way, all of them are killed because the death of all is accomplished by that very consciousness; it is not possible to sever or take as the object otherwise. If it is asked how there is a mass of unwholesomeness in the death of many by a single consciousness, it is because the consciousnesses that occur in each separate death perform a function. How? All of those are only of the nature to be experienced in a subsequent existence; therefore, having given rebirth by whichever of them, all the others partake of the section "overwhelmed by the even more powerful wholesome karma, it became defunct," etc., and they are no longer able to produce a result. Just as another consciousness, even one to be experienced after another, gives rebirth, having overwhelmed that, so too this consciousness, being the same, is called a "mass" because it performs a slight function for those in the immediately subsequent existence by giving rebirth, etc. But when rebirth is given by that, the result is very intense. This is the specialty here, as explained in detail in the anugaṇṭhipada.

Amaritukāmā vā means there is an offense even in spontaneous death, because of the intention. If it is asked, "Since it is said 'nibbattitvā', the falling is not seen?", it is written that "spontaneous generation and falling are the same." Or else, because of the statement "sabbathāpi anuddissevā", since there is a possibility of intention here, it is well said that "uttarituṃ asakkonto marati pārājikamevā." If he had specified "let him fall and die" when digging, and the spontaneously born person, having been born and standing firmly by the specification, thinks "I cannot get out" and dies, the shadow of pārājika is not seen, hence it is said "uttarituṃ asakkonto." He dies falling again and again unable to get out, therefore his fall is also accomplished; this is the intention. Here, one might ask: the one who is said to "die unable to get out" is living in the immaterial realm at the moment of digging the pit. And the intention of the executioner "the unspecified condition is a condition for the condition of fixed wrongness through the object condition, the material life faculty is a condition for the matricide karma, the patricide karma, the arahant-killing karma, the blood-drawing karma through the object condition" (Paṭṭhā. 2.15.38 micchattaniyatattika) has the material life faculty as its object, but that does not exist for a being in the immaterial realm, and that intention is not "the unspecified condition is a condition for the condition of fixed wrongness through the pre-arisen condition, the object pre-arisen, the base pre-arisen, the object pre-arisen. The material life faculty is a condition for the matricide karma through the pre-arisen condition" (Paṭṭhā. 2.15.48 micchattaniyatattika) and so does not have a future object. There is no other being to fall here and die, so what is the object of the executioner's intention? The present life faculty of whatever living being is here is the object. Even though he does not die, still there is killing. For example, if one thinks in the earlier part "I will pierce and kill seven people standing in order with one arrow," and at the time of finalizing, having taken the life of one of them as the object, he releases the arrow, and the arrow pierces him and kills the other six people, even then he is a killer; similarly here, the executioner's intention, discriminating "whoever," proceeds having taken the life of whatever being as the object, and even if that one does not die, he is a killer by way of the other. If he becomes an arahant and attains final Nibbāna, he is a killer of an arahant. This method is the same in all such cases. This alone is the justification and definitive statement passed down by the teachers, it is said. In my opinion, however, even that meaning should be accomplished by the example of the cetiya etc.

Patanarūpaṃ pamāṇanti: Here, just as with the mother who dies by falling and changing form, he is a matricide, not merely a murderer of a human being; therefore, the offense depends solely on the falling. Why? Because the form of falling and the form of death are of one continuum (ekasantāna). Indeed, that is his life faculty (jīvitindriya), and there is no transformation of it. Only the faculties of woman and man cease and arise in activity. And "woman" and "man" are merely conventional terms there. Therefore, he is a matricide, not a murderer of a human being. Just as the offense arises for him due to the form of falling, so too here, due to the form of falling, there is a thullaccaya offense because of the single continuum. This is the reasoning in the first Theravāda tradition. In the second, although a peta or a yakkha falls, because of their causeless rebirth (ahetukapaṭisandhi), all forms are common, like the rebirth of the yakkhas mentioned in "he becomes a pig on the left" (vāmena sūkaro hotī) (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 2.296; mahāni. aṭṭha. 166) due to the result of unwholesome action (akusalavipākassa), and because they are of a non-human species, when they die in animal form, there is a pācittiya offense due to the form of death. Based on the object (vatthu), there is a change to a lighter offense, just like the change in the pācittiya offense for cutting down trees that grow in that location. This very reasoning is more justified; therefore, it is mentioned later. However, for a pārājika offense, let a human being fall and die however they may, the offense is pārājika itself because it is a grave offense. Indeed, there is no reversal of a grave offense, as has been said.

Thullaccayaṃ tiracchāne, mate bhedassa kāraṇaṃ;
Sarūpamaraṇaṃ tisso, phusso maññeti aññathā.

Gaṇṭhipade: In the Gaṇṭhipada, it is written that "in the second explanation, it is stated in terms of a worldling (puthujjana) who falls, attains arahantship, and then dies." Tiracchāne: Regarding "animals," some say, "devas are intended." And they also say, "Death occurs only with one's own form, not otherwise."Yakkhapetarūpena matepi eseva nayo: Even if they die in the form of yakkhas or petas, this is the same principle, meaning it's a thullaccaya offense. It is written, "Like the death of a human body gone to an animal existence."Pahāraṃ laddhā: "Having received a blow," is stated because it was done with the intention of killing beings.

177.Sādhu suṭṭhu maratū: He makes a difference in speech.Visabhāgarogo: A boil or swelling located in the body.

178.Kāḷānusārī: The root of a certain creeper. Or a flower made by Mahākacchapa.Haṃsapupphanti: The wing feathers of swans. Here, too, the principle of personal action, unintentional action should be applied according to the method stated below, and the arising of the offense from body, speech, and mind should be shown.

Padabhājanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Vinītavatthuvaṇṇanā

180.Maraṇatthikāva hutvā: Because of intending to go to heaven through the breaking up of this body, they are virtually desirous of death in meaning, thus those who have such intention are called desirous of death, those who do not know their own state of being desirous of death incur a pārājika offense. Indeed, they are not said to "not know the inclination of their own mind."Vohāravasenā: In terms of the conventional usage of the preliminary act. However, this is not the case at the final conclusion. It is not like releasing a pig tied in a snare.Yathānusandhinā: Meaning, without dying in between.Appaṭivekkhitvā: Without considering. In the lower part, a wrinkle appears where something exists.Dassite: When it has been taken out and placed.Paṭibandhanti: A hindrance by you, meaning, "do not cause an obstacle to the Saṅgha's use."

181-2.Since the action cannot be given, therefore, ‘‘paṭhamaṃ laddha’’nti is said. Even before, while giving fine and excellent food from the almsfood he had obtained, even there, he did not give his own action.Asañciccā: Here, in the case of one person pulling something and another falling, there is no intention at all towards everything.Na maraṇādhippāyassā: There is aversion and effort, but there is no intention to kill.Ajānantassā: Regarding "not knowing," some say, "There is no fault for one who does not know due to not knowing the object; indeed, this is their difference. In the Pāḷi, 'I did not intend to' (asañcicco aha'nti) is not seen. It must be that there was such a Pāḷi since it is stated in the Aṭṭhakathā."No ce, thullaccayanti: Regarding "if not, a thullaccaya offense," some say, "If painful feeling does not arise, it is only a dukkaṭa offense," it should be investigated.‘‘Muggarānāma khādanadaṇḍakā: Muggara means eating sticks.Vemānāma tesaṃ khādanadaṇḍakānaṃ heṭṭhā ca upari ca tiriyaṃ bandhitabbadaṇḍā: Vema means the sticks that should be bound crosswise, below and above, to those eating sticks." It is read both ways below. Hatthappatto viya dissati‘‘tassa vikkhepo mā hotū’’tiupacchindati: "He cuts it off so that there is no distraction for him," it appears as if it has reached his hand.Visesādhigamaṃ byākaritvā: Being ashamed of the honor arising from declaring a special attainment, he āhāraṃ upacchindati: he cuts off food because those of the same status have declared it. Indeed, they announce a suitable field.

186.Akataviññattiyā: Not by invitation (viññatti). Indeed, since it is permitted, even if it is done, it is as if it is not done; therefore, it is not an invitation. It is written that "'Say, venerable, what is needed,' an invitation in a place where it has not been done is not an invitation." It is not proper to give with one's own hand to parents who are sectarians.Pitucchānāma pitubhaginī: Pitucchā means the father's sister.Sacepi na yācanti: Even if they do not ask, (thinking) "it is difficult to ask," or being unable to say so themselves. Or having made a consideration (ābhogaṃ) thinking, "When they have a need."‘‘‘Vejjakammaṃ vā na hotī’ti vacanā: Because of the saying, "or there is no medical treatment," it is proper to make medicine up to the seventh generation of the family.Sabbapadesū: To all locations, such as the great mother, the lesser mother, and so on.

Vuttanayena pariyesitvā: Having sought according to the method stated, beginning with "or by novices." Some say, "Not without an invitation." Some say, "If he expects it, it is a dukkaṭa offense."Kappiyavasenā: Through permissible means, beginning with "bring flowers." Some say, "Since it is said 'he made an offering,' it is not proper to take it oneself."

‘‘Bhaṇathā’’ti vutte pana kātabbaṃ: However, when it is said "speak," it should be done. Indeed, it is proper to speak the Dhamma.No ce jānanti, na pādā apanetabbā: If they do not know, the feet should not be removed. Indeed, they consider it an inauspicious sign.

Coranāgassahi āmaṭṭhaṃ dinne kujjhissati, anāmaṭṭhaṃ na vaṭṭatīti aṅgulantare thokaṃ bhattaṃ gahetvā patte bhattaṃ sabbaṃ adāsi, so tena tussi: If food is given to Coranāga after touching it, he will get angry; it is not proper to give it without touching it. So, taking a little food with his fingers, he gave all the food in the bowl, and he was pleased by that. Varapotthakacittattharaṇanti: A covering or spread that should be made by sewing, a modification.Piturājā: Piturāja, defeated by the Tamil king, having lived in rohaṇe for sixteen years, surrounded by friends and relatives, came thinking "I will take the kingdom," but in the middle of the road, because of a minor matter, he had one of his ministers killed. The rest, fleeing in fear, were robbed by thieves in the forest on the way. Going to hambugallakavihāraṃ, the Thera Tissatthera of the Cātunika community took care of them, brought them back, and showed them to the king. Having taken the kingdom with them, the king made the abhayagirivihāraṃ for hambugallakatissattherassa. It is said that the rest also had individual monasteries built.

187.Corasamīpaṃ pesento‘‘vāḷayakkhavihāraṃpesetī’’ti iminā sadiso: Sending him near thieves is similar to "he sends him to the Vāḷayakkha monastery." Why? Because of the intention to kill. For someone sending a fisherman to the edge of a pond under a different pretext to catch fish etc. in ponds etc., there should be taking of life, similar to "he sent him to the Vāḷayakkha monastery." Why? Because it is in accordance with the statement, "because of the intention to kill," and in the Aṭṭhakathā it is said, "even so is Vāḷayakkha."

189.Taṃ tatraṭṭhitaṃ chindantanti:taṃ-saddo ekaccesu natthi: Taṃ: that. In some texts the word "taṃ" is not present. In the other texts, the meaning is that he incurs a pārājika or thullaccaya offense. It is not proper to cut it even with a wholesome mind, thinking, "Having cut this, I will quickly go and give the bowl and robe to the Saṅgha," because it has not been permitted.Aññassa pana bhikkhuno vaṭṭati: But it is proper for another bhikkhu, because it has been permitted.

190.How? Indeed, the Blessed One has permitted protection from fire etc. for the sake of protecting the hut, the hut is for the sake of the bhikkhus. Therefore, it is said that "there is no need to say here that it is proper for another bhikkhu for the sake of protecting a bhikkhu." If that is so, since the Blessed One has permitted the acceptance of plants for covering nakedness when the robe has been torn, and has permitted it for protecting life at the time of being bitten by a snake, therefore, one should not say "even life should be given up, but a tree should not be cut," therefore that example is not valid, the Aṭṭhakathā teacher is the authority here. However, here is the teacher's reasoning: Even among noble individuals, beings will go to hell because they will develop displeasure seeing nakedness, similarly when snakes bite, plants are permitted for the sake of freeing them from evil. Protection from fire etc. is for the sake of protecting the minds of the donors. Otherwise, there will be an obstruction to the merit of the world, and an obstruction to the gain of the Saṅgha. However, there is no doing what is beneficial to the mind of the killer, that is not transgressing; or, seeing the giving up of life, they might gain pleasure thinking, "what a difficult thing he has done." Therefore, it is not proper for oneself, but it is proper for another. Otherwise, it is for the attainment of the false Dhamma by the sectarians.Gaṇṭhipadepana ‘‘jīvitatthāya rukkhaṃ chindantassa attasinehavasena chindanato akusalattā na vaṭṭati, aññassa vaṭṭatī’’ti likhitaṃ: In the Gaṇṭhipada, it is written that "it is not proper for one cutting a tree for the sake of one's life because it is unwholesome due to cutting it out of affection for oneself, but it is proper for another." When many are pressed by a tree, or when they have fallen into a pit, it is proper for another to do the cutting of the tree etc. for the sake of another. Why? Because of the intention of protecting another.Parittanti rakkhaṇaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ‘‘samantā bhūmitacchana’’ntiādi vuttaṃ: Paritta means protection, to show that, it is said "scraping the ground all around."

191.Tīhi mārite pana visaṅketanti: Here, even if he is killed by one of the three, it is said "because he has entered the field, it is a pārājika offense," if all three kill together, he incurs an offense, therefore it is said ‘‘paricchedabbhantare vā avisaṅketa’’nti: "or within the boundary, there is no uncertainty."‘‘Paricchedātikkame pana sabbattha visaṅketaṃ hotī’’ti vuttattā: Because it is said, "however, outside the boundary, there is uncertainty in all cases," it appears that if the third person kills taking the strength of two, he incurs an offense, it should be investigated.‘‘Dve mārentū’’ti vutte ekena vā dvīhi vā mārite pārājikanti ‘‘dvinnaṃ pahārānaṃ maraṇe sati dve māritā nāma honti, asati ekova hoti, tasmā vijānitabba’’nti vadanti: When it is said "let two kill," if he is killed by one or two, it is a pārājika offense. "If death occurs from two blows, then two are said to be killed, if not, it is only one, therefore it should be understood," some say.

Tatiyapārājikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

4. Catutthapārājikaṃ

Vaggumudātīriyabhikkhuvatthuvaṇṇanā

193.Catutthe vaggu ca sā modayati ca sattetivaggumudā: In the fourth, that which is beautiful and delights beings is Vaggumudā. "Vaggumadā" is also a reading, its meaning is that which is beautiful, clear, and very fine due to the presence of pure waves, like the phrases "beautiful voice of life" (jīvitavaggutthanitā) and "meaning of life" (jīvitattha) in expressions such as "blue lotus" (nīluppalantiādīsu). The etymology is that the river is rich with many kinds of foods, snacks, and drinks on festival days. Vagu means pure, it is considered so by the world. Bhāsitobhavissatīti pāṭhaseso: The rest of the reading is that it will be spoken.

194-5.Vaṇṇavā vaṇṇavanto vaṇṇavantānītipi sijjhati kira bahuvacanena: It is said that "possessing beauty," "possessing beauty," and "possessing beauty" can also be construed with the plural. Since there is no deficiency or fullness of the senses, therefore, it is said ‘‘abhiniviṭṭhokāsassa paripuṇṇattā’’: "because of the completeness of the firmly established space." The firmly established space of the sixth (sense) is the heart-base (hadayavatthu). Pākatindriye in the four postures (iriyāpatha), Attano dahatīti attanā dahati, attanā paṭividdhaṃ katvā pavedetīti adhippāyo: He burns himself, meaning, he burns by himself, the intention is to make known having pierced (the truth) by himself.Santanti vattamānaṃ: "Is" means the present.Gotrabhunoti gottamattaṃ anubhavattā nāmamattakamevāti attho: Gotrabhu means it is only a name because he experiences only the lineage.

Savibhaṅgasikkhāpadavaṇṇanā

197.Padabhājane‘‘tisso vijjā’’ti vuttattā arūpāvacarajjhānāni paṭikkhittānīti ce? Na, tattheva ‘‘yaṃ ñāṇaṃ, taṃ dassanaṃ, yaṃ dassanaṃ, taṃ ñāṇa’’nti dassanapadena visesetvā vuttattā, tasmā evaaṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘vijjāsīsena padabhājanaṃ vutta’’nti vuttaṃ: If it is asked, "Since it is said 'three knowledges' in the word analysis, are the formless attainments (arūpāvacarajjhāna) rejected?" No, because there itself, it is said, "What is knowledge is vision, what is vision is knowledge," having specified with the word "vision," therefore, in the Aṭṭhakathā, it is said "the word analysis is stated with the 'crest of knowledge'."Dhuraṃ katvāti purimaṃ katvā: "Having made a burden" means having made it earlier.

Padabhājanīyavaṇṇanā

199. Because they are the cause of future arising of craving, etc., craving, etc., are themselves called nimitta. And if he, referring to one of the three knowledges, says, "I have attained the knowledges," it is a pārājika. It is not said that it is only the destruction of defilements of material knowledge, etc., for in that moment, the occurrence of superhuman qualities does not happen? No, because it reveals the function of the path. Therefore, it is said, "Without the path, there is nothing." Citta means the mind is free from hindrances. Some say, "If one says, 'As long as knowledge has not arisen, I am an attainer of insight knowledge,' if he speaks referring to the supramundane, and he also knows it as such, it is a pārājika, because even the supramundane has that name." "A pārājika is stated even if he speaks non-specifically," it is proper to say that 'pārājika' is stated if he speaks referring to the supramundane. Just as even when there is a possibility of material knowledge, etc., in the place where it is said, 'Even if one says, "I have attained the knowledges," it is a pārājika,' because they are not intended, it is a pārājika; so too here. It is not possible to make another standard: It is not possible to make the standard that if one, wishing to announce his own qualities, speaks with worldly eloquence mixed in, it is a pārājika; otherwise, it is. Others have said, "That is contradictory to what comes before and after; therefore, the showing of knowledge here is not a showing in the Dispensation, because there is no provision for knowledge of material knowledge, etc. Because the Blessed One did not include their synonyms in the divided-ground passage, it is not possible to make another standard," thus it is written. Some say, "When 'I have attained the paṭisambhidās' is said, because it is said by way of a synonym, a thullaccaya is fitting," but it should be investigated. Having considered, it should be taken: Because of comparison with "Who dwells in your monastery?" etc., a thullaccaya is stated because it is a synonym. The statement "Even if one says, 'I attain the cessation attainment,' or 'I am an attainer of it'," and the statement "If it occurs to him thus," etc., are the same in meaning, for he also speaks only to announce his own distinction. In "Who dwells in your monastery?" etc., because there is no "I"-statement, a synonym is fitting; but here, he indicates himself, saying, "I am an attainer of it"; therefore, it seems fitting to incur a pārājika. Some say, "The statement in the Mahāpaccariya, etc., does not include even one of the superhuman qualities; therefore, because it is stated by way of a synonym, it is not incurred." It should be very well examined. The reading should be taken starting from the word phalasacchikiriyā; in the realization of the fruits too, each one should be understood as a pārājika in terms of each fruit.

Abandonment of craving, etc., means only the abandonment of defilements, such as attachment. But that does not exist without the path. For abandonment of craving and aversion is by the third path, and of delusion by the fourth; therefore, it is a pārājika for one who says "Craving is abandoned by me," etc. Mind free from craving's hindrances, etc., means only the supramundane; therefore, it is a pārājika for one who says "My mind is free from craving's hindrances," etc. Because of the nature of non-decline: some are residents of the upper monasteries. Why is it not? Because it is stated in the matrix itself in the present-tense statement, "Thus I know, thus I see." If so, in the word-analysis passage, because it is stated with "I attained, I am attaining," etc., should it also be incurred for one who says "In the past existence, I was a sotāpanna?" No, because the meaning can be construed differently. How? It is stated to indicate that the present tense should be taken as undoubtedly occurring, not the past existence. The teachers say that the past existence is stated by way of synonym, thus "thullaccaya" is stated.

200. "Even if it is not, it is still a pārājika," it seems it is said based on an assumption of impossibility. He will say, "Thus the speech is threefold." It is not there: Because the former exists while the latter does not, although there is no difference in time in meaning between "I attained" and "I am attaining," there is certainly a difference in statement.

207. Ukkheṭito means frightened. Khiṭa means to frighten.

The explanation of the Suddhikavāra is finished.

Explanation of the Vattukāmavāra

Viññattipathe: in the place of understanding; therefore, it is said, "A bhikkhu who stands having transgressed the place of understanding, and knows having heard with the divine element of hearing, it is not a pārājika." He seems to have attained jhāna: here, if he knows, "This bhikkhu speaks thus with the intention of declaring his own qualities," it is a pārājika. If he knows otherwise? The teacher says that the shadow of a pārājika is not seen.

The explanation of the Vattukāmavāra is finished.

Explanation of the Anāpattibheda

Intention of non-deception: if there were an intention of deception, it would be only a dukkaṭa, according to others. It is said, "That should be taken by comparing it with the passage 'It is not possible for an ordinary person to tolerate it, āvuso.'"

The explanation of the Padabhājanīya is finished.

Explanation of the Vinītavatthu

225-6. In difficult houses, inclining desires, and objects of delight, some say "If there were an intention of deception, it would be a pārājika." But the reason is hard to see; it seems a thullaccaya is stated; it should be investigated. Even if he goes by vehicle or by psychic power, he does not incur a pārājika: it is fitting because the stipulation was made only in terms of going by foot. "Going without a beginning or end": It is said, "Like going holding each other's hand without abandoning the arm's reach." The teacher's thought is that even if one goes before or after in such joint movement as "Arise, come, let's go," he does not incur an offense. Of one who dwells: if he is seen by a lay follower while dwelling thus, it is a pārājika. It is said, "He who goes having dwelt for the night is not a pārājika." Nānāverajjakā: residents of various districts. Saṅghalābho: the portion accruing to oneself according to seniority.

228. Here: in the question asked with "What indeed?" etc. Dhammadhātu: the knowledge of omniscience.

232. Not in reverse order: he did not recall in the manner of a lion's gait. Therefore, it means he penetrates that there is only one birth consisting of an intermediate existence.

Conclusion

233. Twenty-four: here, those who killed their mother, killed their father, and killed an arahant incurred the third pārājika. If the defiler of a bhikkhuni and the four, such as Lambi, incurred only the first pārājika, then how are there twenty-four? No, because of not knowing the intention. For the four, such as the matricide, etc., are intended here as not yet ordained. Although the four, such as Lambi, are included by the first pārājika, because they are not those who engage in sexual intercourse in one way, they are stated separately. "As before, so after," is stated referring to only the impossibility of association thus stated: "One action, one recitation, equal training." Otherwise, there would be no designation, acknowledgement, or state of being a bhikkhu for them.

The explanation of the Fourth Pārājika is finished.

The explanation of the Pārājika Section is finished.

2. Saṅghādisesa Section

1. Explanation of the Sukkavissaṭṭhi Training Rule

235. "Okkamantāna" is the reading. Here he says: Why is the agent, "yo pana bhikkhu," not specified here? To show that this is without dependence on the abhi-prefixed term. How? Even when one intending with the intention of scratching, etc., attempting with the attempt of scratching, etc., attempting on the thighs, etc., with sexual desire, in the case of dukkaṭa objects, and attempting on wounds, etc., in the case of thullaccaya objects, even with emission of semen, it is not a saṅghādisesa. Only with dependence on the intention defined as the pleasure of release is there emission of semen with the attempt, not otherwise, because of the statement "There is no offense for one without the intention of release." Therefore, the agent is not specified here to show that meaning; otherwise, if the agent were specified with "yo pana bhikkhu sañcetanikaṃ sukkavissaṭṭhiṃ āpajjeyyā," there would be a contradiction with the statement that "He intends, does not attempt, and is released, there is no offense." Even when it is specified in the bhumma-form with "Other than in a dream, from intentional emission of semen," that very contradiction would arise. Therefore, without stating both expressions in order, it is stated, "Intentional emission of semen, other than in a dream." There, because of the absence of the bhumma-form in the instrumental sense, a restriction of the sense of cause is not made. If that is not done, this meaning should be understood as being shown: "Intentional emission of semen, other than in a dream, is a saṅghādisesa offense; without an attempt, there is no offense."

236-7. Sañcetanikā: here, the meaningfulness of the prefix is shown by the first analysis, and the ika suffix by the second. Because of difference in location of wind, bile, phlegm, blood, etc., is the meaning. Dhātu: here, it is written in the glossary "Pathavīdhātu, etc., are the four, or cakkhudhātu, etc., are the eighteen." Vatthisīsa: the head of the urethral sac. Some say, "The base of the genitals is intended, not the tip." Tathevā: he takes "from the stimulus, from the attempt," etc. Tato muccitvā: it is written in the glossary, "Not from the entire body; therefore, let it be only when it is separated from that place." If it does not accord with "When one has descended into a stream of water?" It is said that here, the descent into a stream of water is after that. Its meaning is: having made an attempt on the stimulus, having dislodged the semen from its place, then due to remorse, he intends to prevent descent into the stream of water. It is not possible to stop it when it comes out; nevertheless, even if he intends to stop it with the intention of stopping it, because he would not be able to stop it from going upwards from the stream of water in between, "or when it has not come out" is said. Why? For the commentary intention is that semen dislodged from its place will certainly descend into the stream of water, and it accords with the glossary intention. Tato muccitvā: from its own place. For it is only when it has come out from its own body, then the statement "whether it has come out or has not come out" would be contradictory. Because semen separated from that particular part of the body certainly descends into the stream of water, therefore it is said, "when one has descended into a stream of water," and by this he shows the time when the offense becomes apparent. What is said? From attempting on the stimulus with the pleasure of release, even if a great deal of semen separated from parts of the body remains stuck there and there, to the extent that a small fly might drink, to that extent, when one has descended into a stream of water, it is a saṅghādisesa offense. For it is said in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī (Kaṅkhā. Aṭṭha. Sukkavissaṭṭhisikkhāpadavaṇṇanā) "Even if he has not descended into a stream of water, it is a saṅghādisesa," etc. Not noticing the coming out of that amount, even if one describes with the perception of thullaccaya, saying "He intends, attempts, does not release, the offense is a thullaccaya," because of the statement, he is not released; and one should rise from the saṅghādisesa upon seeing semen-like urine or knowing it by the sliminess of what is inside the scrotal sac. This is the reasoning here according to the third elder's school. All the teachers are these three elders themselves; the descent into the stream of water for them too is the attempt on the stimulus; and this is the second definitive judgment generally here; thus Upatissatthera seems to say.

"The offense should be understood as arising only when it is dislodged from its place" is said. The offense arises only when it has descended into the stream of water. For the entire body is the place of semen, and unless it has descended, it is not called dislodged from its place; it should be investigated. Because the elder is an Abhidhamma expert, it is stated in the Kathāvatthuṭṭhakathā (kathā. aṭṭha. 307) that "emission of semen arises from lust," thus the possibility is that it arises from the mind; and it is seen arising from the season, too, because of the statement "He took some of that impure matter into his mouth, he inserted some into his genitals" (pārā. 503); and that is only of one without lust, because of the statement "This is impossible, monks, there is no occasion that impure matter should be emitted by an arahant" (mahāva. 353; kathā. 313). In the Parūpāhāraṭṭhakathā, because of the statement "There is a location for it," it is established that "there is a place of establishment for that semen, like for urine and feces" (kathā. aṭṭha. 309). Because it is unmixed, like naturally mind-arisen matter, and because of the emission, the teachers propose three places for semen: "the head of the urethral sac, the waist, the body." It should be regarded like snake venom, and there is no fixed place for venom; it occurs to one touching due to anger, so there is no fixed place for it; the thought is that it occurs to one attempting due to lust.

Khobhakaraṇapaccayo, namely, the condition of medicine, lodging, food, etc. Saṃsaggabhedatopīti, even with two or three of these. Pahīnavipallāsattāti, here, if whatever a learner (sekha) or ordinary person (puthujjana) sees in a dream is all distorted and untrue, then the statement, "Whatever one sees as a premonition is absolutely true," is contradicted. Therefore, it is not said in reference to the object (visaya). For, it could be true or false. If it were said in reference to that, it should be said, "Asekhas, having abandoned distortions, see only what is true, not what is false." But it is said in reference to the seeing (dassanaṃ). For that is untrue; even not seeing, one is as if seeing; even not hearing, one is as if hearing; even not thinking, one is as if thinking. "Even the truth he sees is not by reasoning (takkoti)," says the teacher. Taṃ rūpanimittādiārammaṇaṃ na hoti, it is said in reference to adventitious, presently arisen objects like the appearance of forms. For appearances of forms relating to karma-nimitta and gati-nimitta are objects of the bhavaṅga. Among these, karma-nimitta is past, while gati-nimitta may be present for a short time.

Īdisānīti, objects such as adventitious, presently arisen appearances of forms that have been previously experienced and conceived, and also those associated with passion, etc., is the meaning. Makkaṭassa niddā lahuparivattā hoti, a monkey's sleep is of light duration. For, fearing falling from a tree branch, it frequently opens its eyes and sleeps. Although humans repeatedly open their eyes and see as if very clearly awakened, even during dreams they have occurrences of bhavaṅga, like the recurrences of bhavaṅga for those who are awakened, which is why it is said that they "sleep." Because it is said that "one sleeps with bhavaṅga-citta," the recurrences of bhavaṅga are called "sleep" due to the dependence on the state of inactivity and stillness of the body. Due to the weakness of the body, even when there is arising from the bhavaṅga during dream seeing, it is also said to "continue" because of the attainment of a state of inactivity and stillness, which is why beings are not said to be "awakened." And because of the attainment of a state of inactivity and stillness of the body, the heart-base (hadayavatthu) on which it depends is not very clear, and therefore, the mental process dependent on it is like the light of a lamp dependent on an unclear wick. Therefore, in the Aṭṭhakathā it is said: "Because this is a weak base, it is unable to draw the rebirth-linking consciousness."

In the Gaṇṭhipada, it is written: "Because of the weak base, even the sign that appears in a dream is weak." That is, all signs are manifold, and the consciousness is not weak because of the weak object-base, but the mental process is weak because it is directed towards past or future objects, or because of the not-weakness of the concept (paññatti), the weakness of the objectless is not appropriate, because of the great strength inherent in the development of the objectless. For the mind, endowed with the power of development, even though formless, can take even a very heavy body and transport it to the Brahma world in a single moment of consciousness. Similarly, even a mundane (kāmāvacara) mind that is not so endowed can make the body capable of leaping in the air, let alone other things. What is the reason for this inference, by which it can be known that it is the power of the mind, or from seeing the accomplishment of special activities such as the acquisition of repeated association through the power of the mind? Therefore, "because of the weak base" means because of the weak heart-base, according to the teacher's reasoning. If the heart-base, by its dull or sharp nature, were capable of producing a dull or sharp state of the mind dependent on it, it would be a sense faculty like the eye, ear, etc., but it is not a sense faculty. Because in the Dhammasaṅgaha, in the section on upādā-rūpa, it is not included among those worthy of mention. Because it is not a sense faculty (indriya), it is not mentioned immediately after the body-sense faculty (kāyindriya); and because it is an object-form (vatthurūpa), it is not mentioned immediately after the objectless life-faculty (jīvitindriya). Therefore, if it is said that "because of its unclearness, the mental process dependent on it is also unclear," then is that not established? It is indeed established, because from the combination of conditions such as suitable and unsuitable seasons, food, etc., which are not sense faculties, variations in the mental process are seen, and it is directly experienced. Since one who is not awakened thinks of himself as if awakened. To this extent, the specific mode of inactivity and stillness of the body is called sleep (niddā). That occurs with a specific mode of the mind's emergence from the bhavaṅga, and a being endowed with that, having emerged from the bhavaṅga, sees a dream; such a one is called "overcome by monkey-sleep (kapimiddhapareto)"; such a sleeping one is not awakened; this meaning is thus established.

"yadi tāva sutto passati, abhidhammavirodho āpajjatī"tiādi vuttaṃ. Because one is not called awakened (paṭibuddho) at the moment of sleep (niddākkhaṇe), therefore "atha paṭibuddho passati, vinayavirodho"tiādi vuttaṃ, it is said, "then if he sees while awakened, there is a conflict with the Vinaya." And because there is one who is not free from sleep (akhīṇaniddo) and has not emerged from the bhavaṅga (anotiṇṇabhavaṅgo), therefore "kapimiddhapareto passatī"ti it is said, "he sees overcome by monkey-sleep". Otherwise, this one would be neither asleep nor awakened, and would not have entered into that sleep. To this extent, the Abhidhamma, the Vinaya, the words of Nāgasena Thera, and reasoning, all are mutually consistent. There, kapimiddhaparetoti means overcome by sleep, having emerged from the bhavaṅga. For here, that is called monkey-sleep (kapimiddhaṃ). "What is middha? That which is unfitness and unworkability of the body...pe... sleep; this is called middha (sloth)," (dha. sa. 1163) thus it comes. This is formless; the unfitness of the body, which is the result of this, and also the specific sleep that is unstable, is called "monkey-sleep" by transference of the cause. And that which is said, "It is when overcome by monkey-sleep (kapimiddhapareto), O Great King, that one sees a dream," (mi. pa. 5.3.5 thokaṃ visadisaṃ) is somewhat different.

Yaṃ taṃ āpattivuṭṭhānanti, the action of Vinaya by which there is rising up (vuṭṭhānaṃ) from that, that here is called rising up from an offense (āpattivuṭṭhānaṃ). Avayave samūhavohārena vāti, here, the example is that one who cuts a branch is said to cut a tree. The example of the name conventionally used (ruḷhīsaddassa) is the aggregates of feeling, etc. Na ca mayāti, it is said in reference to the action of that word of investigation (vīmaṃsanapada), and in reference to the conclusion in the releasing (mocane), and because of the nature of releasing (muccanapakatiyā).

240.Gehanti, the five strands of sense pleasure. Vanabhaṅgiyanti, a gift. Through the pleasurable feeling associated with it, it is desire (rāga) that is called "enjoyment (assādo)". Supantassa cāti, this is said in reference to one who is sleeping without interrupting the stream of bhavaṅga, like one overcome by monkey-sleep; it should be investigated. Jagganatthāyāti, for the purpose of purifying.

266.They say that "even in the contemplation of the sexual organs of images made of wood, pottery, plaster, or paint, there is a dukkata." They write that "when lust arises, it is born of the act of releasing (mocanarāgajo)." Like in "the desire for an elephant is destroyed by the sand," here, everywhere, the reading is "you are an offense (āpatti tva)." Because it comes as "Come, dear novice (sāmaṇera), hold my sexual organ," it seems appropriate to say "verbal action (vacīkamma)" also. In this case, if there is an offense even by ordering another, "do it thus," it would be mixed up. Therefore, some say that it should not be taken as stated.

267.It seems that there are two kinds of "flower garlands: those with and without intoxicants (sāsavaḷiya)."

The Commentary on the Training Rule on Emission of Semen is Finished.

2. Commentary on the Training Rule on Bodily Contact

270.By "entered into (otiṇṇo)," his intention of association is shown. By "with a changed mind (vipariṇatena cittena), with a woman," his effort is shown. For the word "with (saddhi)" indicates union (saṃyogaṃ), and that application (payogo) is meeting (samāgamo), clinging (allīyanaṃ). With what kind of mind? With a changed mind, not with the intention of receiving a bowl, etc., is the meaning. By "should engage in bodily contact (kāyasaṃsaggaṃ samāpajjeyyā)," the perception of contact from his effort is shown. For one who, having made an effort, perceives contact, is said to engage. Thus, his accomplishment of three factors is shown. Or else, otiṇṇo, he has entered. By what? By a changed mind, as if possessed by a yakkha, etc. Or this is an instrumental case in the sense of use. He has entered, with a changed mind, as if possessed into a well, etc. Or else, having approached the state of a monk with the intention that "I will emerge from lust," therefore otiṇṇo, he has entered into that same lust, with the changed mind as the cause. With a woman who has come near to him, or who has been approached by him. By this, whether the woman is passionate or dispassionate, that is immaterial here; there is no need for both to be passionate, as in the bodily contact with nuns.

Kāyasaṃsagganti, the union of two bodies. In the Padabhājana, however, it is said, "samāpajjeyyāti engaging (ajjhācāro) is said," that is in reference to engaging (samāpajjanaṃ), not bodily contact. For the engaging in bodily contact is called "engaging (ajjhācāro)". In the Aṭṭhakathā, however, it is said, "that which is called bodily contact, is in reality engaging (ajjhācāro)", that contradicts the characteristic stated later in the Pāḷi: "intending to associate (sevanādhippāyo), but does not make an effort with the body, and does not perceive contact, there is no offense," (pārā. 279). For contact is indicated by the perceiving of contact. If that is engaging, how can there be no offense? This is well said, but by extracting the phrase "should engage in bodily contact (kāyasaṃsaggaṃ samāpajjeyyā)" and saying "engaging (ajjhācāro) is said," since both phrases are open to a general interpretation, it may be said that "that is in reality engaging" because of the absence of engaging due to the absence of what should be engaged in.

In the Aṭṭhakathā: "Even touching what is not attached with something like hair, or touching what is attached or not attached, he incurs a saṅghādisesa," (pārā. aṭṭha. 2.274). Therefore, even the hairs, etc., that are not attached should be understood as being part of the body. Even so, if it is said that this contradicts the Pāḷi and Aṭṭhakathā method, "because he perceives contact, it is a saṅghādisesa with the accomplishment of three factors. Because of not perceiving contact, it is a dukkata with the accomplishment of two factors,"? No, it is because of not understanding its meaning. For even one who perceives the state of being touched is said to perceive contact; this is one meaning. Therefore, the approval (sādiyanaṃ) of the state of being touched of the hairs, etc., that are included in the bodies of the woman and himself, having touched them, is said to perceive contact, not merely by the arising of body-consciousness (kāyaviññāṇa). For here, body-consciousness is uncertain (anekantikaṃ). If, when the attached body of a woman or the unattached body is touched by the attached body of a monk, and he has a clear body-sense faculty, then body-consciousness arises for him; therefore, he is said to perceive contact. If the body is unattached, desirous, or the body-sense faculty is unclear, or if the body is afflicted by a blinding wind, body-consciousness does not arise for him. And he is not said to perceive contact; merely by intending to associate, having made an effort with the body, while engaging in bodily contact, he is said to perceive contact with mind-consciousness (manoviññāṇa); therefore it is said, "by 'should engage in bodily contact (kāyasaṃsaggaṃ samāpajjeyyāti),' the perception of contact from his effort is shown." Another monk, having been touched by something connected with the body of a woman, or by something that requires forfeiture, he perceives contact by generating body-consciousness; therefore it is said, "body-consciousness is uncertain here (anekantikaṃ)". Another, covering a sleeping woman with a robe, lightly touching the upper part of the robe with the desire for bodily contact, even though not perceiving the touch of the hairs that have emerged through the cloth, intending to associate, having made an effort with the body, is said to perceive contact, he incurs a saṅghādisesa. For it is said, "Intending to touch the skin (nīlaṃ ghaṭṭessāmi), he touches the body, he incurs a saṅghādisesa." This is the second meaning. Thus, because of the manifold meanings, and because of the intention that is difficult to understand, in the Mātikāṭṭhakathā, the perceiving of contact is not stated as a factor. For, if that were stated, this situation would exist: a monk, having incurred a saṅghādisesa, if contact with a nail or hair is seen, and he might think, "I did not experience body-consciousness by the touching of the hair, and being with a body numbed by a blinding wind, I do not perceive contact," he might be under the perception of being innocent (anāpannasaññī); therefore it is not stated. Moreover, showing the method stated in the Aṭṭhakathā for these phrases, "he perceives contact, and he does not perceive contact," he should be informed (paññāpetabbo). To this extent, the reason for not understanding its meaning has been elaborated.

Commentary on the Padabhājanīya

271. Though it is generally said that "Rattaṃ cittaṃ imasmiṃ atthe adhippetaṃ vipariṇata" (a mind that is excited, intending in this matter, changed), in the Vinītavatthu, because it is said, "mātuyā mātupemena āmasati…pe… āpatti dukkaṭassā" (he touches his mother with motherly affection... an offense of wrong-doing), it should be understood as excited only by bodily contact with lust. Similarly, though it is stated non-specifically that "mātugāmo nāma manussitthī" (a woman is a human female), only a human female with intact faculties is intended here, because it is stated, "matitthiyā kāyasaṃsaggaṃ samāpajji…pe… āpatti thullaccayassā" (he engaged in bodily contact with a dead female... an offense of serious misconduct). Even though "Manussitthī" (human female) is sufficient, the statement "na yakkhī na petī na tiracchānagatā" (not a yakkha female, not a ghost female, not an animal) means that not every female with intact faculties and a human form is a human female here. This is said to show that yakkha females and others, transforming through their own innate power of accomplishment, can also take human form. Among these, a yakkha female is a serious misconduct case, because serious misconduct is stated in the Vinītavatthu with bodily contact of a yakkha female. Consistent with that, a ghost female and a deva female are also serious misconduct cases. An animal female is a wrong-doing case. Some say that a human-formed animal female is also a serious misconduct case. In the Vibhaṅga, however, because there is no passage stating "manussitthī ca hoti manussitthisaññī" (she is a human female, and he perceives her as a human female), if there were a statement like "itthī ca hoti yakkhisaññī" (she is a female, and he perceives her as a yakkha female), it would lead to the untenability of yakkha females, and if yakkha females etc. were included in "itthī ca hoti itthisaññī" (she is a female, and he perceives her as a female), it would lead to their being Saṅghādisesa cases, so yakkha females etc. are not stated, it should be understood. Some, however, say, "In the Vinītavatthu, ‘aññataro bhikkhu tiracchānagatitthiyā kāya…pe… dukkaṭassā’ti (a certain bhikkhu with an animal female... an offense of wrong-doing) here refers to a natural animal female not in human form, therefore wrong-doing is stated. In the instances of ‘itthī ca hoti tiracchānagatasaññīti tiracchānagatā ca hoti itthisaññī’ti (she is a female, and he perceives her as an animal; she is an animal, and he perceives her as a female) etc., only a natural animal is intended, and that is only an animal male. Therefore, like the instances connected to human males in the training rules on obscene speech, enticing, and mediating, instances connected to animals do not appear either." Thus they say. Similarly, here, paṇḍaka means only a human paṇḍaka, and purisa also means only a human male, so an inhuman female, an inhuman paṇḍaka, an inhuman male, an animal female, an animal paṇḍaka, and human, inhuman, and animal ubhatobyañjanakas, these eight types of individuals do not appear here. The distinction in offenses based on differences in the object and perception, the calculation of instances that do not appear, should be understood without confusion, as well as their mixed instances, and the distinction between offense and non-offense. "Among these, an inhuman paṇḍaka, an inhuman male, an animal female, and an animal paṇḍaka are four wrong-doing cases; an inhuman female and a human ubhatobyañjanaka are serious misconduct cases; an inhuman ubhatobyañjanaka and an animal ubhatobyañjanaka are wrong-doing cases." In the Pāḷi, however, because an inhuman female does not appear, an inhuman paṇḍaka and ubhatobyañjanaka males do not appear. Animal females, paṇḍakas, and ubhatobyañjanakas do not appear because they have the same status as animal males, and a human ubhatobyañjanaka does not appear because he has the same status as a human paṇḍaka. In the Aṭṭhakathā (pārā. aṭṭha. 2.281), however, because it is stated that "even with a nāga maiden, a supaṇṇa maiden, a kinnarī, or a cow, it is only wrong-doing," that should be taken as the authority.

Because it is stated in the Aṭṭhakathā, an animal in human form is distinct from a natural animal, and because the human forms of yakkhas, pretas, and animals are specified separately here as "for an animal, there is only the arising of suffering, moreover it is only wrong-doing," and because of the statement specifying the offense in "patanarūpaṃ pamāṇaṃ, na maraṇarūpa" (the appearance of falling is the criterion, not the appearance of death), and because of the general statement "ubhato avassute yakkhassa vā petassa vā paṇḍakassa vā tiracchānagatamanussaviggahassa vā adhakkhakaṃ ubbhajāṇumaṇḍalaṃ kāyena kāyaṃ āmasati, āpatti thullaccayassā" (when both are discharging, touching the area above the kneecap with the body of a yakkha, a preta, a paṇḍaka, or an animal in human form, an offense of serious misconduct) (pāci. 661), it is established that it is distinct. Because of the distinction, there is a difference in "samāpajjantassā" (engaging) with an animal female in human form, therefore there should be a distinction in the offense there. If an animal female in human form is also intended in the training rule on bodily contact, due to the impossibility of perception being distorted by the similarity in form in the training rules on obscene speech, enticing, and mediating, that should also be stated, but that does not appear. If it is because the instances are summarized by form, that does not appear? Because it appears here as "itthī ca hoti tiracchānagato ca ubhinnaṃ itthisaññīti" (she is a female, he is an animal, perceiving both as female), the masculine gender designation is not fitting, therefore an animal male also appears here, even though an animal female in human form does not appear in the Pāḷi, it is only wrong-doing because it is stated in the Aṭṭhakathā, the reason for this statement should be sought, is the intention. This is not fitting. Why? Because when females and males are stated together, the masculine gender is present. Here, animal males, paṇḍakas, and females, all three are combined and stated as "tiracchānagato" (an animal).

It is stated in the Mātikāṭṭhakathā. Therefore, those instances appear to be summarized. And there is a distinction for a paṇḍaka, a male, and an animal, if he perceives her as a female, even so, wrong-doing is stated there, therefore what is stated in the Aṭṭhakathā is the authority, between these two views, whichever has additional reasoning or cause, that should be considered and taken, says Āricayo. In such places, one should speak after thorough consideration.

The calculation of instances that appear in the Pāḷi should be understood briefly as follows: Five instances based on females, and five each based on paṇḍakas, males, and animals, twenty instances are single-based, likewise twenty are double-based, and twenty are mixed-based, sixty instances, these are three twenties. Taking one single-based instance in each twenty, three instances related to body-to-body are stated. The remaining fifty-seven instances are summarized, similarly three instances of body-to-body are stated in body-related, the rest are summarized, similarly in the instance of body-to-body related to body-to-body, in the instance of body related to nissaggiya, in the instance of body-to-body related to nissaggiya, and in the instance of nissaggiya related to nissaggiya, three instances each are stated, the rest are summarized. Thus, based on six triads, eighteen instances are stated explicitly, the remaining three hundred and forty-two instances are summarized. Thereafter, by increasing each one in the case of lust towards a mother-figure, the eighteen instances previously stated are now twenty-one instances that appear explicitly, and three hundred and ninety-nine instances are summarized. After that, two sets of four that clarify offense and non-offense appear, four based on intention of association and four based on intention of release.

Parāmasanaṃ means touching. If "Chupanaṃ" (kissing) were stated, it should be understood that parāmasanaṃ would also become a separate single entity. In this first instance of "Itthī ca hoti itthisaññī ca" (she is a female, and he perceives her as a female), all twelve, including touching, are shown by applying them. After that, the first two terms, four terms appear, the others should be understood as summarized. In nissaggiya-body-related etc., however, due to complete unavailability, only touching appears, not the others. "Sañcopeti haratī" (He incites and carries away) is the reading, sañcopeti ca. In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, it is written as "purimanayenevā (just like before) in surrounding with ropes, cloths, etc.," and later, "purimanayenevā (just like before) there is massaging," and "because the offense is prescribed in taking hold of a vein, Saṅghādisesa even in touching a hair," and "to reveal that, upādinnakena hī (by the undertaken) etc. is stated."

Yathāniddiṭṭhaniddese (in the definition as specified) means in the definition exactly as specified. When it is said, "Sadisaṃ aggahesī" (he took something similar), it means he took something like that, making it heavy there, or it means in the Vibhaṅga of bodily contact. The other is also body-related kissing. Gahaṇe cā (and in taking) means taking. Virāgite (in one without passion) means in one without aversion. Sāratta (lustful) means excited with bodily contact lust, intending by oneself, is the meaning. "Mātubhaginiādivirattaṃ gaṇhissāmī" (I will take one without passion, such as a mother's sister), he took without passion, taking with affection for a relative, here wrong-doing is fitting. "Kāyasaṃsaggarāgaṃ vā sārattaṃ gaṇhissāmī" (I will take bodily contact lust or lustful), he took his mother without passion, he took without intention. Here, according to the view of Mahāsumatthera, serious misconduct, "kāyaṃ gaṇhissāmī" (I will take the body) means he takes what is body-related, serious misconduct is obtained. "Itthī ca hoti itthisaññī sāratto ca, bhikkhu ca naṃ itthiyā kāyena kāyaṃ āmasati, āpatti saṅghādisesassā" (she is a female, and he perceives her as a female and is lustful, and the bhikkhu touches her body with his body, an offense of Saṅghādisesa) (pārā. 273), therefore Saṅghādisesa also appears. "Virattaṃ gaṇhissāmī" (I will take one without passion), he takes lustful, even here Saṅghādisesa appears, because of the statement "nīlaṃ ghaṭṭessāmī'ti kāyaṃ ghaṭṭeti, saṅghādiseso" (I will rub blue, he rubs the body, Saṅghādisesa). Here, however, "anugaṇṭhipade (in the sub-commentary) the reason is stated as "na pubbabhāge kāyasaṃsaggarāgattā" (not because of bodily contact lust in the preliminary part). Some, however, say, "fearing a heavy offense, while trying to 'rub only blue,' he rubs the body, because in the preliminary part, it occurred to him to 'rub what is body-related,' there should be wrong-doing." Dhammasiritthero says, "in such a case, it is Saṅghādisesa." "In the case of a female ubhatobyañjanaka with a female and a male ubhatobyañjanaka with a male, the distinction in offenses is as stated; even when the female characteristic is hidden, the offense is based only on femaleness," they say.

Vinītavatthu Explanation

281. Tiṇaṇḍupaka means to be made by taking roots of hiriverā etc. Tālapaṇṇamuddika (a finger-ring made of palm leaf), with that, a container made of palm leaf, a waist cord, ear ornaments, etc., all are not suitable, it is established. Residents of Tambapaṇṇi do not touch a written female form, or a waist cloth, it is said. Ākarato muttamatto. Ratanamisso (mixed with jewels) means made for decoration, intertwined with golden vines, etc. Suvaṇṇena saddhiṃ yojetvā pacitvā (joining with gold and cooking) means cooking by putting in molten gold. Bījato (from a seed) from the beginning of ore and rock. Thero na kappatī (it is not allowable for the Elder) because it is said, "tumhākaṃ pesita" (sent by you). It is allowable if it is said, "Cetiyassa pūjaṃ karotha" (make an offering to the shrine), it is said. Bubbuḷakaṃ means a star. Ārakūṭaloha (brass) is also within the category of gold.

In the Andhakaṭṭhakathā –

"Brass is just like gold, it conforms to gold, it is not to be touched."

Even a portion of what is stated in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā is allowed, therefore the intention should be known and distinguished there.

The Explanation of the Training Rule on Bodily Contact is finished.

3. Explanation of the Training Rule on Obscene Speech

283. In the third section, there are twelve vārā (occurrences): three saṅghādisesa vārā, three thullaccaya vārā, three dukkaṭa vārā, and three kāyapaṭibaddha vārā, which appear in their entirety. Among them, the three saṅghādisesa vārā are mentioned in the second sikkhāpada, and it should be understood that each vāra has a single root among the thirty (tiṇṇaṃ vīsatikānaṃ ekekamūlā vārāti). Therefore, here fifty vārā are condensed in detail (visesāti paṇṇāsa vārā saṃkhittā honti), otherwise, if a woman exists and he (the monk) is doubtful and lustful, and the monk alludes to the woman's birth canal or urinary passage, and speaks in praise...pe... the offense is thullaccaya. If a woman exists and he perceives her as a paṇḍaka or a tiracchānagata, and he is lustful, and the monk alludes to the woman's birth canal or urinary passage, and speaks in praise or insults, the offense is thullaccaya. If a paṇḍaka exists and he perceives him as a paṇḍaka and is lustful, and the monk alludes to the paṇḍaka's birth canal and speaks in praise, the offense is thullaccaya, and so on, the situations of offense would become situations of non-offense, but they do not become so. To indicate that there is a dukkaṭa offense when perceiving a paṇḍaka as a woman, it was stated that "if a woman and a paṇḍaka, to both of whom he perceives as a woman, the offense is saṅghādisesa or dukkaṭa." Therefore, it is already stated that "to a paṇḍaka, if he perceives him as a paṇḍaka, the offense is thullaccaya." Therefore, it should be understood that in all the condensed vāras, thullaccaya in the thullaccaya situations, and dukkaṭa in the dukkaṭa situations, are already stated. Similarly, in the thullaccaya context, by the method beginning with "if a woman exists and he is doubtful and lustful, and the monk alludes to the woman's adhakkhakaṃ or ubbhajāṇumaṇḍalaṃ, setting aside the birth canal or urinary passage...pe... the offense is thullaccaya," they should be extracted as appropriate. Similarly, by the method beginning with "if a woman exists and he is doubtful and lustful, and the monk alludes to something connected to the woman's body and speaks in praise...pe... the offense is dukkaṭa," the kāyapaṭibaddha vārā should be extracted as appropriate. Although the three kāyappaṭibaddhavārā are available, like the three nissaggiyavārā, they are not extracted due to the absence of specific offenses. However, in the three kāyappaṭibaddhavārā, due to the already mentioned method, those vārā and the ones in accordance with them should be extracted as well. In all cases, immature young girls who are not viññū, elderly women, the insane, and so on, are not intended, let alone natural tiracchānagata females, and similarly, paṇḍakas and so on should be understood. The rest should be understood in the same way as stated in the second section.

Explanation of the Word Analysis

285. In the manner already stated: means "in bodily contact with the characteristics of a woman" (kāyasaṃsagge itthilakkhaṇenā), as it is written. It is said that "itthilakkhaṇenā" is the reading of the Great Commentary (mahāaṭṭhakathāpāṭho). Does not come to the head: means it is not an insult (akkosanaṃ na hoti), but it does occur when it is connected (ghaṭite pana hoti). Here there is a distinction: with these three, saṅghādisesa occurs only when they are connected because the utterance is specific to the birth canal and urinary passage, or because it is very vulgar, but not with the other eight, beginning with animittāsīti. Here, alohitāsi, dhuvalohitāsi, dhuvacoḷāsi, paggharaṇīsi, itthipaṇḍakāsi, vepurisikāsīti, these six are not specific utterances for the passages, and the two terms animittāsi and nimittamattāsīti are also not very vulgar; therefore, the eight terms "do not generate saṅghādisesa," as they are stated, therefore those are thullaccaya matters. Some say they are dukkaṭa matters because they are merely insults, like in the paribbājaka vatthu. The terms itthipaṇḍakāsi and vepurisikāsīti alone, which indicate the distinction in the entire bodily structure, do not generate pure saṅghādisesa because they are general to the entire body, while the others do generate it because they are not general. For they indicate only the urinary passage, like the term sikharaṇī-pada. Ubhatobyañjanāsī however, is a mixed utterance with a non-saṅghādisesa matter related to the male organ. For a male ubhatobyañjanaka, the female organ is concealed, and the male organ is apparent. If that too generates it, then how do the terms beginning with animittāsīti not generate saṅghādisesa, some ask? That is not fitting. Because it is an appellation for even the male organ, and because the characteristic of the mātikā "with sexual intercourse, there is saṅghādisesa" is stated, with sexual intercourse, if she recognizes the allusion, there is saṅghādisesa, and if she does not recognize it, there is thullaccaya; with the other allusions, if she recognizes it, there is thullaccaya, and if she does not recognize it, there is dukkaṭa, some say. Everything should be thoroughly investigated and grasped.

287. Laughing: If she to whom he speaks recognizes the allusion, there is saṅghādisesa.

Vinīta Vatthu Commentary

289. Paṭivuttaṃ nāmā is the reading. The word no is additional. Some say "it also occurs with written words," that should be accepted if it aligns with the immediate process of mental advertence.

The Commentary on the Duṭṭhullavācā Sikkhāpada is Concluded.

4. Attakāmapāricariya Sikkhāpada Commentary

290. In the fourth, three saṅghādisesa vārā have come, the remaining fifty-seven vārā are condensed into the categories of thullaccaya and dukkaṭa offenses, and it should be understood that none of the others are extracted here because they are impossible. The order of remaining connections should be understood in the manner already stated. Nagaraparikkhārehi: With the city's surroundings, such as ramparts and moats. Setaparikkhāro: White adornment, meaning moral adornment (sīlālaṅkāro). Cakkavīriyo: The wheel of effort. Vasalaṃ duggandha: He says referring to the genital organ, and referring to that very thing, it is said "what is bad for me, what is foul for me?"

291. Santike: Where he stands and informs. "In the first violation, if he connects it in terms of Pāli, it is kāmahetupāricariyā." Sesaṃ: The term 'intention' (adhippāyo) is a verbal expression due to the absence of meaning. In the second, the terms kāmahetu in terms of Pāli are verbal expressions due to the absence of meaning there. Thus, the four terms are connected based on the two violations, some say that."

295. In these sikkhāpadas, if there is transgression due to lustful desire for sexual intercourse, there is no offense of saṅghādisesa. Therefore, "what, bhante, is the foremost gift? Sexual intercourse" is said only for the purpose of describing sexual intercourse, and it should be understood that it is not said with the intention of sexual intercourse or for that purpose. In describing the service of lustful desire for another monk, there is a dukkaṭa offense. There is also a dukkaṭa offense with indirect speech, "give the foremost gift to the one who lives in your monastery." "He should describe the service of lustful desire. One like me is virtuous," some say. If all five factors are present, there is saṅghādisesa, some say. It should be investigated and grasped. In the Gaṇṭhipada, however, "in these two sikkhāpadas, like in bodily contact with women, thullaccaya is mentioned for lustful speech" some say. "It does not appear in the Aṭṭhakathās," it is written. "A ubhatobyañjanaka, however, is like one who follows the ways of a paṇḍaka," some say.

The Commentary on the Attakāmapāricariya Sikkhāpada is Concluded.

5. Sañcaritta Sikkhāpada Commentary

297. Ahamhi duggatā: I am impoverished. Ahaṃ khvayyo: Here, ayyo is a plural form.

298. Oyācantī: Lowering themselves, they beg the gods. Āyācantī: Raising themselves, they beg with respect. Maṇḍito: Adorned with ornaments and so on. Pasādhito: Embellished with arrangements of hair and so on. Some say "there is a dukkaṭa in making adornments."

Padabhājanīya Commentary

303. Meaning, existing together with the paridaṇḍa. Chandavāsinī means "the loved one dwells with the loved one," this is the Pāḷi, the intention is she makes the man dwell. "The loved one makes the loved one dwell" is the Aṭṭhakathā.

Taṃ kiriyaṃ sampādessatī: Meaning, if she definitely informs, she does inform. If she informs both parents, it is saṅghādisesa, in the Vinaya decision, "the case should be examined" is stated. And in the case, "Udāyitthero informed the courtesan" is stated. That is useless, because the Aṭṭhakathā states, "there is no ambiguity even in speaking to the mother and so on." Taṃ paneta: This is the teacher's statement. Māturakkhitaṃ brūhī: When the one sent goes and speaks to the one protected by the parents, even though that particular one is protected by the mother, there is still ambiguity, why? "When one speaks to another of those protected by the father and so on, there is ambiguity" is stated, otherwise, the word ādi (etc.) would be meaningless. By connecting one decade with the other decade, in the manner previously stated in the case of ejaculation, it should be understood that the mother sends one protected by the mother to her daughter's presence.

338. Anabhinanditvā: Is merely uttering the words, even if he rejoices, as long as he does not announce the message, it is not called "investigated." Sāsanārocanakāle: At the moment of announcing the message of the messenger. Tatiyapade vuttanayenā: Meaning, with the completion of one factor, there is a dukkaṭa offense. Vatthugaṇanāya saṅghādiseso: It is said that it is saṅghādisesa by counting both cases.

339. Catutthe anāpattī: Here, "he receives but does not investigate, does not return, there is no offense," like in this case, "while going he does not accomplish, while coming he deceives," it is said to show that there could also be a non-offense Pāḷi. In some books, "it exists" is also stated.

Vinīta Vatthu Commentary

341. Alaṃvacanīyā: Not to be spoken to, alaṃ-word is used for prevention. Therapitā vadatī: Meaning the elderly father speaks. Although here "a woman is a human woman, not a yakkha, not a petī, not a tiracchānagatā, a man is a human man, not a yakkha," and so on are not present, nevertheless, it is evident here also that a woman is a human woman, since the determination of a woman as a "human woman" has been made in bodily contact and so on. Because of being a preliminary part of sexual intercourse, a human ubhatobyañjanaka is a matter of thullaccaya, the remaining human paṇḍaka, ubhatobyañjanaka, tiracchānagata men, and so on, are matters of dukkaṭa only, because the element of the false conduct message occurs. However, the vārā should be extracted as appropriate. Like not knowing the ordinance, not knowing being alaṃvacanīyā should also be understood as unintentional. Duṭṭhullādīsupī: It is already stated "even in this." "There is no sañcaritta even for one who brings a letter and announces a reply, for one who does not know the state of sañcaritta," some say. It should be investigated and grasped.

The Commentary on the Sañcaritta Sikkhāpada is Concluded.

6. Kuṭikāra Sikkhāpada Commentary

342. Yācanā: Exhortation, "give, give." Viññattī: Informing that we have no need for this. "He asks for handwork, equipment, or money," he asks, it is not allowable. It is allowable to obtain it for lodging, light, conversation, and so on, some say. Anajjhāvutthaka: Without an owner. Na āhaṭaṃ paribhuñjitabbaṃ: "There is a dukkaṭa for informing about soup and rice" is stated. "Although it is stated for those capable of large items," nevertheless, that which is small in terms of object but great in terms of value, such as haritāla and hiṅgulika, it is not allowable to ask for," some say.

344. So kirā: That ascetic. Then he understood, tadajjhagamā.

348-9. It is not possible to do by requesting, therefore, the intention is to use implements acquired by requesting oneself. The wording agrees, not the meaning. Why? Because here it is intended by both, showing that, he said "because, moreover" etc. In the manner stated here: in the manner stated in this sikkhāpada analysis. From the statement "by the knowledgeable one," it should be practiced by the one doing it, and from the statement "he causes others to finish it," by the one having it done. Both of these are the doer and the one who causes to do. The wording might be reversed: for the wording "by the one having it done" is reversed when "by the one doing it" is said, because it is not its meaning. For there isn't such a thing as one who has it done. "In the manner stated here": by the method based on the object taught. In such a case, if it is said that from the statement 'whether by one doing it or by one having it done,' even by one doing it, the matter should be declared as undone by others, then, for the purpose of explaining that meaning, "if however, he said" etc.' is stated in the Anugaṇṭhipada. It is stated based on the statement, "while building a hut with indication." Because the 'or' -word indicating विकल्पत्थ (vikalpattha?) is taken without saying "in length and in breadth," even if it is increased in one part only, there is an offense. A bed with proper measure is said to be nine spans. "The statement 'four hatthas in breadth' includes the statement 'or three hatthas across', because the concluding statement 'where it is with proper measure' etc. is impossible," it is said. Even if it is less than the measure: even if it is four or five hatthas in breadth, without exceeding the stated measure in length, the object taught is just the stated measure. For doing an unstated object is an offense. Because it is stated that he might build a hut exceeding the measure, he would build a hut exceeding the measure. "Thambhatulā" is the reading. By the method of proclamation: here, they say, "it is also suitable in the Tamil language."

353. Cārabhūmi: pasture. Not taken: not forbidden. In the Commentary: "a prison for a reason, or a place for not doing, a dhammagandhikā, a gandhikā for cutting off hands and feet," is written. With two oxen: because it is said that it is not possible to open it from the lower end because it is a cut vat, it should be understood that the conclusion is stated for the purpose of revealing the meaning. Pācina: the foundation of the object. For the sake of that: for the sake of carving. Even a leaf hut: only a hut plastered and smeared, covered with leaves. Therefore, it is stated "with walls and roof," it seems that everything un-smeared is suitable. Having first placed a little, then increasing it again. In that: placed in the door frame or the window. Just at the first: here, it seems that Dhammasiri Thera means just at the time of the offering. Upatissa Thera means, it seems, at the time of placing. Because the plaster was not applied by the former, and it was done with the tip of the rod by the latter, there is no offense for either. If it is done by command, there is an offense for both from the statement "he does or has it done" if there is a purpose for oneself, and if not, for the one who is in the original place. If the lower measure is possible, the teacher's reasoning is that there is an offense of dukkaṭa and saṅghādisesa for the one building a hut entirely of clay.

354. Thirty-six tetrads are namely the tetrad of unstated object, the tetrad of stated object, the tetrad of exceeding measure, the tetrad of proper measure, the tetrad of unstated object exceeding measure, the tetrad of stated object with proper measure, these are six tetrads, and similarly in the series beginning with samādisati, there are thirty-six in the five. For the purpose of showing the difference in offenses: here, because it is stated without distinction "if, bhikkhu, there is undertaking in the object without circumambulation...pe... saṅghādisesa" in the Mātikā, even in undertaking and non-circumambulation there is a saṅghādisesa, therefore, the intention is that the difference in offenses is shown for the avoidance of wrong grasping, therefore, they are stated. If it is asked, why, without saying so in the Vibhaṅga, is the object of dukkaṭa stated in the Mātikā? Bhikkhus should be brought near by the declaration of the object, by those bhikkhus the object should be declared. What kind? Without undertaking and with circumambulation, not the other, because in the other it has come in the manner of benefit, "if, bhikkhu, there is undertaking in the object without circumambulation" etc. Because there is an object that is with undertaking, and there is one without undertaking, there is one with circumambulation, and there is one without circumambulation, there is one with undertaking and circumambulation, there is one with undertaking and without circumambulation, there is one without undertaking and with circumambulation, there is one without undertaking and without circumambulation, thus because the object is of many kinds, it is stated that the object should be declared as without undertaking and with circumambulation, not the other. But what is the purpose of this declaration? It is for the means of avoiding the cause of declaring a grave offense. For by the declaration of the object, the state of undertaking which is the cause of generating affliction in laypeople by an un-declared declaration and which is the cause of suffering for oneself and suffering for others, these are avoided by means of the declaration of the object. For a bhikkhu does not declare an object with undertaking which is a cause of affliction for laypeople or for the purpose of building an unallowable hut. This has already been established first that they declare an object for the purpose of building a hut. Mixed offenses: mixed offenses of dukkaṭa and saṅghādisesa.

355. There, instead of saying "with two saṅghādisesas," it is stated with the explicitness of the inflection, and with the explicitness of the number, "of two saṅghādisesas". "Āpatti dvinnaṃ saṅghādisesānaṃ" is also a reading.

364. Does not fit: because of the absence of roofing and plaster, there is no offense, that is established later. It is said that being plastered and smeared is stated with reference to the roof only. Saying "a chicken-coop is suitable," and then showing that by the method beginning with "roofing with rods" etc., only a hut covered with grass and leaves is stated. There, having tied the roof with rods lengthwise and crosswise like a net, to cover with grass or leaves, the state of being plastered etc. is stated with reference to the roof only, thus this is fitting. Therefore, "there is an offense for the one who increases a wall made of clay and makes it fitted with plastering, smearing or both on top of the wall, even without wall plaster," is written. "'And that is stated with reference to the roof only': is stated mainly, the lower part is not rejected," they say, it should be considered. Here: in the grass hut. As commanded: the intention is as said in the stated manner. In the statement "there is an offense of dukkaṭas for three builders" etc., that group of six hearings is also obtained. Because it is commanded in both ways, there is no offense for the commander. For the one commanded, there is dukkaṭa because of the reason of not doing as commanded by the commander. If he also makes a purpose for himself, saying "I will also live here," it is a saṅghādisesa. "Build a hut": in a place stated without distinction, there is also a saṅghādisesa for the commander because the sikkhāpada is un-intended.

I will also live: here, because of the absence of someone else intended, there is an offense only because it is restricted "for the one who is doing," there is no offense because it is undivided. And it is written that "here, only the mere knowledge of the enactment is intention." But in the Anugaṇṭhipada, here in I will also live: he who desires "may it be a dwelling for me," there is an offense for him. But he who desires a uposatha hall, there is no offense for him, therefore, after saying "both agree," and because of the statement "one should stand by the grave in the Vinaya decision," if it is asked whether the other should be said later than the Mahāpaccarivāda? No, because of strength. From the statement, "having established a dwelling, everywhere, there is no offense," because of doing this for the sake of the dining hall etc., mixtures have arisen. Just as - two or three do "we will live together," in a place like there, he protects. Even if it is divided and done "this place will be a dwelling, this place will be a uposatha hall," there is an offense only. In the two, the Mahāpaccarivāda is strong, therefore, it is excessively elaborated by "said later" etc. What is the point of that. Other tetrads should also be shown by connecting as possible by the method "he finishes what is undone by himself and by others," etc., although there is no offense of saṅghādisesa in shelters etc., if there is an un-declared declaration, there is an offense only because of that cause.

The commentary on the Kuṭikāra Sikkhāpada is finished.

7. Vihārakāra Sikkhāpada Commentary

366. In the seventh, the eva-word should be understood as for emphasis.

The commentary on the Vihārakāra Sikkhāpada is finished.

8. The First Duṭṭhadosa Sikkhāpada Commentary

380. To be attained by a disciple: is stated with reference to an ordinary disciple, not a chief disciple. In accordance with the supporting condition and in accordance with the individual, "three knowledges" etc. are stated. By some disciple three knowledges, by some four analytical knowledges, by some six special knowledges, by some only nine supramundane dhammas, thus it should be understood that they are stated separately as possible.

382. From the statement "those bhikkhus who are Suttāntikas" etc., it is established that even while the Blessed One was existing, there was a division of the three piṭakas. Dhammakathikā: Ābhidhammikās. The fixing of their delight in animal talk by venerable Dabba such as "they will be cut off from delight" etc., appears like that, it should not be seen like that. Avoiding an obstacle to the comfortable dwelling of those Suttāntikas etc. from association with the Suttāntikas etc., a dwelling without delight for them too due to the absence of delight in animal talk, and from that a falling away from their own asceticism, he considered thus, it should be seen. "The nature of the created": they say, only of those created by disciples, not by Buddhas. "The most effective is the instrument," thus stated, the meaning is that the third inflection is in the sense of instrument.

383-4. Ya: by which. "Doer": it is written "doer, not doer." The accusation of the one saying "she commits adultery with me like a wife" is strong. Then: here, just as in the case of the regretful one at the mere touching, because of the arising of lust from bodily contact, he enacted a saṅghādisesa without asking, so too it should be understood that it is stated knowing his previous state of immorality. If then, having destroyed by a true admission, the elder is a doer. But if by an untrue one, the Blessed One should not have said "destroy," and he said, therefore it is said "if then, having destroyed by an admission, the elder is a doer."

But if without admission: having destroyed by considering her natural state of immorality even without this admission "I was corrupted by the venerable," the elder is not a doer. The Abhayagiri residents also, after stating their sutta, say "in your view, the elder is a doer." Why? Because there is dukkaṭa due to false speech and because the removing of the sign is not to be destroyed. For only of a pārājika is the removing of the sign to be destroyed. And because it is said "destroy," only a pārājika has arisen, what is that considering, therefore, the elder commits an offense. But if it is said "destroy by one's own admission," the intention is that even a non-pārājika can be destroyed by one's own word. The Mahāvihāra residents also, after stating their sutta, say "in your view, the elder is a doer." Why? Because if it is said "destroy by one's own admission," the truthfulness of the admission arises from the statement "destroy." For only by a truthful admission should it be destroyed, not by an untrue one, is the intention. In the former method: in the dukkaṭa view. The former should be understood as proceeding by way of reasoning, the latter as proceeding by way of the Pāḷi statement.

385-6.Pītisukhehīti: Here, where it should have said "sukhena (with happiness)," the mention of pīti (joy) is to exclude the happiness of the third jhāna and physical happiness; it is stated with associated pīti. If it is done based on accusation, it is called baseless; he should say, "He did not commit [the offense], he did not do it." These ones will do it; therefore, the reading is "thinking that he has seen such, he accuses." The reading, "In this way, also the suspected based on hearing and thought should be understood in detail" [should be noted]. "By one of the four": This is stated by taking what came up in the pātimokkha recitation itself; the teacher does not consider that even if he is not stirring up with one of the others, it is still a saṅghādisesa offense. Because of the capacity to remove from the state of a bhikkhu. Because of the statement, "standing nearby," the accusation or instigation to accuse does not reach the head of one who accuses facing away. If he accuses or instigates to accuse based on what is seen, heard, or suspected, or if what is heard or suspected is accused or instigated to be accused based on what is seen, etc., it does reach the head, because of accusing with something baseless. This was stated: "For one who sees, while committing an offense entailing expulsion, if he accuses, saying, 'I heard…' up to… 'of a saṅghādisesa offense' (pārā. 387)." "A person is impure, having committed a certain offense entailing expulsion, and if, being of impure view, he speaks intending to expel him without giving an opportunity, there is an offense of wrong-doing. If he speaks intending to expel him after giving an opportunity, there is no offense" (pārā. 389). This seems not to agree with that; how? One who sees, while committing an offense entailing expulsion, is called an impure person; "being of impure view regarding a certain [person], if he accuses, saying, 'You have committed an offense entailing expulsion, I heard,' there is an offense of saṅghādisesa for each utterance," according to the former method, there is an offense. "He speaks intending to expel him, there is an offense of wrong-doing," according to the latter method, there is an offense of saṅghādisesa; these two textual methods seem to contradict each other, but Buddhas do not speak contradictory things; therefore, a justification should be sought here. The Aṭṭhakathā teachers say this much: "There is no offense for one who accuses based on something factual or based on perception of something factual, but there is an offense for one who accuses based on something baseless or based on perception of something baseless." Its meaning is: there is no offense for one who accuses based on a factual basis of seeing, hearing, or suspicion, or even based on something baseless, [but] based on perception of something factual; there is an offense for one who accuses based on something baseless due to the absence of seeing, etc., as a basis, or even based on something factual, [but] based on perception of something baseless; therefore, for one who sees, while committing

an offense entailing expulsion, etc., even if he accuses based on something factual with a basis of seeing, [but] saying, "I heard," based on perception of something baseless, there is an offense of saṅghādisesa. To reveal its meaning, the turns beginning with "doubtful in what is seen" are to be understood as stated.

However, in "a person is impure," etc., because he accuses based on something factual, based on perception of something factual, there is no offense. Just so, those turns were stated to illuminate its meaning. There, the turns beginning with "for one who does not see" are stated to show that there is an offense for one who accuses based on something baseless. With "doubtful in what is seen," etc., they are stated to show that there is an offense for one who accuses based on perception of something baseless. Otherwise, the turns "for one who sees, doubtful in what is seen," etc., would be indistinguishable. This is the conclusion here: just as there is a wrong-doing for one who accuses an impure person without giving an opportunity, and there is a wrong-doing for one whose intention is abuse with speech of contempt, so too, even one of impure view accuses an impure [person], one of impure view accuses based on something baseless; there is an offense. If he accuses based on something factual, there is no offense; that conclusion should be taken as according with this: "there is no offense for one who is pure [accusing] one of impure view, or for one of impure view [accusing] one of impure view." Otherwise, a justification should be sought.

Sīlasampanno: Here, "the word of an immoral person is unreliable. A bhikkhunī does not have power over a bhikkhu; therefore, the Elder stated it in regard to the rule in the 'raising up' method. The second Elder [stated that even if] a bhikkhunī accuses without knowing, or trainees, etc., accuse, the bhikkhus themselves, having heard them, investigate and make him act according to his admission. What fault is there here? This was stated regarding this. The third [Elder stated that even if] bhikkhus hear the words of sectarians, they themselves investigate; therefore, no one does not obtain [the opportunity]; thus, everything agrees," some say. Tiṃsāni: Thirty [days] having. Anuyogo: A reply. Ehitī: Will come. Diṭṭhasantānenā: By the method of seeing, the intention is: by the manner of seeing. Patiṭṭhāyā: Having obtained a basis. Ṭhāne: In a shameful place.

Gāhaṃ: The seizing of self-appropriation, thinking, "I will accuse." Cetanā: The intention of seizing self-appropriation. Vohāro: Knowing from here and there and making it known. Paṇṇattī: Name-concept. That which is cognized by the mind-door consciousness that arises immediately after the stream of consciousness of the ear-door, which has a sound of speech as its object, by the previously perceived convention; because of its being cognized, its meaning, whether the ultimate meaning or the non-ultimate meaning, is cognized by the mind-consciousness that arises for the third time; that which is expressed in Pali by six expressions beginning with name, that is shown by the teachers in six ways beginning with "existing concept, non-existing concept," etc. Being a part of that and not being a part of that is suitable only for a fully realized phenomenon, not for a concept, because it is the object to be adjudicated and because it occurs in the adjudication; the object of adjudication is like a couch in the adjudication site; like the use of "couch" in the phrase "on the couch." "Pariyāyena": There is no baseless name-concept. [It is] merely a mode of expression; it does not exist in reality. It is merely a designation; there is no designatum," is also written. Idheva: In this training rule itself. Na sabbattha: Not in disputes, adjudications, etc. Why? Na hī, etc. Just as there is the existence of disputes, adjudications, etc., there is no baseless adjudication. Pubbe vuttasamathehī: The intention is: by the settlements stated earlier, "the settlements that occur concerning something." Moreover, sabhāvato natthī: It is said because it does not have a nature that has been obtained. Like consciousness, etc., not arisen. Na hi vivādādīnaṃ paṇṇatti adhikaraṇaṭṭho: Settlements do not occur concerning a concept; therefore, it is not the object of adjudication; thus, the intention is: the concept of disputes, etc., is not the object of adjudication. There is this here:

"If the offense of expulsion were baseless,
The path, fruit, and Dhamma would be mere concepts;
The fourth basis of expulsion,
Would be mere concepts in just the same way.

"Then the path, fruit, and other phenomena, in two ways,
Would be the same as past and future;
The six concepts would not exist then,
Or from that, it is said to be a conventional expression."

Anuvadantī: They abuse. Kiccayatā: Being something to be done. If [asked] what that is? Apalokanakamma, etc. Kiccaṃ: It seems that the mind that gives rise to the intimation is intended.

387.Sutādīnaṃ abhāvena amūlakattaṃ: Here, the one who, even having seen, is unable to say "you were seen by me," says "you were heard by me" simply because of his own fixed view of what he has seen. Because of his impure view in that, there is an offense; here, however, this is said regarding the one who, having previously heard, did not incur an offense, and later, having forgotten that, speaks while being of pure view. "This method [applies] everywhere," some say. The chief bhikkhu [is like] the reverse of a crow-egg. Yadaggenā: As far as, or when. No kappetī, etc.: It shows that this is stated only to indicate the absence of doubt. By that, it is not proper that only one who is doubtful, and therefore forgetful, incurs an offense, because of being immediately after that; therefore, the second Elder's statement is stated later.

389.Sabbatthā: In all the Aṭṭhakathās. Okāsakammaṃ: The making of opportunity. "Action with opportunity is okāsakamma," is written. Just as in "a maiden does not see the sun," it becomes "the maiden does not see the sun," so too, when it is said "having caused no opportunity," it becomes "not having caused an opportunity."

The Explanation of the First Training Rule on False Accusation is Finished.

9. The Explanation of the Second Training Rule on False Accusation

391.Veḷuvaneyeva: This is stated in reference to the time stated by them. "Previously, friends, we spoke based on hearing," this is stated in reference to the statement "it was encouraged by us, being angry, displeased," etc. Aññabhāgassa idaṃ: This adjudication of the goat species belongs to a different state from the state of human bhikkhus, the state of an animal, a goat. Aññabhāgo vā assa atthī: Or, does that different state, reckoned as the state of an animal, a goat, exist for that goat? That goat itself is called an adjudication belonging to a different state.

Nāmakaraṇasaññāya ādhāro: Here, name itself is naming. The perception of those who name is name-perception; for that. The human species is the basis of the goat species by name. The intention is: that name is not without a basis, like a tortoise's hair. However, that named thing of the goat is called "country." Therefore, even another thing sticks or clings to the Elder with something baseless, etc., by mere expression, not in reality; the intention is: a little bit clings, this is a trace. Because traces of countries are essentially different due to not being inferior, therefore, having extracted "taking a mere trace of a certain country," it should be understood that "ten traces, birth-trace," etc., were stated. Just as in the origin, so too, in the formulation of the training rule and in the summary, this same meaning [applies]. Because of aññabhāgiyassa adhikaraṇassa: Of the goat. Kañcidesaṃ lesamattaṃ upādāyā: Taking the name "thing," this meaning has become manifest only by the power of the arising of the event; therefore, it is not divided. Moreover, because of being unfixed. Just as for the inhabitants of Mettiya's land, the goat itself is not an adjudication belonging to a different state for all of them. There is also a cow, a buffalo, etc.; and just as the inhabitants of Mettiya's land do not all take only a mere trace of a name. They also take another thing, such as a birth-trace, etc.; therefore, because of being unfixed and because it is not divided in the way stated. Moreover, when it is stated thus, the state of belonging to a different state is possible only for the goat, not for another, by which only that is shown. And a trace is only a trace, not a birth, etc., by which only that is shown; thus, because of the implication of wrongly grasping, it is not divided thus.

393. Aññabhāgiyassā means belonging to someone other than the accused. Adhikaraṇassā means one should state whether it pertains to a human, a non-human, or a subhuman being. For, when stated thus, the jāti, lesa, etc., apply specifically to humans, etc.; otherwise, they would apply to all four adhikaraṇas, since the statement "a mere trace of a point of the case" is mentioned as preliminary. But shouldn't it be so? No, because, like a name, jāti, etc., invariably serve as a basis for humans, etc., implying an invariable adhikaraṇa status. And, if it is invariable, jāti is the basis for jāti, liṅga for liṅga, the offender is the basis for the offense, and the owner is the basis even for robes and bowls that are unaccepted or not given away, which would lead to them being counted as an adhikaraṇa. Therefore, the word "adhikaraṇassa" should not be divided and thus should not be extracted; it should be extracted. Therefore, everything, beginning with "adhikaraṇa"nti vacanasāmaññato" should be stated. Apākaṭā because there is no place shown elsewhere. Jānitabbā ca vinayadharehi Since otherwise, in the Parivāra, when asked "why?" in a future instance in the manner of "vivādādhikaraṇaṃ catunnaṃ adhikaraṇānaṃ vivādādhikaraṇaṃ bhajati," the reason would not be apparent; therefore, vinayadharas should know both their tabbhāgiyatā and aññabhāgiyatā. For, when those are known, vivādādhikaraṇaṃ adheres to vivādādhikaraṇaṃ. Why? Because of its tabbhāgiyatā. The other does not adhere because of aññabhāgiyatā; thus, they become apparent due to ease, therefore, starting with vacanasāmaññato laddhaṃ adhikaraṇaṃ nissāyā. Here, since āpattaññabhāgiyaṃ is a vast subject and its description is dissimilar to the others, even though it is included in adhikaraṇapariyāpanna, it is stated separately as "āpattaññabhāgiyaṃ vā hotī". And because it is included in adhikaraṇapariyāpannattā, it should be understood as stated in "adhikaraṇaññabhāgiyaṃ vā." There too, due to its vastness and being present in the Mātikā, aññabhāgiyatā is stated first, and tabbhāgiyatā later. Here, since it is established by implication through the statement adhikaraṇaññabhāgiya. Adhikaraṇaṃ tabbhāgiyaṃ, therefore, instead of making a statement like "adhikaraṇaṃ tabbhāgiyaṃ hotī," the instruction is given in the form of a question: "kathaṃ adhikaraṇaṃ adhikaraṇassa tabbhāgiyaṃ hotī". There too, although the aññabhāgiyatā of āpattādhikaraṇa is stated in terms of pārājika because of the authority on not being eradicated by pārājika, it should also be understood in terms of the remaining āpattikkhandhas. And that accusation, such as "asuko nāma bhikkhu saṅghādisesaṃ ajjhāpajjanto diṭṭho hotī," is stated in the Vinaya due to unfamiliarity or similarity of the respective object. In all cases, "pārājikadiṭṭhi hotī" is not stated. Due to non-offense for one with such perception. "Tabbhāgiyavicāraṇāya" in the statement of tabbhāgiya, it is stated because even aññabhāgiyatā is indicated.

Vatthusabhāgatāyāti means similarity in the object of accusation. Otherwise, the statement "catasso vipattiyo" would be contradictory. Sabhāvasarikkhāsarikkhato cāti due to similarity and dissimilarity in nature. There, even with jhānādi objects being dissimilar, the uttarimanussadhamma pārājika āpatti is tabbhāgiya to that itself due to sabhāvasarikkhatā. Similarly, anuvādādhikaraṇaṃ and kiccādhikaraṇaṃ are each said to be of four types, but aññabhāgiyaṃ has not arisen; therefore, because tabbhāgiyatā is established through inference upon knowing tadaññabhāgiyatā, it is fitting to say "aññabhāgiyameva paṭhamaṃ niddiṭṭha". Ekaṃsena tabbhāgiyaṃ na hotīti due to the possibility of vivādādhikaraṇaṃ being aññabhāgiya because of the state of being unstated due to the presence of dispute whether arahathood is an offense or not an offense, based on the similarity, pāḷiyaṃ it is stated thus because āpattādhikaraṇaṃ is mentioned, ādito paṭṭhāyāti starting from "aññabhāgiyassa adhikaraṇassā". "Methunarāgena manussaviggaho dosenātiādinā sarikkhato cā" is written. That is established by vatthuvisabhāgatā itself. But this, even when there is vatthusabhāgatā, āpattisabhāgatā is similar, thus it is not appropriate, because there is a difference in offense in even one object, says ācariyo. It should be understood according to the method stated later, this is the connection.

Kammalakkhaṇanti means the nature of the kammas. Taṃ nissāyāti indeed, the Saṅgha performs the kamma having previously arranged it. Alternatively, purimaṃ purimaṃ means it is said because abbhāna, osāraṇa, etc., arise depending on parivāsa, ukkhepaniya, etc., Saṅghakammāni. Therefore, although Saṅghakamma itself is kiccādhikaraṇaṃ, it shows that further distinctions can be obtained.

394. In meaning, it is one; therefore, it seems that after stating the meaning of the location, "leso" etc., is stated.

395. Savatthukaṃ katvāti having attributed it to the individual, aññabhāgiyatā based on being a khattiya, etc., of one jāti or based on seeing, hearing, or suspecting long, short, black, white, etc., one accuses based on jātilesa, due to the basis being established by the designation of short, etc., khattiya seeing one engaging with a long khattiya, or seeing one engaging with one khattiya, one accuses using jātilesa, taking a khattiya that is distinct and aññabhāga from that, "a khattiya is seen, you are a khattiya," due to aññabhāga of sight, etc. Here, "long, etc., and sight, etc., are the basis of jāti, nāma, etc., therefore, adhikaraṇa" is written. That does not overcome the fault stated as "adhikaraṇabhāvāniyamato," in the Aṭṭhakathā, "adhikaraṇatā should also be understood as based on the basis of khattiyajātipaññatti." That too, is not universally applicable because there is no nāma for anyone other than nāmagotta for another nāmagottapaññatti; therefore, the extraction of the word "adhikaraṇassa" is for the purpose of showing the four adhikaraṇas, that is for the purpose of showing the samānavacana, thus it is not appropriate. There dīghādino vā diṭṭhādino vāti dīghāditā and diṭṭhāditā are aññabhāgo, the accused is different from the other, from which it is called añña.

399. Lahukaṃ āpattinti a minor offense is saṅghādisesa, etc., which is lighter than pārājika. Therefore, at the end, "bhikkhu saṅghādisesaṃ ajjhāpajjanto diṭṭho hotī," etc., is stated to show that. If one asks why āpattilesa is not elaborated like jātilesādayo, it should be understood that it is because it is not possible that way.

400. Sāṭakapatto sarīraṭṭhapatto. Āpattiyāti aññabhāgiyaṃ to pārājikāpatti is saṅghādisesa, etc., and the adhikaraṇa is by the āpattipaññatti. Because "leso nāma āpattibhāgo" is stated, āpattibhāvaleso is said to be stated, therefore, accusation taking the āpattibhāvalesa of the āpattinikāya of saṅghādisesa, etc., which has attained the designation of "adhikaraṇa" due to being the basis of āpattipaññatti, which is aññabhāgiya to pārājikāpatti, should be understood as āpattilesacodanā.

408. Anāpatti tathāsaññī codeti vā codāpeti vāti only in āpattaññabhāgiyacodanā, not elsewhere. To this extent, it is compared to the investigation stated for the first duṭṭhadose, how does that become apparent here? From the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇiyāvacana. For it is stated that "there and here also, there is no offense for one with such perception in āpattaññabhāgiyacodanā."

Aññābhāgiyasikkhaṃ yo, neva sikkhati yuttito.

Gacche vinayaviññūhi, aññabhāgiyatañca Soti.

Dutiyaduṭṭhadosasikkhāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.